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Located at the intersection of philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of 
biology, this thesis aims to provide a novel approach to understanding the strong 
continuity between life and mind. This thesis applies the Free Energy Framework, 
predictive processing and the conceptual apparatus from ecological psychology to 
reveal different manners in which the organizational processes and principles 
underlying life have been enriched so as to result in cognitive processes. By using 
these anticipatory cognitive frameworks this thesis unveils different forms of 
cognition at work in surprising places and considers how such expressions of 
cognition are ultimately driven by various forms of environmental complexity. 
Importing the concepts of affordances, environmental information and perceptual 
medium from ecological psychology into predictive processing and the Free 
Energy Framework, an empirically grounded account of cognition as an 
anticipatory process that allows living systems to adapt to various degrees of 
uncertainty in their environments at distinct and yet overlapping timescales is 
argued for. In doing so, this thesis attempts to identify both the explanatory limits 
of ecological coupling accounts of perception and action, and the possible 
environmental conditions under which the predictive brain evolved from its 
decentralized non-neural predecessors as a solution to uncertainty. In contributing 
to a novel approach to constraining the mind, the various concepts deployed in 
both philosophy and cognitive science are sharpened, furthering the current 
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“Nevertheless, the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great 




The continuity between the cognitive faculties of ‘higher’ animals (e.g., apes, 
monkeys, canines, etc.) and those of human animals is something that most 
cognitive scientists today would not find contentious. However, one thing that 
remains unclear and certainly debateable is the point(s) at which mind (a term 
which will be henceforth interchangeably used with “cognition”) begins to emerge 
in the evolutionary history of living systems and just how far ‘downwards’ the 
continuity of mind reaches in describing the capacities of lesser complex 
organisms. Although any current answer to this question will be somewhat 
speculative in nature, there are certainly better and worse speculative answers that 
can be arrived at. This thesis does not aim to provide any final say on the question 
but aims less ambitiously to provide a systematic manner of thinking about 
continuity of life and mind. More specifically, the primary question which this thesis 
addresses is:   
 
What kind of insights do the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing 
and ecological psychological collectively offer about the strong continuity of 
life and mind?  
 
 x 
To understand the nature of this question, let us proceed by looking at a series of 
more general questions and establishing some provisional characterizations of life 
and mind over the course of this introduction. The hope is that analysing these 
more general questions and laying down provisional manners of thinking about 
“life” and “cognition” will lead us back to the primary question with a better 
understanding of what it is asking and what is at stake.  
 
The aim of this introduction is to provide a tour of the theories and theoretical 
frameworks that will be deployed throughout the thesis in investigating the relation 
between life and mind. A few caveats however before proceeding. This thesis is 
naturalist in its approach to doing philosophy. Rather than leaning on a priori 
conceptual analysis, the central manner in which the primary question will be 
investigated throughout will be supported with evidence from scientific disciplines 
– especially biology and cognitive science. This is not to downplay the importance 
that sharpening concepts will play in this thesis, but it is to say that it is empirically 
and scientifically informed conceptual analysis that will drive this investigation into 
strong life-mind continuity. With this in mind, it should be noted that the provisional 
characterizations provided below are not meant to be definitions in the sense of 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions. They are merely useful 
characterizations that will be deployed as starting points in the investigation of the 
primary question and other questions which may fall out of it. Over the course of 
this thesis these characterizations will be sharpened and revised in light of both 
the empirical evidence considered and the insights provided by the frameworks 








0.1 Life-mind continuity  
 
 
How is life related to mind? One general manner of answering this question, the 
manner that is central to this thesis, takes the form of what has been called the 
life-mind continuity thesis (LMC) (Godfrey-Smith, 1996). LMC in its least 
controversial form suggests only that cognition requires life. In other words, 
wherever there is mind, there is life and yet the converse is not true. In contrast to 
this position, a stronger interpretation of LMC suggests that cognition is an 
enriched version of the same organizational principles constitutive of life. These 
two versions of LMC have been referred to respectively as the “weak continuity 
thesis” and the “strong continuity thesis” (Godfrey-Smith, 1996). Let’s consider 
them in a little more detail. 
 
If the weak continuity thesis is true, then cognition at base turns out to be a kind of 
biological process.1 However, there is no commitment to the existence of (or 
specifications of) underlying principles or properties which life and cognition share. 
Weak continuity is something which sits well with our intuitions and folk concepts 
of cognition and life. Humans, along with some other animals engage in cognitively 
driven behaviour but rocks don’t. One possible source of the intuitive force behind 
weak continuity may be based upon the fact that most of the agents that we 
uncontroversially recognize as cognizers and interact with on a day to day basis 
are living.2 Another motivation in favour of weak continuity arises when thinking 
 
 
1 This is interesting at least for two reasons. Firstly, it goes against a dominant theoretical current 
in the history of AI and computational modelling, a current that sees cognitive systems as 
something which may be investigated entirely independently from living systems. Secondly, weak 
continuity challenges the somewhat orthodox notion of multiple realizability (i.e., that mental 
states and processes may be instantiated in a multiplicity of different physical structures) that 
accompanies functionalism in the philosophy of mind (see Godfrey-Smith (1996,2002). Cognition, 
if weak continuity is true, may require very particular (biological) substrates to be in place in order 
to be realized.  
2 Although current cognitive robotics has recreated particular aspects of cognitive systems, that 
they have recreated full blown cognitive systems that are able to perform more than highly 
simplified tasks in well-defined (non-natural) environments is a more tendentious claim. 
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about what it is that cognition does for those living things that deploy it. For 
example, if cognition is understood as a toolkit of various capacities, the evolution 
of which occurred as a result of the various fitness related benefits that such 
capacities bestowed on living things (Godfrey-Smith, 1996), then weak continuity 
falls out of this evolutionary understanding of what cognition does (more will be 
said about this functionalist view of cognition below in Section 0.1. Amongst the 
proponents of weak continuity have been most notably John Dewey (1929) and 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996,2002).  
 
In contrast, strong continuity is more than the claim that life is necessary for 
cognition. It is stronger than the weak continuity thesis in that it specifies (although 
abstractly) how life and mind are related: cognition is an enrichment of 
organizational principles and properties definitive of life. The process of cognition 
somehow outstrips the process of living and yet both are governed by (and thus 
related by) the same organizational principle(s). Hence, life and cognition may be 
understood to be different in form but not different in kind or, in other words, “mind 
is literally life-like” (Godfrey-Smith, 1994, p. 83). Amongst the notable proponents 
of strong continuity have been Aristotle (1907), Herbert Spencer (1885), and 
Charles Darwin (1871). Both weak and strong continuity leave the possibility open 
that life and mind, although not identical (numerically or otherwise) might very well 
be co-emerging processes (i.e., where there is life there is mind and where there 
is mind there is life). Let it be stressed, however, as I am interpreting strong 
continuity, it is not built into the definition that life entails mind; rather, strong 
continuity makes the claim that cognition builds upon life without taking a stand on 
whether or not the process of life which cognition builds upon is imbued with 
properties specific to cognition. As such, it is consistent with strong continuity to 
hold that perhaps most life is minded and that which is not fails to instantiate those 
enriched patterns of organization specific to cognition.  
 
What might motivate the strong continuity thesis? One straightforward motivation 
may come from considering the homeostatic resilience of living organisms. Being 
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alive implies being able to return to a limited range of homeostatic states (e.g., 
metabolic-related, temperature-related, osmotic-related, etc.) and all living 
organisms are equipped with various manners of avoiding their own systemic 
dissipation via homeostatic regulatory mechanisms (allostatic change, enabling 
the return of homeostasis). Under the assumption that various cognitive capacities 
have evolved because they allowed living systems to cope with selective pressures 
in their surrounds (Godfrey-Smith, 1996), and given that homeostatic regulatory 
mechanisms are the most minimal conditions for coping with selective pressures 
(deprive any organism of the continued functioning of regulatory mechanisms and 
you soon deprive it of life), then one might reason that cognitive capacities are 
enriched versions of living processes because they are enriched versions of such 
regulatory mechanisms. The thought is that because such homeostatic regulatory 
mechanisms were already in place, rather than having to ‘start from scratch’, 
evolution by natural selection could enlist and improve upon these mechanisms, 
providing a manner for living systems to respond effectively to the dynamic 
pressures of their environments. Importantly, with enriched regulatory 
mechanisms such living systems could branch out environmentally, slowly coming 
to occupy and create new niches with different forms of selection pressures that 
their continuously evolving specialisations were adapted to.  
 
It is with this kind of rationale that some theorists have argued that these 
homeostatically enriched specialisations may have minimally taken the form 
“meta-metabolic functions” (Moreno & Etxeberria, 2005) before reaching the status 
of cognition. Such meta-metabolic functions are characterized by fast and flexible 
metabolically decoupled internal dynamics which play the role of exerting 
(behavioural) control over slower environmentally coupled metabolic-based 
processes. Importantly, metabolically decoupled internal dynamics support flexible 
adaptive coping with the environment in ways that ultimately bring about the 
conditions for continued metabolic functioning. Thus, meta-metabolic functions are 
“meta” in the sense that they regulate metabolic regulatory systems. While some 
theorists have postulated that such meta-metabolic functioning required the 
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evolution of nervous systems before getting a foothold (Moreno & Etxeberria, 
2005) others have argued that nervous systems were merely an augmentation of 
regulatory capacities that were already in place in non-neuronal organisms (van 
Duijn, Keijzer & Franken, 2006; Lyon, 2006; Bitbol & Luigi, 2004). Both of these 
manners of arguing for where meta-metabolic functions arise may be seen as 
representative of the strong life-mind continuity thesis in virtue of their identifying 
empirically defensible manners in which the enrichment of homeostatic regulatory 
mechanisms could have resulted in bona fide cognitive processes (a rough and 
ready working characterization of cognition will be provided below).   
 
Lastly, there is an even stronger interpretation of the LMC. The entailment thesis 
states that where there is life, there is mind (and the converse also being the 
case).3 In contrast to  both weak and strong life-mind continuity which hold that life 
is necessary for mind, the entailment thesis holds that life is both necessary and 
sufficient for mind. If entailment is true, then life and mind are co-emerging 
processes and complex modes of mind and life build upon lesser complex modes 
of the same. In other words, unlike strong continuity which sees the role of 
enrichment as an “adding to” the processes fundamental to life, entailment sees 
enrichment as an “adding to” cognitive (and life) processes from the start to arrive 
at ever more complex modes of cognitive (and life) processes. Notable proponents 
of the entailment thesis have included Hans Jonas (1966) and Maturana & Varela, 
(1980). 
 
The entailment thesis is often motivated by autopoetic theory (Maturana & Varela, 
1980), which holds that all living systems––from bodily cells to blue whales––are 
autopoetic systems. Broadly, autopoetic systems are those which both adaptively 
respond to their environmental dynamics and continue to actively produce 
 
 
3 Autopoietic theories of mind and life have used “strong life-mind continuity” and/or the “deep 
continuity of life and mind” to refer to what I am here calling the entailment thesis. See section 2.0 
of chapter 1 for an example. For readings of the strong life-mind continuity thesis that are 
consistent with the manner in which I will continue to use it see Stillwaggon (2005) and Wheeler 
(2011). 
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themselves and their systemic boundaries (Maturana & Varela, (1980). Cognition 
includes in its most minimal sense what is called “sense-making” (i.e., norm and 
significance driven behaviour) (see Thompson, 2011, p. 42). For example, certain 
features of a bacterium’s milieu (e.g., glucose gradients) are valuable as food 
insofar as a bacterium is a glucose metabolizing organism that can climb glucose 
gradients. It is in virtue of their active sense-making that living systems have a 
significance-laden perspective on the world, and having this perspective, the 
thought goes, means that even the simplest living systems’ active exchanges are 
cognitively driven.4  As such, autopoetic theorists reason from the claims that all 
living systems are autopoetic systems and that all autopoetic systems are 
inherently cognitive (i.e., sense makers) to the conclusion that all living systems 
are inherently cognitive. 
 
This thesis will be primarily concerned with investigating strong life-mind 
continuity.5 Its truth will be taken as an assumption – it will not be directly argued 
for. Over the course of this thesis we will see that the kinds of explanatory 
frameworks associated with strong continuity turn out to have surprising 
applications, and to be able to deal with more kinds of cognitive phenomena than 
we might have thought. Thus, while I do not directly argue for strong continuity, 
this thesis still does work in making it a plausible position. Given that strong 
continuity implies weak continuity (Godfrey-Smith, 1996) this thesis will investigate 
the weak life-mind continuity only indirectly. Strong continuity may be thought of 
as a determinate of determinable weak continuity. Similarly, the entailment thesis, 
something which this thesis will be concerned with only marginally, may be thought 
of as a determinate of determinable strong continuity. Thus, when asking about 
 
 
4 Importantly, sense-making need not entail the kind of intentionality that is distinctive of human 
cognition (whatever that may be). 
5 This being said, if this thesis succeeds in deploying the Free-energy Framework, predictive 
processing and ecological psychology to help clarify strong life-mind continuity, then it might 
indeed make strong life-mind continuity a more tenable thesis. 
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the relationship between life and mind, there are at least three ways of interpreting 
LMC (see Figure 1).6  
 
 
                                        
Figure 1 







6 I write “at least three” here to make conceptual space for a fourth interpretation of LMC that 
allows for the possibility that mind needn’t require life, but mind is necessary for life. This kind of 
position would be one that stands in direct opposition to weak continuity which sees life as a 





0.2 Characterizations of life and mind 
 
 
Of course, whether or not any given agent qualifies as being alive and/or a cognizer 
is dependent upon how we understand the concepts of life and cognition. 
Currently, there is however little to no consensus in philosophy, biology or cognitive 
science as to how to define either cognition or life; some theorists even going so 
far as to doubt the fruitfulness of defining cognition or life to scientific practice (see 
Bich & Green, 2018 for a case against defining life; see Allen, 2017 for a case 
against defining cognition). While acknowledging there is controversy here, this 
thesis will use the following initial characterizations of life and cognition as place 
holders (not definitions!) in order to approach the question as to how life is related 
to cognition.7  
 
A provisional characterization of life may take the following form: 
 
Life: an adaptive process by which an open system, in virtue of its metabolic 
processing, continues to both produce and actively preserve itself as a well-




7 That some biological sciences are fruitful without using explicit definitions of ‘life’ is consistent 
with the fact that other biological sciences (e.g., astrobiology, systems biology, origins of life, etc.) 
require working definitions. Take for example astrobiology if we want to send a probe to a 
different planet to search for life there, we must make some assumptions about the kind of thing 
we are looking for. 
8 One important feature of life which is not included in this characterization of living systems is 
that of reproduction (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 1995). Given that this thesis when analysing 
LMC does not take the perspective of biological individuals as units of reproduction but rather the 
perspective of biological individuals as physiological units, reproduction as a feature of living 
systems will not be focused upon here or in the chapters to come.   
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Let us briefly analyse this characterization, beginning with the notion of open 
systems. Such systems are those that exchange energy, matter and/or information 
with their environments. One way of being an open system is to be a system that 
uses metabolic processing. Such processing is characterized by both the 
harvesting of energy in the form of resources (i.e., anabolism) and the breaking 
down of that energy for work (i.e., catabolism). The notion of self-production, a 
concept that is both central to autopoetic theory (Maturana & Varela, 1980) and 
the chemoton model of minimal life (Gánti, 1971/1987) names the circular process 
that a biological system engages in of (1) reconstructing itself by synthesizing its 
component elements and (2) bringing about processes which in turn allow it to 
bring about or maintain those very processes and synthesize the component 
elements which are fundamental to it. Central to the notion of active self-
preservation is that the living system is the source of the processes which 
constitute its own self-preservation. The last of the crucial notions in this first 
characterization of life are related; the notion of active self-preservation is relative 
to the kinds of environmental conditions encountered by a living system. Active 
self-preservation is a specific manner of actively adapting to the environment. 
What must necessarily be preserved is a boundary that separates that living 
system from what it is not. In other words, the process of life requires that a 
biological system through its own devices (i.e., actively), maintains itself as a 
distinct unit from the environment in which it is embedded. Living systems remain 
living when they manage to produce and preserve themselves despite various 
encounters with integrity challenging environmental dynamics (e.g., temperature 
and pressure fluctuations, lack of metabolic resources, the presence of predators, 
the presence of competitors, etc.).  
 
This characterization of life seems to overlap with our folk biological intuitions 
concerning what kinds of thing are living; everything from bacteria to humans seem 
to engage in this kind of process; whether or not viruses are living according to this 
characterization, given that they do not possess their own machinery for 
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metabolism, is less certain; neither rocks nor robots (at least up until now) exhibit 
life.  
 
Moving on to a provisional characterization of cognition: 
 
Cognition: a process by which an agent actively adapts itself to the 
conditions of its environment through the deployment of different interacting 
capacities. 
 
Explicit in this very broad brushstroke characterization of cognition is the idea that 
cognition is not expressed in merely one capacity, but is a process that involves a 
collection of many capacities (e.g., perception-action, learning, memory, language, 
decision making, etc.) Importantly, whatever this collection of capacities may turn 
out to be, this characterization of cognition leaves the possibility open that such 
capacities may be expressed differently in different systems; they may take various 
forms using different mechanisms which allow for the kind of adaptation that is 
relative to both organism-type and the types of precarious environmental 
conditions encountered. By describing cognition in terms of what cognition does or 
what it is for (i.e., it is something which guides adaptive interaction with the 
environment) this initial characterization falls under the category of a 
teleofunctional characterization (the prefix “teleo” coming from the Greek telos 
which translates roughly as purpose or aim). Teleofunctional characterizations of 
a given capacity answer the question why that capacity has been selected for over 
the course of evolutionary timescales (Wright, 1976; Godfrey-Smith, 1996). One 
such teleofunctional characterization of cognition which is implicit in the provisional 
characterization of cognition above (and one which will be revisited throughout the 





The environmental complexity thesis (ECT): the function of cognition is to 
allow organisms to cope with environmental complexity.  
 
 
Complexity is understood here as heterogeneity or being composed of different 







a.                  b. 
 
Figure 2 
Examples of complexity across two different spatio-temporal scales: in plate a. there is 
complexity exhibited spatially at each time-step, although it remains the same over time. In 





Cognition is adaptive only when there is both variability (i.e., complexity) in the 
environmentally distal states that are relevant to an organism’s survival and 
stability (i.e., highly reliable correlation) between those distal states and the 
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proximal states to which an organism is sensitive.9 Thus, the claim of ECT is that 
complex environments were a requirement for cognition.10 For without the 
variability in the environmental states that are relevant to an organism, cognition 
would have not been needed as an adaptive solution that makes use of stability to 
control complex behaviour. 
 
Whereas environments with more complexity may require cognitive capacities that 
are themselves more functionally specialized in order to allow for successful 
adaptation, environments with less complexity may be dealt with using simpler 
capacities. This kind of complexity matching between environmental complexity 
and cognitive complexity will be a recurring theme in its various guises throughout 
the chapters that follow. I noted above that ECT was implicit within our initial 
characterization of cognition. Given that cognition allows a system to actively adapt 
to environmental conditions, and that actively adapting to environmental conditions 
is tantamount to dealing with environmental complexity, cognition may therefore–
–as ECT suggests––be seen as having the function of dealing with environmental 
complexity. This being said, not all manners in which an organism deals with 
environmental complexity qualify as cognition (e.g., digestion, respiration, 
hibernation, etc.). Attempting to identify those manners that do without being overly 
permissive will be a recurring project of this thesis (see chapters 1, 2, and 3).   
 
The notion of adaptivity is a common feature of both the characterizations of life 
and cognition provided above. Although adaptivity may be understood in a more 
general manner as the ability of an organism to cope with environmental change, 
 
 
9 According to Godfrey-Smith, (1996) ‘distal’ here need not be construed in terms of spatial 
distance but may also include behavioural tendencies that are less regular (i.e., dispositional 
behaviours). 
10 Godfrey-Smith takes ECT and life-mind continuity (of any variety) to be independent theses. 
Assuming this is correct, it is still possible to use ETC methodologically in order distil a functional 
notion of cognition that can be used to investigate life-mind continuity.  As I hope to show in this 
thesis, ECT and strong life-mind continuity may be brought together by a particular conception of 
cognition that sees it geared towards the anticipation and adaptation of living systems to the 
complexities of their environments.  
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throughout this thesis I will follow Di Paolo (2005) in using the term more 
specifically to refer to “a special manner of being tolerant to challenges by actively 
monitoring perturbations and compensating for their tendencies” (2005, p.9).11 
Whereas adaptivity underlying life may take the form of a system’s monitoring the 
states that challenge its viability and engaging in active self-preservation (i.e., 
behaving in ways that directly support continued homeostatic regulation), the kind 
of adaptivity underlying cognition may be more general; it may take the form of a 
system’s monitoring the states that challenge non-existential goals and making 
various types of adjustment to environmental conditions such that those goals are 
not impeded (e.g., making a good chess move to win the match). Importantly, the 
processes that are expressive of active adaptive processes differ from those 
expressive of passive adaptive processes in that the former are endogenously 
generated by the system itself. For instance, a “smart” heat-seeking missile might 
adaptively preserve itself whilst in flight by avoiding collisions with various 
obstacles that it encounters which are not its target. However, in this case, such 
adaptation boils down to a set of non-physiological controlled variables (i.e., 
variables that are kept in a specific range for the system to function as it was 
designed to) and response parameters that have been programmed and 
determined extrinsically to the system (i.e., by an engineer). To say that a living 
system actively adapts itself to its environment is tantamount to saying that its 
adaptivity is an expression of the biological autonomy of that system. More will be 
said about the notion of biological autonomy in chapter 3 but let it suffice for now 
to understand autonomy as the capacity that a system has to govern its interaction 
with its environment.  Such a system is self-directed in the sense that it is its own 




11 I will continue to use the term “adaptivity” without taking on all of the commitments of autopoetic 
theory. My attitude to some of these commitments will become apparent over the course of this 
thesis.  
12 The notion of “autonomy” that this thesis will help itself to is in line with thermodynamic 
accounts of self-organizing dissipative systems; such systems, through a process of energic 
exchange with their environments, counter the dissipative effects of random fluctuations, thereby 
remaining distinct from their environments (see Turner, 1982). Living systems are a subclass of 
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Let the reader be reminded once more that these characterizations of cognition 
and life are provisional and will, throughout the course of this thesis, be sharpened 
in light of various considerations examined in each chapter. This being said, we 
will now turn to one feature that may be used to not only refine the initial 
characterizations of cognition and life, but that also motivates the use of the 




0.3 Anticipation  
 
 
Assuming that strong life-mind continuity is correct––as this thesis does-––and that 
both life and cognition are active adaptive processes––as this thesis does––what 
can be said about the manner in which cognition contributes to the self-
preservation of living systems? More precisely, what is it about cognition that 
enables living systems to deal with environmental complexity so as to preserve 
themselves? There are two ways of interpreting this question. On one 
interpretation, it is a question about the kinds of particular strategies that might be 
used to navigate challenging environments (e.g., problem solving, learning, 
perception, sensorimotor coordination, memory etc.). On the other interpretation, 
this question asks about a possible underlying feature (or features) of all such 
cognitive strategies. For the purposes of this thesis, it is this second interpretation 
that I am interested. This thesis, following a long tradition in psychology and 
cognitive science (Bartlett, 1932; Craik, 1943; Piaget, 1970; Neisser, 1976; 
 
 
self-organizing dissipative systems that characteristically direct their own exchange with their 
environment and hence exhibit autonomy. This notion is importantly distinct from the “autonomy” 
of traditional autopoietic theory, which denies the fundamental role of system-environment 
exchange (cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2016).  
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Drescher, 1991; Arbib, 1992; Grush, 2004; Castelfranchi, 2005; Bar, 2007) takes 
anticipation as an essential property of cognitive systems.   
 
To see why this is intuitively feasible, consider the following simple thought 
experiment. Imagine a particular organism, O, possessing cognitive capacities that 
are purely reactive and limited to acting, tactile perception, and learning. Moreover, 
imagine that O inhabits a very simple environment, consisting of empty space, one 
kind of food source and one kind of predator. Now in order to identify food and 
nourish itself O must move around, touching everything that it comes into contact 
with. Depending upon the predator population and the abundance of food, this kind 
of strategy for food identification and nutrient consumption could be a metabolically 
expensive process over the long run and, more importantly, immediately 
dangerous. For example, if food was not abundant but predators were, depending 
on how fast and severe the damage inflicted upon O by these predators (and how 
fast or resilient to damage O is), it would be very likely that this purely reactive 
creature would fail to survive very long, perishing in its attempts to nourish itself. 
Now imagine a slightly different scenario, where a property of the food, say its 
porous texture, is a cue for the presence of predators; there is a reliable chemical 
reaction that causes the food’s surface to become porous when exposed to the 
predator’s fresh metabolic waste. Furthermore, imagine that O has the capacity to 
detect and use this textural cue to direct its behaviour. In this case, food with a 
porous texture is a predictor of the presence of predators. With this simple addition 
of a textural cue and the ability to use that cue to direct its interaction with its 
environment, O is  equipped to cope with the complexity of its surrounds; a simple 
tactile perceptual system, in becoming an anticipatory system, allows O to avoid 
dangerous situations prior to encountering them.  
 
The take home message from this thought experiment is that behaviour that is 
driven by anticipatory processes poises organisms to respond to possible 
deleterious environmental perturbances and/or to avoid prolonged physiologically 
stressful and/or homeostatically destabilizing states prior to their actually 
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occurring. If, as ECT postulates, cognition evolved as a way of dealing with 
environmental complexity, then, baring the assumption that cognition has been 
exapted for some other function, situations in which  there are cognition-using 
living systems that fail altogether to face malign environments may not happen 
very often or play out for very long when they do. From the perspective of ECT, 
the behaviour of an organism that engages purely in responsive activities (e.g., 
metabolic processes) would fail to qualify as an expression of cognition because 
responsive activities are not sufficient for coping with environmental complexity; 
anticipation as opposed to mere reaction seems to be something that is crucial for 
dealing with the kind of environmental complexity that presents direct challenges 
to an agent’s continued self-preservation.  
 
The notion that anticipation is fundamental to cognitive systems may be traced at 
least as far back as the research programme of cybernetics (Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 
1952; Conant & Ashby, 1970). According to this programme, the role of anticipation 
is central to homeostatic maintenance in goal-directed adaptive systems. A system 
may maintain its stability, returning its controlled variables (i.e., physiological 
variables in the case of living-systems) to their viable range when disturbed, by 
using a combination of feedback and feedforward closed loop mechanisms to 
govern its interaction with the environment. Importantly, rather than waiting to 
register a discrepancy between the values of the controlled variables that it should 
occupy and those values that it does currently occupy (e.g., waiting to feel the 
effects of oxygen depletion in a closed room), a living system that is equipped with 
a forward model (i.e., a model that captures the anticipated effects of its regulating 
actions upon its environment) can avoid deleterious disturbances to its 
organization prior to their occurring (e.g., opening the room’s window prior to 
hypoxia occurring).13 Another manner of understanding anticipation that falls out 
of cybernetics looks not at the possession of models by a homeostatic system but 
 
 
13 This process that I’ve described is generally referred to as allostasis. More specifically, 
allostasis is defined as achieving stability through change in both physiological and behavioural 
systemic parameters (Sterling, 2004).  
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rather at the self-regulating system itself as a model of its environment (and the 
effects of itself acting upon its environment). The “good regulator theorem” (Conant 
& Ashby, 1970) states that “every good regulator of a system must be a model of 
that system” (p.89). Accordingly, in this sense living systems are models of the 
environments that they regulate and as such they come to anticipatorily capture 
the effects of their actions upon their environment. 
 
What of the relation between anticipation and living systems? The notion that life 
is an anticipatory process is one that has been supported in great detail by the 
work of theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (2012), who in his seminal book 
Anticipatory Systems models biosynthetic pathways (and living systems more 
generally) as anticipatory systems. He defines an anticipatory system as one that 
“contain[s] a predictive model of itself and/or its environment, which allows it to 
change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to a 
later instant” (2012, p. 313). Living systems accordingly may be cast as 
anticipatory systems that use self-generated predictive models to modify 
themselves, pre-empting their own destabilization.14 
 
It should be noted that in both of these accounts of anticipation in cognitive systems 
and in living systems there is an explicit emphasis upon the use of models. This 
being said, there are other accounts of anticipation (and anticipatory systems) that 
avoid the use of models in their proposed explanations (see Riegler, 2001; Stepp 
& Turvey, 2010; Bickhard, 2016). Rather, such model-free accounts see 
anticipation as “aris[ing] from the system itself via lawful regularities embedded in 
the system's ordinary mode of functioning” (Stepp & Turvey, 2010, p. 2). 
Accordingly, the internal dynamics of the organism are biases which anticipatorily 
‘nudge’ organisational processes to certain attractor states rather than others in 
response to the dynamics of the environment that it is coupled to.  
 
 
14 See Nasuto & Hayashi (2016) for an interesting account of how this notion of anticipation can 
be used to inform cognitive robotic technologies. 
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In attempting to shed light upon strong life-mind continuity, this thesis will deploy 
two model-based anticipatory frameworks (the Free Energy Framework and 
predictive processing) along with a model-free anticipatory framework (ecological 
psychology). It will be assumed throughout that the active adaptation that 
underwrites life and mind is an anticipatory process. Let us now turn to an overview 




0.4 Anticipatory cognitive frameworks 
 
 
In this thesis I have chosen three different anticipatory cognitive frameworks to 
investigate strong life-mind continuity and the various forms of cognition that strong 
life-mind continuity can help to make sense of.15 The three anticipatory frameworks 
that will be deployed––sometimes concurrently and sometimes separately––are 
the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing and ecological psychology. I 
choose these frameworks for three reasons: firstly, given what has been suggested 
above about the relation between adaptation and anticipation, these anticipatory 
frameworks are ideally placed to investigate the possible relation between active 
adaptation in cognitive systems and in living systems and hence to investigate 
strong life-mind continuity. Secondly, because each of these frameworks 
emphasize the interaction between embedded cognizers and their embedding 
environments as essential to cognitive explanation, I find that they are able to do 
justice to the fact that cognition does not happen in a vacuum (Wilson,1994; 
Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1997; Rowlands, 1999). Lastly, each of these frameworks 
take interestingly different starting points in providing an account of cognition. As 
 
 
15 A theoretical framework may be roughly understood as an analytical structure that constrains 
and guides theoretical investigation of a given phenomenon (or phenomena). This structure may 
include concepts, assumptions, and theoretical commitments.  
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will become apparent below and in later chapters, while the Free Energy 
Framework starts from considerations about the self-preservation of living systems 
and predictive processing starts from considerations about cognitive architecture, 
ecological psychology begins from methodological considerations concerning the 
ongoing cause and effect relationships of the organism on its environment and the 
environment on the organism.16 Given that these starting points lend themselves 
to distinct and yet sometimes overlapping theoretical perspectives on cognition, 
the various commitments, assumptions and theoretical apparatus that accompany 
each perspective can be contrasted, compared, and synthesized into a larger 
encompassing framework which this thesis will use to guide the investigation of 
strong life-mind continuity.  
 
One of the recurring themes of this thesis is that the conceptual apparatus of one 
framework might be used to inform and/or constrain the others and help build a 
more complete picture of cognition and a more holistic account of life and mind. 
These differences will be used instrumentally to mark out different forms of 
cognition and possible explanatory limitations of the particular frameworks under 
consideration. In other words, where one framework fails, another may succeed in 
offering its apparatus to account for and constrain putative cognitive phenomena. 
Thus, an overarching aim of the thesis is to identify instances where the 
explanations and apparatus provided by one framework may be said to enrich the 
other which is suited to explain cognitive processes and phenomena up to a certain 
level of complexity. For example, while the Free Energy Framework and ecological 
psychology may help expose and account for forms of cognition in unexpected 
places (e.g., bacteria and plants), given its emphasis upon precision weighted 
prediction driven dynamics (something which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
4), full-blown predictive processing might be considered to demarcate a transition 
 
 
16 While the ongoing open exchange between the environment and agent is also a central feature 
the way cognition and life are modelled in Free-energy Framework, this exchange for ecological 
psychology is both central to its analysis of perception and action, and importantly describes its 
methodological approach to the question “what is perception?”  
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from minimal cognition to the very kind of decoupled cognitive capacities that are 
definitive of human cognition. By deploying these anticipatory frameworks, this 
thesis aims to distil what makes the self-preserving processes of life continuous 
with that of the more general adaptive process of cognition, and to locate  possible 
“transition markers” (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019) in cognition along the way to the 
kind of enriched processes which are distinctively human. Transition markers are 
“criteria that may be used to mark different forms of life that can persist over time” 
(Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019, p. 27).17 Such transition markers help us to 
understand how strong life-mind continuity is consistent with the complexification 
of lifeforms; they provide the possible loci at which life has become further enriched 





0.5 The Free Energy Framework 
 
 
The Free Energy Framework (FEF) (Friston, 2005; Friston & Stephan, 2007; 
Friston, 2010) is a powerful and ambitious unifying cognitive framework that has 
been deployed to account for a vast array of phenomena in both theoretical biology 
and biophysiological neuroscience, ranging from the adaptive behaviour of 
bacteria (Auletta, 2013; Corcoran, Pezzulo & Hohwy, 2019), morphogenesis 
(Friston, Levin, Sengupta, Pezzulo, 2015) and natural selection (Campbell, 2016) 
to neuropsychological disorders in humans (Parr & Friston, 2018). FEF begins with 
the fundamental assumption that any living system, in maintaining its structural 
and functional integrity will appear to (temporarily) violate the second law of 
 
 
17 It should be noted that a transition marker is not necessary or sufficient condition for the 
expression of some mode of being but is rather a diagnostic characteristic that allows scientists to 
reverse engineer the mode of being under investigation (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019).  
 
 xxx 
thermodynamics, avoiding (near) global thermodynamic equilibrium while 
maintaining (near) local thermodynamic equilibrium. A living system is thus one 
which will tend to revisit a limited range of states (defined over a state space of all 
possible states it could occupy) over time despite the influence of random 
environmental fluctuations. The fact that a system exists at all entails that it 
continues to remain distinct from its milieu.  
 
Another assumption that falls out of the fact that a living system must remain 
distinct from its environment is that such systems must possess a boundary 
separating it (i.e., the states that define it) from its environment. This boundary is 
mathematically describable with the Markov blanket formalism (Friston, 2013), a 
statistical construct borrowed from Bayesian graph theory (Pearl, 1988). In short, 
a Markov blanket describes the set of boundary states (i.e., active states, and 
sensory states) that induce a statistical conditional independence between a 
system’s internal states and its environment (i.e., external states)18. The 
conditional independence induced by a Markov blanket means that internal states 
and external states can only influence one another by way of blanket states. A 
bacterium is a somewhat intuitive example of how this partition may be applied to 
a living system. A bacterium’s cell membrane states may be cast as its sensory 
states; its flagellar activity and/or states of its actin filaments correspond to its 
active states; the activity of its intracellular states corresponds to its internal states; 
the conditions of the bacterium’s surrounding milieu beyond its Markov blanket 
correspond the external states. As long as the bacterium’s internal states 
continued to be enshrouded by a Markov blanket, its internal states may resist 
change despite change in the surrounding environment. By deploying the Markov 
blanket formalism, FEF uses a mathematical tool to ontologically individuate living 




18 The Markov blanket formalism will be fleshed out in detail in chapter 3. 
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A further assumption, and one that is crucial to understanding FEF’s status as an 
anticipatory framework, is that any biological organism embodies a generative 
model of its niche and its behaviour in its niche. When approached from the 
perspective of  Bayesian statistics, a generative model is understood as a network 
of ‘beliefs’ (i.e., a joint probability density) that a living system’s morphology, 
phenotype and the tendencies of its internal states are an expression of.19 Because 
they parameterize a probabilistic mapping between sensory states and the 
environmental states which cause those sensory states (Corcoran, Pezzulo & 
Hohwy, 2019), generative models are used to estimate––via processes that 
approximate Bayesian inference––the environmental causes of sensory states.20  
 
Generative models may be equally approached from the perspective of the physics 
of flow. From this perspective models may be described in terms of an attracting 
set of states that a self-organizing system tends to frequent over the course of its 
existence - living systems being one kind of self-organizing system. That is, from 
all possible states in a phase space that a living system could possibly occupy, it 
will tend to return to a limited neighbourhood of states when perturbed (Friston, 
2019b). This attracting set of states that underwrites a living system’s dynamics is 
referred to as its non-equilibrium steady state density (NESS); it is equivalent to 
that system’s generative model (Friston, 2019b; Ramstead et al., 2019; Palacios 
et al., 2020). A living system is one that (self) organizes around energy gradients, 
behaving at different interacting timescales (i.e., from cellular responses to overt 
sensory-motor behaviour) in ways that––when everything goes well––ensures that 
 
 
19 Care should be taken to avoid conflating these statistical ‘beliefs’ from the personal level beliefs 
of folk psychology. 
20 Approximate Bayesian inference conforms to Bayes’ Rule:   
 





Where H is the hypothesis and E is evidence, Bayes rule states that the probability of the 
hypothesis conditioned on the evidence, 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) (i.e., the posterior probability) is proportional to 
the product of the probability the evidence conditioned on the hypothesis (i.e., the likelihood)  and 
the probability of the hypothesis (i.e. the prior) over the probability of the evidence (i.e., the 
marginal likelihood or what is also referred to as model evidence). 
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its dynamics flow towards its NESS (see chapter 3). For a living system, failure to 
do so means failing to remain distinct from its environment and hence eventual 
dissipation, death, and decay.  
 
An organism’s behaving in ways that garners evidence for its generative model is 
equally the manner in which its Markov blanket is preserved and the manner of 
flowing towards its NESS density. In other words, a system’s behaving in ways that 
garners evidence for its model is tantamount to its garnering evidence for its own 
existence. That this is the case, follows from the assumption that any organism 
that continues to exist embodies a model of its environment.21 In this sense, 
according to FEF,  an organism does not possess a generative model of the causal 
structure of its environment, but it is a model of that causal structure (Friston, 2013) 
(see also Bruineberg et al., 2016). This approach to generative models may thus 
be seen as a recapitulation of the good regulator theorem (Conant & Ashby, 1970). 
In the case of the cognizing organism, such a self-organising system must regulate 
the dynamic, yet regularly structured, environmental energies which it comes into 
contact with on a continuous basis. Thus, the embodied cognizer in learning the 
causal regularities of its world becomes a model of its world and of the effects of 
its acting upon its world. Here, then, ‘model’ is to be understood “in the most 
inclusive sense, as combining interoceptive dispositions, morphology, and neural 
architecture, and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied 
organism and the embedding environment” (Friston, Adams, Perrinet, & 
Breakspear, 2012, p.6). Importantly, this suggests that generative models are not 
merely in the business of biophysically encoding accurate (statistical) descriptions 
of sensory and environmental states, but they are first and foremost in the business 
of guiding long-term, self-preserving action. Crucially, FEF does not presuppose 
that any particular kind of anatomical structure must be in place for the existence 
of a generative model. This has the consequence that both neural organisms and 
 
 
21 The notion of generative model employed here is in many ways analogous to the notion of 
anticipatory models proposed by Rosen (2012).  
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non-neural living systems (e.g., bacteria, plants, etc.) alike entail the existence of 
generative models over the duration of their continued existence.  
  
According to FEF, one way an organism may preserve its structural and functional 
integrity despite the global tendency for entropic increase is by both evaluating and 
reducing surprise (also referred to as “surprisal”). Surprise is an information- 
theoretic measure of disorder, quantifying how improbable sensory state 
observations are for a given kind of organism. Sensory states in the context of FEF 
are those states that are those states of an organism’s sensory receptors. Any 
persisting organism will have a higher likelihood of occupying certain sensory 
states and not others. This set of likely sensory states is associated with that 
organism’s viability. An organism’s occupying sensory states outside this viable 
set is improbable and the further removed from this set sensory states are, the 
higher the quantity of surprise is. Surprise may thus be cast as system-relative 
error. For instance, in contrast to a human, a fish’s being out of water will result in 
high quantities of surprise given the kind of biological water-inhabiting system it 
is.22 However, given that evaluating surprise requires that a living system has 
access to all of the near infinite possible sensory states which it could occupy 
(which, needless to say, it does not), evaluating surprise is computationally 
intractable. The free-energy principle states that any organism that exists, 
continuing to avoid global thermodynamic equilibrium, will optimize its internal 
states (i.e., predictions) and action states (i.e. behaviour) so as to minimize free 
energy. Free-energy is a measure of the difference between the sensory states an 
organism expects to observe given its generative model and those that it actually 
observes at its sensorium. Because free-energy is an upper bound on surprise 
(i.e., free-energy always greater than or equal to surprise) and is something that 
an organism has access to it can be used to approximate surprise (Friston, 2009, 
 
 
22 Information theoretic surprise should not be conflated with the personal-level feeling of 
surprise.  
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2010). Moreover, FEF suggests an elegant mathematical manner in which free-
energy is minimized: active inference. 
 
Active inference is a solution to an optimization problem. By optimizing its internal 
states over time an organism may reduce discrepancies which arise between its 
internal states and the sensory states. Because, as we have just seen, this 
discrepancy may be quantified as free energy, reducing the discrepancy is the 
same as reducing free energy. This process of minimizing free-energy via internal-
state optimization is referred to as perception. Free-energy is also minimized by 
action state optimization, what is referred to as action. This occurs when internal 
states drive action state change in ways that modulate the organism’s relationship 
to its environment, bringing about the kinds of sensory states that it expects. 
Although optimizing internal states minimizes the upper bound on surprise, it is 
only this process of action state optimization that can reduce surprise, thus 
returning the living system to the set of viable states which its existence depends 
upon.23 Because optimization is driven by the dynamics of the generative model, 
Free-energy minimization is evidence for the generative model which governed the 
changes in internal states and active states. Thus, it follows that by engaging in 
this process of active inference, (when all goes right) an organism minimizes free 
energy, minimizes surprise and thereby maximizes evidence for its generative 
model. Importantly, if a living system is a model of its environment, then by 
minimizing free-energy via perception and action (i.e., active inference), an 
 
 
23 That this is the case can intuitively be captured by imagining the different outcomes arising 
from either updating your belief so as to accurately represent that there is a polar bear (rather 
than a person in a polar bear suit) quickly approaching you or fleeing to avoid contact with the 
approaching bear. Arriving at an accurate belief is useful in this situation, but alone it might result 
in the highly unexpected (high surprise) sensory observations that accompany your being a polar 
bear’s next meal. It is only by using that belief to direct action in an appropriate manner (i.e., 
fleeing) that you are likely to avoid harm’s way. This example illustrates the more general idea 
that free-energy minimizing living systems are embedded in dynamic environments replete with 
selection pressures. The nature of these pressures often demand that living systems not only 
change themselves (i.e., change their expectations), but also initiate behaviour that changes their 




organism maximizes the evidence for own existence (i.e., it remains well-adapted 
to its environment).  
 
Importantly, perception and action in FEF need not map neatly on to our folk 
psychological understanding of those concepts. In this manner FEF challenges our 
folk psychological conceptions of perception and action, conceptions that are 
heavily informed by paradigmatic human capacities (and by our folk-biological 
conceptions as it will be illustrated in chapter 3). FEF thus allows for a broader 
approach to understanding how a range of living systems, in virtue of their 
sensitivity and adaptive response to the complexity of their milieus, possibly 
exercise a range cognitive capacities.24 It is in virtue of active inference, the central 
workhorse of FEF, that cognition and life are elegantly brought together; by acting 
on the environment in ways that reduce the (real-time and expected) discrepancy 
between the sensory states that they (expect to) observe and those that they 
‘prefer’ to observe, living systems actively preserve themselves and garner 
evidence for the generative models that their organization and patterns of 
behaviour instantiate. Importantly, if FEF is correct, both anticipation (i.e., 
prediction) of the sensory states that would be observed were certain actions 
performed and anticipation of sensory states that should be observed relative to a 
given phenotype play a fundamental role in the processes of life and mind.  
 
Let us now turn to another anticipatory cognitive framework which will be used in 







24 Corcoran et al. (2019) have insightfully interpreted the notion of dealing with environmental 
complexity as described by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) as free-energy minimization (or equally 
the reduction of uncertainty). 
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0.6 Predictive processing 
 
 
As it has developed over the course of the last 10 years, the predictive processing 
framework (henceforth PP) has taken many forms, ranging from ‘brain-centric’ 
views (e.g., Hohwy, 2013) to various grades of embodied and enactive views 
(Clark, 2016; Orlandi, 2016). The former kind of view emphasizes the brain and 
brain processing as central to (and perhaps sufficient for) satisfactory explanations 
of cognitive phenomena. The latter view, in its more moderate form, sees brains 
and brain processing as central to cognitive explanation but also emphasizes the 
important (and often necessary) roles that bodies and bodily interaction with the 
environment play for satisfactory cognitive explanation. In this thesis I shall be 
primarily concerned with one form of predictive processing, action-oriented 
predictive processing, developed by Andy Clark (2013,2016a), a form that is 
located closer to the embodied and enactive pole of PP. The following outline of 
the characteristics of this framework, however, will for the most part be applicable 
to all forms of PP unless otherwise noted. More generally PP is a cognitive 
framework which, although often located within the broader FEF, may be used 
independently of FEF. Although there are many features which PP and FEF share 
(e.g., generative models, active inference, error and (approximate Bayes-driven) 
hierarchical error minimization), there are some important differences. By making 
these similarities and differences explicit, we may glean a better general picture of 
PP (and FEF) and how it too qualifies as an anticipatory cognitive framework.  
Whereas FEF arrives at an account of anticipatory cognition by beginning with a 
fundamental principle about what it is to remain alive, PP begins with a general 
Helmholtzian assumption about the nature of cognitive processing and offers a 
testable process theory of cognition from this assumption. According to this 
Helmholtzian assumption the brain is an environmentally isolated, hypothesis-
generating organ and the only access it has to the world is through the mediating 
flows of sensory input which it is sensitive to. Perception is seen as the ongoing 
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result of the brain’s active generation and testing of explanations (hypotheses) for 
the evolution of sensory signals across the sensorium.25 Given the causal relation 
between the structure of the environment impinging upon the sensorium and the 
sensory signals, the brain (subpersonally) infers the structure of the environment 
from the impoverished sensory signals. These sensory signals are ambiguous in 
that the same signals can be caused by many different structures in the world and 
different signals can be caused by the same structure. Moreover, because these 
ambiguous sensory signals exhaust the information that the brain has about the 
world, this results in an “inverse problem” (Marr, 1983) of how it is possible to 
accurately identify (perceive) the cause from such an impoverished sensory 
array.26 PP, by making use of the Helmholtzian assumption, solves this inverse 
problem; perception is seen not as process of filtering and classifying but as one 
of the brain’s unconsciously inferring the causes of the sensory signals it has 
access to.27 PP suggests that the brain actively arrives at its best (i.e., most 
probable) guess about the distal causes of the sensory signals that it has access 
to by engaging in a process of reiterative and hierarchical prediction error 
minimization. Here, error quantifies the discrepancy arising from the comparison 
of brain-generated predictions and the incoming sensory signals that predictions 
target. To minimize prediction error is thus to minimize this discrepancy. It is when 
the brain settles upon its best guess about the amalgam of hidden causes across 
many spatio-temporal scales that it “has self-generated the sensory data using 
stored knowledge and perceives a meaningful, structured scene’’ (Clark, 2016a, 
p. 21)  Essential to this kind of account is the idea the brain is not a passive 
 
 
25 See Gregory (1980) for a similar account of perception as hypothesis testing. 
26 von Helmholz (1867/1910), motivated by the notion that the brain does not have direct access 
to the causes of its sensory signals, suggested that perception was a process of unconscious 
inference.  
27 It should be noted however that some PP theorists have suggested to bypass both the 
perceptual inverse problem and the unconscious inferential manner of dissolving it altogether by 
placing emphasis upon an idea borrowed from J.J. Gibson’s (1966,1979) ecological psychology 
that there is rich information for disambiguation available in the environment (see Anderson, 
2017; Orlandi, 2016). We shall return to this notion of environmental information below in section 
0.5.  
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information processor, but that it is engaged in the endogenous generation of 
predictions which meet incoming sensory signals (Clark, 2016a).  
Thus, perception is understood to come about in virtue of hierarchical bidirectional 
message passing involving the comparison of sensory signals originating from the 
body and world with signals originating from the brain and the reiterative reduction 
of residual error between the two. Importantly, PP holds that this process is able 
to account for most (if not all) cognitive phenomena. Action, perception, learning, 
and planning are “seen as profoundly unified and, in important respects, 
continuous” (Clark, 2013, p.7), all being driven by the hierarchical process of 
minimizing discrepancy between world-generated and brain-generated signals 
across different timescales; perception arising from error minimization at faster 
scales, and learning being the result of error reduction at slower timescale. 
Crucially, all of these processes may be accounted for in PP, without being 
committed to the kinds of assumptions that are central to FEF. For example, PP 
need not be committed to a statistical view of life. Thus, it may provide an account 
of cognition in terms of hierarchical bidirectional message passing and error 
correction without invoking the free-energy principle or its corollaries. As such, 
from the perspective of PP, there may be living systems (and cognitive systems 
for that matter) that minimize free-energy but do so in a manner that fails to qualify 
as PP. Such systems fail the capacity to engage in environmentally decoupled 
cognitive processing, the kind of processing that underwrites complex cognitive 
capacities like planning, mental imagery, and thought.28 This being said, action-
oriented PP, places emphasis upon satisficing action rather than constructing 
accurate generative models of the environment and as such, it emphasizes the 
adaptation of the organism to a complex environment as the ultimate driving force 
in cognition. Because action-oriented PP acknowledges a relationship between 
cognition and adaptation in some living systems (i.e., it sees cognition as playing 
 
 
28 This is not to say that PP agents do not also engage in environmentally coupled processes. 
Rather, the point is that agents deploying PP architectures are not limited to the use of 
environmentally coupled action-perception loops. 
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the fundamental role of supporting adaptive behaviour), is a valuable resource with 
which to investigate strong life-mind continuity.29 Having made the difference in 
starting points between PP and FEF explicit, let us now look at the various 
characteristics of PP in detail. 
Like FEF, the construct of a generative model is central to PP. Importantly, 
whereas both statistical ‘beliefs’ and NESS densities are equally valid manners of 
describing generative models in FEF, the NESS interpretation is something that is 
theoretically extrinsic to PP. For PP is generally committed to the Bayesian 
interpretation of models and belief update.  
 
Another important difference between the manner in which PP and FEF envision 
generative models is that according to PP, in order for the kind of complex 
hierarchical prediction dynamics distinctive of PP to arise, generative models 
require the kind of physical hierarchical organization exhibited primarily by the 
anatomical structure of the brain (or something brain-like). According to PP, 
generative models are the brain’s best guess at the ‘hidden’ causes of sensory 
signals that it has direct access to; they are understood as the rich and integrated 
global patterns of network connectivity distributed across and between the 
information processing hierarchies of the brain. Each cortical layer of the 
generative hierarchy endogenously issues cascading (top-down) statistical 
estimates (i.e., predictions) of the forward flowing (bottom-up) sensory and/or error 
signals in the cortical layer below it. Over time, in virtue of successfully being able 
to reduce the discrepancy between the top-down and bottom up signals (i.e., 
prediction error) at many layers, the dynamic activity of the generative model 
comes to capture the nested hidden causal structure of the environment that gave 
rise to such sensory flows. Brains, due to their hierarchical structure allow for 
 
 
29 PP does not have to be applicable to all living systems in order for it to be a valuable 
framework for understanding strong life-mind continuity; its value is located in its ability to help 
think about specific forms of enrichment.  
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temporally deep prediction dynamics.30 Models with a high degree of temporal 
depth capture statistical regularity over long timescales and can be used to predict 
the outcome of actions that have not––or may never be––performed. Hence 
models with a high degree of depth are thought to underwrite the ability to engage 
in decoupled cognitive processing (see Pezzulo et al., 2015).  
 
In contrast, although generative models are often assumed to be hierarchical, FEF 
does not gravitate towards any particular anatomical manner in which they must 
be implemented; every living system that exists––from plants (Calvo & Friston, 
2017) and bacteria (Auletta, 2013) to humans––embodies a generative model of 
the structure of the environment it must anticipate in order to adaptively behave. 
FEF, but not necessarily PP, sees the kind of structure the brain has (i.e., 
hierarchically organized cortical layers) along with the body’s gross morphology 
and physiology as expressive of the fact that generative models are learnt at 
phylogenetic timescales in addition to being learnt at ontogenetic timescales. For 
example, according to FEF, the fact that the structure of the brain is organized 
hierarchically, recapitulates the nested and hierarchical structure of the 
environment which the brain and its activity has become a model of (Friston, 
2019a). Moreover, FEF acknowledges that all living self-organizing systems entail 
generative models with some degree of temporal depth. Unlike PP, which is 
thought to require a high degree of model depth for the kind of prediction error 
dynamics that it describes to take place (Clark, 2017), in FEF there is no particular 




30 Seth (2014) refers to models that possess temporal depth as “counterfactually rich models” 
because they roughly capture the counterfactual conditional structure ‘were action A to be 
completed, sensory outcome O would be observed.  
31 That PP places a demand on temporally deep models is made evident when Clark (2017) in a 
footnote writes: “Among those systems, those equipped with generative models that enable them 
actively and systematically to anticipate how the world will alter in response to their own possible 
future actions plausibly constitute the sub-class most demanding of the full predictive processing 
interpretation” (p. 5). 
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There is one further construct of PP which requires brief explication that is 
indispensable to the PP cognitive framework and one that is backgrounded in 
many FEF explanations: precision weighting. Not only are the forward propagating 
signals being met and recurrently estimated at many different cortical levels by 
descending predictions, but those very same bottom-up signals as they are 
propagated forward are being estimated and modulated so as to reflect their 
reliability. This process, precision weighting of error, may be understood 
statistically as tracking the inverse variance of a probability distribution over the 
error. The higher the precision a sensory/error signal is assigned, the more 
informative (i.e., reliable and/or valuable relative to the current pragmatic context) 
that signal is estimated to be.32 The weighting itself is thought to occur 
biochemically in virtue of increasing postsynaptic gain within superficial pyramidal 
cells (Bastos, et al., 2012) via the regulation of neuro-modulators such as––but not 
limited to–dopamine (Friston, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014) and acetylcholine 
(Friston, 2008).33  
 
Precision weighting estimation thus determines the relative influence of the 
bidirectional signals; by increasing the precision weighting of a sensory/error 
signal, that signal comes to play a greater role in determining which streams of 
prediction error ascend to higher levels of the hierarchical generative model. With 
respect to top-down signals, precision weighting plays an important role in 
 
 
32 One neat example that Clark (2016a) uses to illustrate the effects of precision weighting is the 
move from the indecipherability to the stubborn decipherability of sinusoidal speech recordings. 
These are speech pattern recordings that have been treated by applying ring-modulation effects. 
Prior to decoding sinusoidal speech is indecipherable, sounding merely like a metallic pattern of 
tones. However, when a subject hears the original speech recording without the ring-mod effect, 
and then listens again to the sinusoidal speech of the same recording, the pattern of words that 
was once indecipherable remains salient. This odd phenomenon is explained by PP in terms of 
precision weighting; after hearing the unaffected speech recording, certain sensory signals 
associated with particular words (or syllables) are precision weighted, influencing which streams 
of error drive ‘belief’ update. When listening again to the sinusoidal version of the speech pattern, 
the spoken sentence stands out of the sinusoidal cacophony given that the precision weighted 
sensory signals remain salient drivers of the top-down prediction dynamics. 
33 The weighting itself has been hypothesized to occur biochemically in virtue of increasing 
postsynaptic gain within superficial pyramidal cells (Bastos, et al., 2012) via the regulation of 
neuro-modulators such as––but not limited to–dopamine (Friston, 2012; Lawson et al., 2014) and 
acetylcholine (Friston, 2008). 
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selectively driving the kinds of predictions generated by narrowing the scope of 
information that elicits those predictions. As such, it has been suggested that 
attention itself is a “means by which certain error unit responses are given 
increased weight, hence becoming more apt to drive response, learning. […] and 
action” (Clark, 2016a, p.57). Furthermore, if bottom-up signals are estimated to be 
unreliable, the most statistically probable predictions issued by the generative 
model exert more influence over what is experienced until better environmental 
conditions arise (or are sought out) that provide reliable sensory signals. Precision 
weighting, thus, allows for and simultaneously constrains what might be thought of 
as a contextually sensitive balancing between the impact of bottom-up sensory 
signals and top-down predictions. Whichever of the two signals (bottom-up or top-
down) is thought to be the most reliable and informative––relative to one’s current 
aims––plays a larger role in driving experience and action (Hohwy, 2013; Clark 
2013,2016a; Seth, 2014).  
 
Crucially, although the brain plays an essential role in implementing the predictive 
hierarchy, PP––at least in its action-oriented form––need not discount the role of 
the active body (Clark, 2015,2016a, Friston, 2012). At the heart of PP is the claim 
that cognition emerges as the result of the anticipatory operation of hierarchical, 
bidirectional, precision weighted prediction error minimization. One effect of 
successful prediction error minimization is providing maximum evidence for the 
statistical generative model which thereby reflects the organism-relevant regular 
structures of its environment. In addition, such error reduction may be seen as 
signalling sensory information that has effectively been made available for possible 
action (Clark, 2016a). Action-oriented PP’s emphasis on the role of active 
inference (as contrasted to perceptual inference) as a means to minimize error 
brings along with it an important emphasis upon the role of the entire body and 
body-environment interaction. It is the active dynamics of the brain-body-world 
system that brings about prediction error minimization even if the primary locus of 
the PP cognitive architecture centres around neural processing in the brain.  
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With this overview of PP in hand, let us now turn to the third anticipatory cognitive 




0.7 Ecological psychology  
 
 
The framework of ecological psychology EP, spearheaded by James J. Gibson 
(1966,1979) and further developed by psychologists Michael Turvey, Robert 
Shaw, E.S. Reed, & William Mace (1981), Clare Michaels & Claudia Carello (1981) 
and William Warren (1984,2005) takes its starting point as an anticipatory theory 
of perception and action from the notion of organism-environment mutuality: the 
perceiving and behaving organism and its perceptible and behaviour-relevant 
environment mutually imply one another such that neither perception nor action 
may be successfully accounted for without taking the organism’s relation to its 
econiche into consideration (Gibson, 1966,1979; Turvey et al., 1981; Warren 
2005). More generally, the organism cannot not exist without an environment and 
vice versa. To explicate the environment’s place in a perceptual theory is thus 
crucial “since what there is to be perceived has to be stipulated before one can 
even talk about perceiving it” (Gibson, 1979, p.2).This mutual implication may be 
understood in terms of a niche or evolving organism-environment system wherein 
the possible behaviour of the organism complements the kind of environment it 
inhabits and the kind of environment it inhabits complements the kind of behaviour 
which the organism may possibly engage in.  
 
Another significant feature of EP is that it aims to provide a common analysis of 
what perception involves in a wide range of organisms which engage in adaptive 
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behaviour.34 An account of perception should be able to not only say something 
about the way humans perceive in their niche but also be, at core, applicable to 
the way spiders, birds, and other non-human animals might be said to perceive in 
each of their respective niches (Barrett 2011). Although this is the case, EP 
stresses that attention must be given to the fact that there are different species-
specific perceptual systems, which by prolonged organisms-environment 
interaction over evolutionary timescales have become sensitive to different 
structures specific to an animal’s econiche.  
 
This brings us to the central feature of EP, its notion of environmental information.  
Gibson’s theory of environmental information begins with the observation that 
objects, or more specifically, substances, structured surfaces, textures, and 
relations amongst them, are what populate the environment. Light, the medium of 
vision, when radiating from some source, reflecting off surfaces and then onto a 
point of observation, captures the structure of those objects and the relations 
amongst them. This structured light, what Gibson termed the ambient optic array, 
specifies in a one-to-one manner the surface layout and texture of its causes in the 
environment in relation to the perceiving organism. Crucially, it is by a perceiver’s 
moving around the environment or the environment moving in relation to the 
perceiver that information about the structure of the objects and their relations are 
‘picked-up’ by the perceptual system.35 Gibson argued that such movement, from 
the point of observation, generates mathematically describable light 
transformations amongst the relative angles of the array with respect to the point 
of observation, revealing an underlying invariant structure across behaviourally 
 
 
34 That Gibson’s analysis of perception is meant to be generalizable to all visually perceiving 
animals is evident when he argues that retinal images are not necessary for vision. He does so 
by invoking the fact that arthropods see despite their having compound eyes (see Gibson 1979, 
p. 62). This implies that an ecological account of vision should aim not only at an analysis of 
perception for vertebrates and molluscs with chambered eyes but for animals with distinct visual 
systems.  More generally, the ecological account of perception in all modalities is not constrained 
by anatomical features per se and thus may be deployed in accounting for a wide array of cases 
in which organisms with strikingly different anatomies adaptively respond to organisms-specific 
opportunities for action in their niches. 
35 More will be said about the notion of information pick-up in chapter 2. 
 xlv 
induced transformation. ‘Structural invariants’ lawfully specify––in a one-to-one 
manner––the properties of objects located in the environment and are behaviour 
relevant and rich sources of information about them. Texture gradients and optic 
flow are commonly understood as being examples of such invariants.36  Moreover, 
given the active nature of invariant harvesting, that which is made available in 
virtue of a perceiver’s movement not only corresponds to properties of objects in 
the environment but also to various properties of the perceiver (i.e., relative 
location, direction of motion, acceleration or deceleration, etc.) In this way, 
environmental information specifies something about both the environment and 
the perceiving organism in relation to its environment.  
 
Environmental information for perception and behavioural guidance is held to be 
both abundant and rich. To say that information is abundant is to say that it is 
readily available in the environment for all perceptual modalities. In other words, 
“information in ambient light, along with sound, odour, touches, and natural 
chemicals, is inexhaustible” (Gibson, 1979, p. 243). To say that information is rich 
means that it sufficiently specifies the surface layout and textures in the 
environment in a one-to-one manner. The importance of this cannot be 
understated with respect to comparing EP to PP. For the inverse problem that 
unconscious inference solves fails to arise under the assumption that there is rich 
environmental information that does not need to be disambiguated in the first 
place. Thus, the availability of rich environmental information suggests that there 
is no need for the construction of internal models, inference or use of memory to 
infer and disambiguate the causes of sensory stimulation. Perception-action, 
according to EP, does not begin with ambiguous stimulation that stands in need of 
enrichment by top-down knowledge or priors. Instead stimulation is already richly 
 
 
36 Texture gradients, gradual changes in the size of textured elements of a surface, relay 
information about both depth and distance. The smaller the texture the further away from the 
point of observation the surface is. Gibson also introduced the notion of optic flow, which is the 
spatio-temporal pattern of outward flowing blur produced by moving in a single direction. The 
centre of this flow pattern is non-blurred when one’s direction remains fixed and thus, by its being 
invariant over movement (i.e., transformation) it is able to deliver relative information about steady 
forward motion maintenance.  
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structured (cf. Orlandi, 2016). Environmental information is something which is 
altogether absent from PP (see Anderson & Chemero, 2019). This being said, EP 
like PP and FEF stresses that perception and action are mutually guiding activities. 
Unlike PP and FEF, which describe this coupled process in terms of active 
inference, in EP action and perception together allow for disambiguation; by 
actively picking-up on invariant structure in the array an agent is able to 
disambiguate between what might otherwise be (i.e., when not moving) ambiguous 
information. Part of the richness of environmental information is that it is available 
for active discovery; the ability to explore the environment further being “an 
absolutely essential aspect of the adaptive behaviour of organisms and therefore, 
of the ecological approach to perceiving and acting” (Turvey et al., 1981).  
 
This brings us to another central feature of EP: direct perception. EP holds that 
because perceptual systems can detect environment-specifying information 
without the use of mediating internal models, inferential operations upon sensory 
input, memory or internal representations more generally, the process of 
perception is direct. Perception exclusively involves the detection of and coupling 
to available environmental information by the perceptual system (i.e., the sensory 
organs and the moving body). Given that environmental information is not seen as 
impoverished, there is no need for processing involving the use of memory states 
to supplement such information.  
 
Although direct perception stresses online, moment to moment sensorimotor 
coupling to the environment, just what this coupling allows an organism to perceive 
is not limited to the present. To get a feel for how EP is an anticipatory theory of 
perception-action, let us look at what is arguably one of Gibson’s largest 
contributions to cognitive science and perceptual studies, viz. his theory of 
affordances. In addition to perceiving objects and events, Gibson held that 
organisms perceive what he called affordances. Affordances are organism-specific 
opportunities for behaviour that the environment offers (Gibson, 1979). They are 
organism-specific in that they exist relative to the existence of certain 
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morphological features, physiological states and skills possessed by agent-
perceivers. As such, affordances are an eloquent manner of fleshing out the 
Gestalt notion that objects have a “demand character” (Koffka, 1935) which imbues 
them with perceivable pragmatic value. For instance, although a non-vertical, 
pliable branch high up in a tree might afford ‘perch-on-ability’ for a kestrel given its 
bodily features and ability to land, for a human the same branch affords no such 
thing. The kestrel prior to landing perceives the branch as something that has value 
in relation to its behavioural repertoire and its current situation (e.g., requiring a 
position high in a tree to perch and track its prey below). In perceiving affordances, 
an organism directly perceives something about the structure of the environment 
and simultaneously something about itself. It follows that affordances are 
understood to be higher order invariants (i.e., invariant structure in the environment 
as a function of the invariants that describe the states of the living system) (Gibson, 
1979). Importantly, because affordances are possibilities for action, affordance 
perception, although direct, is anticipatory. In perceiving an affordance, rather than 
perceiving what is being exploited, an organism perceives that which could be 
exploited were it to bring intermediate actions about that are conducive to such 
exploitation. As such affordance perception may be seen as intrinsically future-
oriented (see Turvey, 1992; Bruineberg, et. al. 2018).  
 
Having outlined the characteristics of FEF, PP and EP, the manner in which each 























This thesis is an attempt to synthesize these three anticipatory frameworks for the 
purposes of identifying different forms of enrichment and thereby shedding light 
upon strong life-mind continuity. Having provided descriptions of FEF, PP and EP, 
I would now like to flag a potential worry that might seem to stand in the way of 
using these frameworks together consistently: “how can the fundamental role of 
generative models in PP and FEF be reconciled with the fact that EP rejects the 
use of inner models in its explanation of perception-action?”. This thesis avoids 
this worry because rather than endorsing all the theoretical commitments of EP 
wholesale, I will use some of EP’s commitments and motivations instrumentally as 
a means of teasing out ecologically informed explanations where such 
explanations can be used. Thus, a priority will be given to the various commitments 
of FEF and PP with respect to models; generative models will be taken as an 
 Anticipatory Features of Cognition 
Free Energy Framework Action is guided by (and guides) model generated 
internal states that allow an organism to avoid and/or 
adaptively respond to anticipated deviations from the 
limited range of sensory states that it tends to occupy 
given the kind of organism it is. 
 
Predictive processing   Action is guided by (and guides) model generated, 
precision weighted predictions that allow an organism to 
minimize the anticipated discrepancy between its best 
predictions of the incoming sensory signals and the 
sensory signals that it actually encounters.   
 
Ecological psychology  Action is guided by (and guides) the direct perception of 
species-specific, future-oriented opportunities for action 
that the environment offers (i.e., affordances).  
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essential feature of cognition (and life). However, where aspects of cognition can 
be accounted for by the role of agent-environment coupling, thus lessening the 
need to engage highly complex models and/or decoupled processing (but not 
doing away with models altogether), EP’s conceptual apparatus will be deployed. 
This should be welcomed because “the best ways to minimize long-term prediction 
error will often be both frugal and action-involving” (Clark, 2016a, p. 191). 
Importantly, one from the perspective of PP and FEF must not be committed to the 
thesis of direct perception to use EP’s apparatus. As such, the worry that these 
frameworks cannot be consistently used together given their different 
commitments to models only arises when endorsing each framework wholesale, 




0.8 The Primary Question of the Thesis Revisited 
 
 
With this understanding of the three anticipatory frameworks in hand, let us now 
return to the primary question of this thesis: 
 
What kind of insights about the strong continuity of life and mind do the Free 
Energy Framework, predictive processing and ecological psychological 
framework collectively provide?  
 
Given the anticipatory natures of FEF, PP and EP, and assuming the 
environmental complexity thesis (ECT) affords a fruitful starting point for the 
investigation of cognitive systems, we may restate this question as: 
 
What can our three specific anticipatory cognitive frameworks (FEF, PP and 
EP) tell us about the underlying organizational principles of both living 
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processes and cognitive processes which allow organisms to deal with 
environmental complexity? 
 
Again, one suggestion that has been hinted at above, and that falls out of our initial 
characterizations of life and cognition is that both of these processes are 
anticipatory processes by which an autonomous system continues to actively 
adapt to fluctuations that it encounters in its environment. Mind via adaptive 
behaviour ultimately serves metabolism and metabolism serves the continued 
ability to self-organize (i.e., self-production and self-maintenance of the system 
boundary). Thus, mind via adaptive behaviour serves the continued ability to self-
organize. It is my hope that by attempting to understand strong life-mind continuity 
through the frameworks of FEF, PP and EP this notion that life and mind are 
adaptive processes may be supported, sharpened and expanded upon. By 
deploying these anticipatory frameworks to think about different (yet interrelated) 
forms that cognition can take, this thesis aims to not only throw into relief common 
underlying organizational principles and properties of life and mind, but to also 
investigate the explanatory scope and limits of these frameworks and their 
combinations to account for biological cognition. 
 
One of the suggestions that this thesis will attempt to motivate via considering 
these frameworks with respect to strong life-mind continuity is how full-blown PP 
emerged later in evolutionary history as a result of life’s becoming enriched in 
various manners. The kind of PP underwriting decoupled capacities such as 
planning, mental time travel, thought, and mental imagery generation will be taken 
as an end point for cognitive enrichment. FEF, along with some of the core 
conceptual apparatus from EP, will be used to identify the kind of enriched living 
processes definitive of cognition prior to this full-blown form of PP. In attempting to 
understand how PP systems might have evolved from simpler precursors, the 
current thesis suggests possible cognitive architectural precursors to full-blown 
PP. The cognitive capacities of these PP precursor systems, which deploy many 
of the same PP mechanisms but may be lacking others, may be described using 
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FEF and the apparatus of EP. In identifying where such mechanisms are in place 
and where they are not, various cognitive transition markers and different manners 
of dealing with environmental complexity be identified. In chapter 4, a particular 
case will be made for the claim that environmental demands upon organisms to 
guide their behaviour according to environmental information that is no longer 
available, what I call historical context sensitivity, accounts for the shift to free-
energy minimizing, ‘partial’ PP architectures to full blown hierarchical PP.  
 
The primary question therefore may be broken down to a series of further 
questions that each of the chapters contained in this thesis is organized around. 
One question is how FEF, PP and EP can inform the philosophy of cognitive 
science as to the possible range of forms that biological cognition takes. Chapter 
2 investigates this question by looking at the notion of plant perception and how it 
may differ considerably from animal perception, while chapter 3 uses FEF to 
investigate and offer an of account of cognition in multi-organismal (symbiotic) 
associations. A further question that falls out of the primary question is whether or 
not ecologically direct perception (i.e., coupling to environmental information) is 
sufficient to account for the kinds of complex cognitive phenomena that are 
paradigmatic of human cognition. If EP can provide some conceptual apparatus 
for understanding how living processes may be enriched in simple living systems 
so as to rise to the status of cognitive processes, can the framework of EP also be 
deployed in accounting for complex phenomena such as mental imagery 
generation (chapter 4) or behaviour that is contextually sensitive to events of the 
past (chapters 5)? Or do such complex phenomena require a distinct kind of 
enrichment, representative of transition markers that separate the forms of 
cognition found in simpler organisms from that found in more complex organisms? 
In providing answers to these kinds of questions, this thesis will use FEF, PP and 
elements of EP to construct a logical space for thinking about the degrees of 
complexity that fall out of strong life-mind continuity.  
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From the primary question of this thesis it is possible to tease out an important 
methodological question:  
 
What would conceptualizing cognition––first and foremost––as a kind of 
biological process suggest about the manner in which cognitive phenomena 
should be investigated by cognitive science?  
 
In other words, when considering the fact that cognitive capacities in biological 
systems have an evolutionary history and that the continued presence of these 
capacities today suggests that they have contributed to ways of dealing with 
selective pressures (i.e., environmental complexity), how might the manner in 
which cognitive science investigates such capacities remain sensitive to these 
biological facts?37 It is my hope to illustrate that investigating the primary question 
of the thesis will suggest an answer to this methodological question. Understanding 
strong life-mind continuity through the lenses of FEF, PP and EP may help to 
reveal surprising forms of cognition, the existence of which may suggest that the 
scope of models of organisms used in cognitive science should be expanded in 
order to account for the range in the manners in which organisms cope with the 
kinds of complexity in their econiches (chapter 1). This being said, just how much 
the methodology of cognitive science should be influenced by understanding 
cognition as an organizational enrichment of life is a question which this thesis 
does not attempt to fully answer. More humbly, this thesis may at least provide one 
reason for the reader to assign value to this question and at most provide a partial 






37 One answer to this question is manifest in the biogenic approach to cognition developed by 
Pamela Lyon (2006). More will be said about this approach in chapter 1.   
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0.9 Summary of Chapters 
 
 
Although this thesis has been written as a collection of independent and 
interrelated papers, and as such there is no particular order in which they must be 
read, I would suggest that the reader proceeds by reading the chapters 
consecutively. The present thesis begins with a groundwork chapter that sets up 
the theoretical space in which the remainder of chapters will be situated. The 
subsequent chapters of the thesis are organized to reflect a progression from 
simpler forms of cognition (and simpler organisms) and the anticipatory 
frameworks which are best suited to account for them to more complex forms of 
cognition in humans and the respective framework(s) that can best account for 
those forms. This organization hence throws into relief a picture not only of how 
the apparatus of FEF, PP and EP can be used together to consistently account for 
various forms of cognitive phenomena ranging from simple to complex but this 
organization also brings out the limitations of these frameworks; it makes explicit 
how one framework might be deployed in accounting for a particular phenomenon 
where another one falls short given its theoretical tenets and conceptual 
apparatus. Finally, I would like to acknowledge that because this thesis has been 
written as a collection of interrelated papers, there is some repetition from chapter 
to chapter in the exegesis of various theoretical frameworks being deployed.  
 
Below is a list of the chapters as they are organized and a brief summary of each.  
 
 
Chapter 1 looks at the biogenic approach to cognition (Lyon, 2006). This kind of 
approach begins with an understanding of cognition as a biological process and 
emphasizes the methodological importance of the continuity of mind and life to a 
complete investigation of cognition. This chapter then turns to a particular worry 
for biogenic approaches, an example of which is voiced by Fred Adams (2018): by 
being overly permissive and wrongly identifying sensory processing without 
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intentional content as cognitive processing, the biogenic approach is antithetical to 
progress in cognitive science. This worry is defanged by firstly looking at some of 
the explananda and actual practices of contemporary cognitive science and 
showing that this range is consistent with the kind of phenomena which a biogenic 
approach recognizes as cognitive processes. The second part of this chapter 
proposes the notion of a continuum of intentionality that is defined over the degree 
to which behaviour is tied to representational content. FEF is used as an illustrative 
and worked-out example of how a system’s weak-intentionality-endowed internal 
dynamics (i.e., predictions engendered by generative models) give rise to 
phenotype-constrained adaptive behaviour. Understanding intentionality as both a 
mark of the mental and as existing along a continuum allows biogenic approaches 
and approaches that focus primarily on human-like cognitive phenomena to 
investigate the same overarching process of cognition as expressed in its different 
forms positioned along this continuum. Whereas one of the forms which cognition 
takes at one end of the continuum is that of minimal-perception, something which 
will be developed in detail in Chapter 2, another form of cognition which occupies 
the opposite end is that of decoupled mental imagery generation (Chapter 4).  
Chapter 2 turns from FEF to an FEF-embedded form of PP. The hypothesis of 
plant predictive processing (Calvo & Friston, 2017) suggests that plants, by 
minimizing prediction error, anticipate the perceptual states they need to occupy 
to remain in homeostatic balance with the environment. This chapter demonstrates 
that plant predictive processing when enriched with some of the apparatus of EP 
can satisfy two independently plausible constraints on perception (i.e., the 
veridicality constraint and the constancy constraint). It is in the context of this 
argument that the notion of minimal-perception is developed as the active and 
anticipatory perception of behaviour guiding gradient structure in the perceptual 
medium. Minimal-perception is contrasted with the kind of ‘maximal’ perception of 
objects or gradient sources which is located higher up the continuum of 
intentionality (Chapter 1). It is concluded that, pace our folk-psychological notions 
of perception, an ecologically enriched plant predictive processing provides a 
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plausible reason to believe that plants engage in minimal-perception and exemplify 
the strong continuity of life and mind.  
Chapter 3 The notion of a physiological individual has been developed and applied 
in the philosophy of biology to understand symbiosis, an understanding of which 
is key to theorising about the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality 
to multi-cellularity. The chapter begins by asking what such symbiotic individuals 
can help to reveal about a possible transition in the evolution of cognition. Such a 
transition marks the movement from cooperating individual biological cognizers to 
a functionally integrated cognizing unit. Somewhere along the way, did such 
cognizing units simultaneously have cognizers as parts? Expanding upon the 
multiscale integration view of the FEF, this chapter develops an account of 
reciprocal integration, demonstrating how some coupled biological cognizing 
systems, when certain constraints are met, can result in a cognizing unit that is in 
ways greater than the sum of its cognizing parts. Symbiosis between V. Fischeri 
bacteria and the bobtail squid is used to provide an illustration of this account. A 
novel, graded, manner of conceptualizing biological cognizers is then suggested. 
Lastly it is argued that the reason why the notion of ontologically nested cognizers 
may be unintuitive stems from the fact that our folk-psychology notion of what a 
cognizer is has been deeply influenced by our folk-biological manner of 
understanding biological individuals as units of reproduction.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the degree to which EP, a framework which may be able 
to successfully account for many aspects of cognitively driven behaviour in simpler 
organisms (Chapter 2), can account for the kind of context sensitive intelligent 
behaviour paradigmatic of human cognition. To go about answering this question, 
this chapter looks specifically at affordance perception as developed by Gibson 
(1979). I argue that although the ecological account of direct perception (i.e., 
explanation without recourse to intervening information processing states) has the 
conceptual apparatus to explain many of the seemingly difficult cases of 
affordance context-sensitivity that are studied experimentally, there is one kind of 
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context-sensitivity that ecological direct perception cannot account for: historical 
context sensitivity. After identifying this explanatory limit of ecological direct 
perception, it is argued that because PP adapts the ecological notion of 
affordances, despite its being representationalist about context sensitive 
affordance perception, PP manages to respect a primary motivation behind direct 
perception by securing an indispensable role for environmental information 
exploitation. The explanatory limit of direct perception that historical context 
sensitivity helps to identify suggests a principled manner of identifying a difference 
in contextual conditions that maps on to a difference in required PP processing. 
Here, precision weighting mechanisms start to exert more of an influence on 
perception-action than would be the case in other instances of affordance 
perception.  
Chapter 5 looks at whether or not and how ‘higher’ forms of cognition can be 
accounted for by some of the same theoretical apparatus which can account for 
the forms of cognition occupying the lower areas of the intentionality continuum. 
Action-based theories of cognition, EP being one of the more stringent forms of 
which, emphasize the role that agent-environment coupling plays in the 
emergence of psychological states. Prima facie, mental imagery seems to present 
a problem for some of these theories because it is generally thought to be an 
environmentally decoupled phenomenon. This chapter, however, argues that 
mental imagery is much more multifaceted than it seems on the face of it. Focusing 
on a particular kind of imagery, comparative mental imagery generation, I 
demonstrate that although such imagery can arise without the need for sensory 
stimulus as input (it can be what I call “stimulus-absent”) it is also sensitive to 
ambient stimulus flux; it is what I call “stimulus-sensitive”. That a process is 
stimulus-sensitive is sufficient for it to qualify as an environmentally coupled 
process. This chapter contributes to EP by developing the ecological notion of 
variant coupling (i.e., the coupling of a perceptual system to variant environmental 
information). I argue that variant coupling may not only offer a manner in which 
action-based theories may account for comparative mental imagery generation, 
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but it may offer a manner of accounting for other forms of imagery also. The 
chapter concludes by offering a novel taxonomy for online/offline cognitive 
phenomena that takes the notions of stimulus-absence and stimulus-sensitivity in 
addition to coupling/decoupling to invariant and variant information into account, 
showing how the traditional offline/online distinction is inadequate for 
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A Continuum of Intentionality: linking biogenic and 






Biogenic approaches investigate cognition from the standpoint of evolutionary 
function, asking what cognition does for a living system and then looking for 
common principles and exhibitions of cognitive strategies in a vast array of living 
systems – non-neural to neural. One worry which arises for the biogenic approach 
is that it is overly permissive in terms of what it construes as cognition. In this paper 
I critically engage with a recent instance of this way of criticising biogenic 
approaches in order to clarify their theoretical commitments and prospects. In his 
critique of the biogenic approach, Fred Adams (2018) provides a strict demarcation 
criterion that uses the presence of intentional states with conceptual-level 
representational content to identify cognitively driven behaviour. In this paper I 
propose to grant Adams’ contention that intentionality is a mark of the cognitive, 
but I argue that this is compatible with endorsing the biogenic approach. I argue 
that because cognitive science is not exclusively interested in behaviour driven by 
intentional states with the kind of content Adams demands, the biogenic 
approach’s status as an approach to cognition is not called into question. I then go 
on to propose a novel view of intentionality whereby it is seen to exist along a 
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continuum which increases or decreases in the degrees that behaviour is tied to 
representational content. Understanding intentionality as existing along a 
continuum allows biogenic approaches and anthropogenic approaches to 
investigate the same overarching capacity of cognition as expressed in its different 




1.1 Introduction  
 
 
One kind of starting point for investigating cognition begins by asking questions 
pitched at the kind of ‘high-level’ capacities paradigmatic of human cognition (e.g., 
beliefs, desires, concept formation, language, reasoning, conscious experience, 
etc.): What is the relationship between perception and belief?  How does a child 
learn the concept of a “bird”? Is attention necessary for consciousness? This 
starting point then attempts to account for possible instances of such ‘high level’ 
capacities within an explanatory framework tailored specifically to them. From this 
anthropogenic starting point, human cognition is the standard against which all 
other forms of behaviour are recognized as a proper topic for cognitive scientific 
inquiry. Another kind of starting point, the biogenic approach (Lyon, 2006) begins 
investigating cognition from the evolutionary assumption that ‘higher’ cognition, 
like other biological capacities, has evolved from simpler cognitive (or cognition-
like) capacities. Under the evolutionary assumption, cognition, like forms of 
breathing, may have evolved many times over the course of evolutionary history. 
The biogenic approach (BA) as such starts with biological facts and attempts to 
work its way up to human cognition. By widening the scope of model organisms 
under consideration to include organisms such as bacteria and plants as 
cognizers, proponents of BA suggest that it is well placed to identify possible 
unifying principles and conserved mechanisms underlying a full range of cognitive 
capacities, from simple to complex (see Lengler et al., 2000; Ben Jacob et al., 
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2006; van Duijn et al., 2007; Baluška & Mancuso 2009; Bechtel, 2014;  Barrett, 
2019; Calvo et al., 2020). 
 
One worry which arises for BA is that it is overly permissive in terms of what it 
construes as bona fide cognition. The behaviour of bacteria and plants is 
something that philosophers have been prone to consider as an inflexible, reflexive 
response to sensory stimuli (Dennett, 1984; Sterelny, 2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2002; 
Schlicht, 2018). If such behaviour under BA qualifies as an expression of cognition, 
then it seems––one might worry––that the very notion of cognition is rendered too 
unconstrained to be explanatorily useful. This kind of worry is voiced by Fred 
Adams (2018), who in a recent critique of BA responds by providing a strict 
demarcation criterion that allows for drawing a sharp line between the cognitive 
and the non-cognitive. This classification methodology, which is informed by 
traditional philosophy of cognitive science, uses the presence of intentional states 
with conceptual-level content as a manner of picking out behaviour that is 
underwritten by cognitive processing. Armed with this conception of the mark of 
the cognitive, Adams mounts an argument against BA: because the various cases 
of behaviour that biogenic theorists have classified as cognitive are not 
underwritten by intentional states with conceptual-level content, such cases of 
behaviour fail to be expressions of cognition; they are more accurately classified 
as hardwired responses to sensory information processing.  What I call Adams’ 
‘argument from intentional content’ goes on to conclude that this conflation is 
harmful to the endeavours of cognitive science and that BA should be abandoned 
as an approach to cognition.  
 
The general worry that BA is overly permissive (or even incoherent) relies on an 
implicit appeal to some mark of the cognitive. Adams is thus useful to engage with 
because he makes a rare attempt to explicitly spell out what this mark of the 
cognitive is, in a way that purports to be informed by the nature and methodology 
of cognitive science. Identifying the infelicities of Adams’ critique gives us a better 
view of the explanatory tools that BA might have at its disposal, and the manner in 
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which anthropogenic and biogenic approaches relate to each other. Is there, 
however, another classification methodology available that is compatible with the 
range of cognitive behaviours recognized by biogenic theorists, yet which 
nonetheless offers a manner of distinguishing the cognitive from the non-
cognitive? In what follows, I will argue in favour of an affirmative answer to this 
question.   
 
For the purposes of this paper, I propose to grant Adams’ contention that 
intentionality is a mark of the cognitive, but I argue that this is nonetheless 
compatible with endorsing BA. I do so by proposing and arguing for the 
intentionality continuum thesis, a thesis that is informed by looking at the range of 
projects cognitive scientists actually spend their time doing. On one end of the 
taxonomy I present there is weak intentionality of the internal dynamics that drive 
sensorimotor and biochemical behaviour. Meaningful content at the level of weak 
intentionality is, we shall see, phenotype-dependent. It is directed at sensory states 
that are to be pursued (or avoided) given the conditions which an agent must 
remain in in order to preserve its organization over the long run. On the other end 
there is strong intentionality which involves internal representations with 
conceptual content and possible phenomenological character that is deployable 
offline. Intentionality is a necessary feature of cognition, but where a particular 
behaviour/state falls upon the continuum of intentionality is of no relevance to that 
behaviour’s being (or not being) an expression of cognition. I shall argue Adams’ 
anthropogenic-based hallmark of the cognitive looks arbitrary once we appreciate 
that the intentionality that is of interest to cognitive scientists is not exhausted by 
intentional states with truth evaluable content. Given that contemporary cognitive 
science does indeed investigate and recognize putative cognitive phenomena and 
mechanisms that fall all along the continuum of intentionality, the manner in which 
Adams delineates cognitive from non-cognitive processes is undermined by the 
range of interests and aims of researchers in the very discipline he attempts to 
safeguard. Understanding intentionality as existing along a continuum allows 
biogenic approaches and anthropogenic approaches to investigate the same 
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overarching capacity of cognition as expressed in its different forms positioned 
along the continuum. The continuum thesis is promising not only as grounds for a 
reply to cognitive chauvinists who use an overly sophisticated notion of cognition, 
but because it illustrates that both biogenic and anthropogenic approaches are 
valid starting points for investigating a common notion of cognition. 
 
This paper will proceed as follows: Section 1.2, provides an overview of BA. In 
Section 1.3, I present Adams’ argument from intentional content against BA. In 
Section 1.4,  after quickly surveying some of the practices and projects of 
contemporary cognitive science, I argue that because cognitive science is not 
exclusively interested in behaviour driven by intentional states with truth evaluable 
representational content, BA’s status as an approach to cognition is not called into 
question in the way that Adams suggests. I then propose a novel view of 
intentionality whereby it is seen to exist along a continuum which increases or 
decreases in the degrees that behaviour is tied to representational content. I make 
use of some of the conceptual apparatus of the Free Energy Framework to 
illustrate the kind of ‘weak intentionality’ that arises at the initial end of this 
continuum. This section concludes by returning to the worry that BA is overly 
permissive. I argue that the worry is defanged when it is recognized that there may 
be living systems that do instantiate weak intentionality and that cognition, even if 
widespread, takes many forms. This being said, sharpening the concepts that 
delineate the various forms of cognition that are located along the continuum of 
intentionality will be central to the continued progress of any biogenic approach to 






1.2 The Biogenic approach  
 
 
In her seminal paper ‘The biogenic approach to cognition’ Pamela Lyon (2006) 
identifies a particular investigatory strategy which she claims has been central to 
two distinct kinds of cognitive explanation: self-organizing complex systems 
theories and autopoietic theory. The first of these kinds of explanation, examples 
of which may be seen in the work of Goodson (2003), Rosen (1985), Piaget (1970), 
Popper (1965/1972), Vertosick (2002), Christensen (2004), Bickhard (2009), and 
Deacon (2012), among others, places emphasis upon the relation between 
cognition and the second law of thermodynamics. More precisely, it sees cognition 
as a process that underwrites an organism’s ability to remain in thermodynamically 
improbable non-equilibrium steady states despite the tendency for all systems to 
move towards thermodynamic equilibrium. Homeostasis, the preservation of 
steady-states (e.g., physiological states such as oxygenation, core temperature, 
and metabolic energy levels), is an ongoing result of a dissipative system’s ability 
to modulate its parameters (i.e., internal processes and external behaviour) so as 
to avoid persistence-compromising situations (e.g., starvation or predation).38 Self-
organizing complex systems theorists thus see cognition as the host of capacities, 
varying in their complexity, that guide a system’s parameter modulation so as to 
preserve its homeostatic balance and keep it at thermodynamic disequilibrium 
despite environmental perturbance.  
In contrast, rather than understanding cognition in terms of thermodynamic 
regulation, autopoietic theory (Maturana 1970/1980; Maturana & Varela,1980; 
 
 
38 A dissipative system is a thermodynamically open system that, which in virtue of exchanging 
matter and energy with the environment, remains far from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
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Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2005) understands cognition in terms of a biological 
system’s ability to continuously produce itself and distinguish itself from its milieu.  
Self-production is the internally driven process whereby a biological system 
continuously constructs and realizes its own network of processes (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980).39  Self-distinction, on the other hand, is the process of generating 
and preserving systemic boundaries (e.g., a cell membrane) by which an organism 
partitions itself from its non-systemic environment. Self-production and self-
distinction are construed as necessary and sufficient conditions on life. According 
to autopoietic theory, cognition is entailed by life, expressing a deep continuity 
between life and mind. In other words, “living systems are cognitive systems, and 
living as a process is a process of cognition” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13).40 
The overlap between self-organizing complex systems theory and autopoietic 
theory should be clear: both kinds of theory construe cognition as a biological 
adaptive strategy; cognition is expressed in a set of adaptive behavioural 
capacities which functionally underpin a biological system’s ability to remain alive. 
Self-organizing complex systems theory emphasizes capacities to navigate 
energetically dynamic environments so as to self-preserve; autopoietic theory 
emphasizes the capacities leading to self-production of the organismic boundary 
that defines the autonomous organism in relation to its external environment.  
This overlap is illustrative of the core explanatory strategy of BA; BA starts from 
the notion that cognition is a functional capacity that, being driven by various 
selection pressures, has been gradually selected for––perhaps many times––over 
evolutionary timescales. Thus, BA starts with the facts of biology in attempting to 
 
 
39 There are important disagreements between ‘autopoietic theory’ as propounded by Maturana 
and the enactive approaches developed by Varela, Thompson and Di Paolo. See Villalobos & 
Ward (2015). 
40 Although autopoietic theory is an example of a biogenic explanatory approach, it is not required 
that a biogenic approach be committed to the kind of entailment thesis (i.e., that life entails mind 
and mind entails life) that is central to autopoietic theory. The entailment thesis, for example, is 
not held by self-organizing complex systems theories. 
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understand what cognition does for biological systems. This is clear when Lyon 
writes:  
 
“An investigator adopting a biogenic approach assumes that the principles 
of biological organization and the requirements of survival and reproduction 
present the most productive route to a general understanding of the 
principles of cognition. Cognition, whatever it may be in the future, is 
naturally a biological process and a biological function” (2006, p.12).  
 
 
We saw above that BA may be contrasted with the anthropogenic approach (AA) 
(Lyon, 2006). This latter approach may be understood in terms of two related 
claims. The first claim is that the most fruitful starting point to the investigation of 
cognition in general as it is found in nonhuman animals and other lifeforms is 
understanding human cognition. The second claim is one of demarcation: the 
cognitive is demarcated from the non-cognitive by using distinctively human 
capacities (e.g., believing, thinking, planning, decision making, reasoning, etc.) as 
the non-negotiable standard of cognition. The notion of cognition that these kinds 
of capacities and their putative mechanisms suggest is then used comparatively 
to determine whether or not the behaviour of non-human systems should be 
considered as expressive of cognition. With these two moves, AA works from the 
human case “downwards” to possible cases of non-human cognition (Lyon, 2006). 
Because of its human-centred demarcation criteria, AA generally assumes that the 
possession of a central nervous system, the use of representational states, and 
rationality are all central features of cognition.  
 
In contrast, by seeing the evolutionary function of cognition as the proper starting 
point of investigation, the biogenic theorist may choose to investigate how that 
function is expressed in humans as well as in bacteria depending upon the 
theorist’s interests. As such, BA’s proponents argue that since it recognizes human 
cognition as being a determinate of a larger determinable category ‘cognition’, the 
biogenic perspective allows for a more complete picture of what cognition does for 
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living systems and how various cognitive phenomena are related despite being 
selected for by different evolutionary pressures. Lyon writes: 
 
 
“It is important to stress that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
indeed, both are necessary for a complete picture. We must understand 
what cognition is and what it does as a natural phenomenon, but we also 
have to understand human psychological experience” (2006, p. 26). 
 
 
Here, Lyon makes it explicit that the two approaches to investigating cognition are 
complementary; investigating what cognition does for biological systems will 
ultimately include investigating how it does what it does in the human case. That 
being said, there is a tension between AA’s demarcation criterion and BA’s 
biological starting point. For BA, many genuine instances of cognition may take a 
very different form than that of human cognition. It is due to the AA theorist’s more 
restrictive conception of cognition that she may attempt to dismiss the broader set 
of non-human-like capacities recognized as cognitive by BA theorists as something 
else. As will be seen in the next section, it is just this kind of charge that Fred 




1.3 The Argument from Intentional Content  
 
 
Adams (2018), on behalf of AA, has recently raised an objection against BA. 
Appealing to the interests and practices of contemporary cognitive science, he 
argues that cognitive scientists use the term “cognition” to refer to something very 
different than what BA theorists use the term to refer to. Hence, thinks Adams, 
attending to cognitive scientific practice shows that we should prefer AA to BA. In 
line with a venerable trend in philosophy of cognitive science (Fodor, 1990; 
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Dretske, 1981), Adams’s general anthropogenic classification methodology 
distinguishes cognition from non-cognition by holding that the former is a kind of 
processing that necessarily involves internal representational states with 
intentionality. Intentionality, the property of “aboutness” that mental states have to 
be directed at the world was originally proposed by Brentano (1874/1995) as the 
mark of the mental. In other words, “all and only mental phenomena exhibit 
intentionality” (Schlicht, 2018, p. 8). These intentional states, Adams contends, 
take the format of representations with conceptual-level content, the meaning of 




“[…] cognition requires specific kinds of representational formats. And these 
formats are built on top of information processes. The symbols that are 
cognitive are built from information exchanged between system and 
environment. But the format of these representations is semantic at a level 
above that of the information itself” (Adams, 2018, p. 24; my emphasis). 
 
 
It is only when intentional states with conceptual-level content operate on sensory 
representations (i.e., sensory information states) that the resulting behaviour can 
truly be said to be cognitively driven.41 Adams’s clarifies this format distinction 
between meaning-bearing representations with conceptual-level content and 
sensory representations when, referring to his own work and that of Dretske 
(1981,1998) he writes: 
 
“But conceptual representations are different kinds of representations than 
sensory ones. The change from information to meaning (where the content 
of a concept is its meaning) involves changes in the format of 
representation” (Adams, 2018. 28). 
 
 
41 The mere deployment of representations with intentional content without resulting behaviour 
(e.g., thinking, reasoning, etc.) or in the absence of sensory information states would also qualify 





“I am suggesting that cognition is this kind of information processing which 
alters the representational format to a different level––to the level of 
meaning and not just information” (Adams, 2018. 28).  
 
 
To get an idea of the kind of representational format that he argues underwrites 
genuine cognition, Adams offers an example. If a person senses that the 
temperature of a room is increasing, whether or not she is aware of it, she also 
senses the increasing mean molecular kinetic energy (mmke) of the air 
surrounding her. However, if she thinks that the room’s temperature is increasing, 
she needn’t think that the mmke of the surrounding air is also increasing. This 
example demonstrates that although thoughts, beliefs, desires, and other 
representations with intentional content may be about the same referent (in this 
case a target event), thinking one kind of thought (distinguished by its meaning) 
about a referent does not entail thinking all corollary thoughts about the same 
referent. Although sensory information processing may involve representations, 
such representations fail to have the right format, on Adams’ construal, and thus 
they never to rise to the level of meaning.42  
 
In contrast to the deployment of intentional states with conceptual-level content, 
Adams claims that what BA calls ‘cognition’ is mere information processing of 
sensory states which results in hardwired, adaptive behaviour. Although cognitive 
and non-cognitive processes both involve information processing and adaptive 
 
 
42 The distinction between what Adams calls sensory representations and representations with 
intentionality may be interpreted as being analogous to Grice’s (1957) distinction between 
“natural meaning” and “non-natural meaning”. Natural meaning is indication-based. For example, 
smoke indicates fire, but smoke is not about fire in the sense that one cannot intelligibly speak 
about the presence of smoke in the absence of fire as something that is ‘false’. Non-natural 
meaning, on the other hand, rises to the level of semantics. For example, that the word “water” 
means “tasteless, odourless, colourless liquid” makes it the case that the proposition “water is 
black and tastes like tar” is false.  
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behaviour, the kind of adaptive behaviour that is driven by mere sensory 
information (in a sensory format) alone does not rise to the status of being cognitive 
behaviour. It is because what biogenic theorists refer to as cognition is actually 
“information-driven behaviour that is adjusted in response to variable 
environmental conditions” (Adams, 2018, p.27), that biogenic plant scientists and 
biologists erroneously categorize the adaptive behaviour of organisms such as 
plants and bacteria as cognition-driven processes. When biogenic theorists claim 
that plants and bacteria exhibit cognitive capacities what they are really doing is 
changing the subject altogether from cognition to something else. For in such 
cases “there are no internal states that mean (in the sense of having truth values) 
things outside the system” (Adams, 2018, p.29). Adams concludes that because 
intentionality is a distinctive characteristic of the cognitive and this is something 
which BA by ascribing cognition to plants and bacteria fails to respect, biogenic 
researchers are in the practice of investigating something very different than what 
cognitive science recognizes as cognition.  
 
I will now respond to this argument by providing another classification methodology 
for distinguishing the cognitive from the non-cognitive, one which is compatible 




1.4 Responding to the Argument from Intentional Content 
 
 
It may be assumed that Adams’s primary reason for locating cognition at the level 
of intentional states with semantic content is based upon his view of what cognitive 
science recognizes as cognition.43 If biogenic theorists when ascribing cognition to 
 
 
43 To be clear, Adams is in agreement with Lyon, who when setting out what she identifies as the 
core anthropogenic principles (i.e., the core principles of contemporary cognitive science), claims 
that intentionality is a distinctive feature of cognition according to AA. BA principles as put forth by 
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bacteria and plants are using “cognition” to mean something other than processing 
that reaches the level of intentional states with conceptual-level content “then no 
one in current cognitive science would be alarmed” (Adams, 2018, p.28). However, 
if such theorists are not ascribing cognitive capacities to plants and bacteria 
instrumentally and actually “intend the cognitive ascriptions to be true, then it is not 
harmless” (Adams, 2018, p.29).  I will now demonstrate that proponents of BA can 
both agree with Adams that intentionality is a distinct feature of the cognitive and 
yet consistently reject his claim that intentionality must be concept-based in order 
for processing to qualify as cognition. More specifically, using a classification 
methodology that takes what cognitive scientists actually do as its lead, I shall 
propose a view of intentionality that conceives of it as a continuum, ranging from 
weak to strong intentionality. Because cognitive science investigates and 
recognizes cognitive phenomena all along the continuum and not just at the level 
of strong intentionality where Adams restrictively locates cognition, his argument 
against BA turns out to be ill-motivated. In locating cognition exclusively at the level 
of strong intentionality, Adams disregards the range of research that cognitive 
scientists have engaged in over the course of the last 40 years. I begin with an 
initial response that considers some of the current practices of cognitive science. I 
shall then introduce the intentionality continuum thesis as a primary response to 
Adams’ argument from intentionality and more generally as a ground for rejecting 





Lyon do not include intentionality. Interestingly, if the continuum that I propose below is correct 
then Lyon has overlooked intentionality as a necessary feature of cognition that is common to BA 




1.4.1 The Practices of Current Cognitive Science 
 
 
Does cognitive science recognize and investigate only those phenomena that are 
underwritten by intentional states in the form of beliefs and desires with concepts 
as their constituents? While there is plenty of cognitive science that is aimed at 
investigating phenomena at the level of Adams’ strong intentionality, it appears 
that there is plenty that is not. A wide range of cognitive scientific research 
programmes such as action-blindsight research (Kentridge, Heywood & 
Weiskranz, 1999), two visual streams research (Milner and Goodale, 1992), 4E 
cognition (i.e., enactive, embedded, embodied and situated cognition) (Clark, 
1997/2008; Chemero, 2009; Beer 2000; Thompson, 2007; O’Regan, 1992; Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980; Kirsh, 2010), action-oriented cognition ( Jeannerod, 2006; Cisek 
& Kalaska, 2010; Engel, Maye, Kurthen, & König, 2013; Pezzulo, 2011; Tversky, 
2019), and dynamic systems accounts (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Beer, 2000; Kelso, 
2016; Newell & Liu, 2012)–to name a few–investigate and explain psychological 
processes in ways that do not essentially implicate states with conceptual-level 
contents. This is not to deny that much of cognitive science is focused upon 
phenomena at the level of strong intentionality. What I am arguing however is that 
cognitive science does not exclusively investigate phenomena at the level of strong 
intentionality. The existence of each of these many programmes demonstrates that 
cognitive science recognizes and investigates processes that do not exclusively 
involve conceptual representations. To take an example, the core of embodied 
cognition is based upon the claim that a complete understanding of cognition 
requires understanding the various constitutive roles that the sensorimotor 
systems play in not only conceptualization (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) but also 
how we respond to environmental changes and solve problems in the here and 
now (Clark, 2008). A classic example of this is the ecological solution to the 
baseball outfielder problem in which by moving so as to keep a flyball’s position 
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steady in one’s field of view––staying coupled to it via sensorimotor engagement–
–one is able to adjust one’s movement’s in light of the ball’s perceptible trajectory 
and eventually catch it (McBeath et al., 1995).44 The kind of conceptual-level 
representation that Adams argues is definitive of intentionality is rendered 
superfluous by this simple solution to the problem of how to catch a fly ball.  
 
More generally, the kind of cognitive science which has emerged in the last 40 
years has recognized a problem space that calls for the use of adaptive strategies 
that are not limited to detached planning, abstract thought, and conceptualization. 
The agreed problem space of cognitive science has been widened to include 
problems that arise on faster timescales. Attempting to address these problems 
has motivated many researchers to abandon the kind of traditional “sandwich” 
model of cognition that Adams uses (i.e., where cognition is conceived of as a 
process occurring sandwiched between perceiving and acting).45 Many of the 
problems in this wider problem space may be efficiently solved by eliciting frugal 
and fast solutions of environmentally coupled perception and action loops (Clark, 
2008). This is not to say (radically) that all solutions required within this widened 
problem space involve the coupling of an organism to the environment via action 
and perception, but rather that there are various kinds of cognitive strategies that 
may be deployed given the nature of the problems which organisms are faced with. 
 
Adams’ argument from intentionality would like to conclude that BA is untenable 
and is harmful to cognitive science because it conflates actual cognition with mere 
sensory information processing. However, if one takes into account the range of 
research programmes that have been developing over the last 40 years (i.e., what 
cognitive scientists have actually been investigating and how the field is 
developing), his claim about what “cognition” means to cognitive science is simply 
 
 
44 For different theoretical perspectives regarding this process see McLeod, Reed & Dienes, 
(2006) on optical acceleration cancelation and see McBeath, Shaffer & Kaiser, (1995) on linear 
optical trajectory. 
45 Susan Hurley (1998) is responsible for coining the term “sandwich model”. 
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not true (anymore). Adams hence fails to provide a valid reason to reject BA as a 
cognitive explanatory framework. This being said, the argument from intentionality 
does however provide a valuable opportunity to demonstrate just how BA and AA 
are linked across a continuum of intentionality. Disagreeing with Adams about BA 
doesn’t entail rejecting the idea that intentionality is a distinctive feature of 
cognition. It does, however, require understanding more about the relationship 
between the kind of conceptual-level intentionality Adams emphasises and what is 
implicated in the self-organising/autopoietic dynamics of BA.  
 
In the next subsection I will develop the intentionality continuum thesis and argue 
that when taking it into account, demarcating the cognitive from non-cognitive by 
way of an intentionality criterion fails to be a consideration against BA. If the 
intentionality continuum thesis is correct, BA and AA merely lie upon two poles on 
the continuum, separated by the degree of intentionality involved in the kinds of 
cognitive phenomena they investigate. I will now introduce the crucial notion of 
weak intentionality that underlies all degrees of intentionality on the continuum and 





1.4.2 The Intentionality Continuum Thesis: weak intentionality 
 
 
On one end of the intentionality continuum is what I call weak intentionality. I shall 
define this as the phenotype-relative aboutness of internal dynamics that is 
directed at target objects/environmental state changes (e.g., gradients) and which 
causally underpins adaptive behaviour. Such dynamics are meaningful insofar as 
they guide an organism’s interactions with its relevant environment or Umwelt (von 
Uexküll, 1957), allowing it to remain in the select set of physiological (viable) states 
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that are defined by its phenotype.46 Importantly, although these dynamics allow 
homeostatic maintenance, as we shall see below, they are not reducible to the 
kind of closed loop feedback control involved in maintenance of homeostatic 
states.  
 
Much like what the autopoietic theorists have called “basic intentionality” 
(Thompson, 2007; Schlicht, 2018), weak intentionality is a feature of the entire 
organism and its behaviour rather than a feature of cognitive states or underlying 
mechanisms. Weak intentionality is a property of an organism’s integrated internal 
dynamics that is causatively manifested in sensorimotor and biochemical 
behaviour. Given the integrated nature of these dynamics, not just any behavioural 
response counts as weak-intentionality-driven. In order to qualify as such 
behaviour must be directed at having higher-order homeostatic influence; an 
organism invests its current short-term homeostatic stability (i.e., metabolic 
resources) for anticipated long-term homeostatic stability brought about as a result 
of that investment. In some organisms, this will be manifest as overt behaviour, 
exerting a direct influence upon its surrounds (e.g., spending metabolic resources 
now in cutting timber and building a fire to avoid freezing over the night). In other 
organisms, this higher-order influence may take the form of metabolically 
expensive investments in gene transcription in preparation for yet-to-be-
encountered stress conditions (see below for an example). 
 
One primary distinction between autopoietic basic intentionality and weak 
intentionality is that where the former may be understood as non-representational, 
the latter is representational but in an undemanding way. Representation at the 
level of weak intentionality is compatible with the idea that biological systems 
detect rich environmental information to perceive their surrounds and direct their 
 
 
46 Similar to the notion of meaning underwriting J.J. Gibson’s (1966,1979) ecological notion of 
affordances (i.e., perceivable organism-relative opportunities for action that the environment 
offers) the meaning expressed in weak intentional content is not something that may be divorced 
from either the (anticipated) structure of the environment or the (anticipated) states of the 
biological system. 
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behaviour (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Michaels & Carello, 1980). This is because the 
function of these representations is not to mediate an organism’s epistemic contact 
with the world or to be accurate proxies of their target states but rather to poise the 
entire biological system for adaptive interaction with meaningful aspects of its 
environment. The upshot of this poise is that an organism’s integrated 
sensorimotor (and biochemical) behaviour is continuously driven towards 
anticipated outcomes brought about by that very behaviour (e.g., chemical gradient 
increases that specify the distribution of food). These outcomes reflect the 
conditions under which that kind of organism can successfully continue to preserve 
itself under selective pressures. In other words, the poising representational 
activity at the level of weak intentionality––when all goes well––may be inaccurate 
but nonetheless deliver satisficing results in the form of survival. 
Representation at the level of weak intentionality may be conceptualized in terms 
of two different content-related aspects: weak intentional content is both future-
oriented and action-oriented. Content is future-oriented in that it is anticipatory of 
environmental and sensory state changes which would occur were such and such 
a behaviour initiated given current environmental states. These future-oriented 
dynamics are tantamount to the occasioning of subpersonal predictions that (via 
sensorimotor or biochemical behaviour) mandate the temporary alteration of 
homeostatic equilibrium now (action) in order to avoid anticipated irrecoverable 
deviation from homeostatic equilibrium later.47  Such predictions arise in virtue of 
the fact that a living system embodies a model of itself thriving in its environment; 
because all living systems that exist are the result of an evolutionary history of 
organism-environment interactions, any existing organism’s anatomy, physiology 
and behaviour has been ‘tuned’ to its environment, capturing the very conditions 
under which it can metabolically function (i.e., its viable state range). These 
conditions take the form of stable expectations that are the standard against which 
 
 
47 For example, your expending a lot of precious metabolic energy now (i.e., swimming as fast as 
you can to reach the shore) is a temporary deviation that might allow you to avoid being eaten by 
a hungry shark. 
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all environmental perturbation is measured; they govern both when and how a 
system compensates for possibly damaging deviation from the evolutionary norms 
they capture. Future-oriented content allows some systems to act before deviation 
from the norms it embodies has occurred. 
For example, after detecting decreasing levels of its preferred nutrient (glucose) in 
its environmental medium, some strains of wild yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, 
begin the metabolically expensive process of galactose utilization pathway 
induction, allowing them to catabolize galactose in preparation for eventual 
glucose depletion (Wang et al., 2015).48 One manner of understanding this 
phenomenon is that the internal dynamics that facilitate galactose utilization 
pathway induction are modified in part by the yeast’s sensitivity to a tendency in 
the global structure of its environmental medium (i.e., decreases in glucose 
concentration specify the eventual exhaustion of glucose). This modification 
biases the system to behave anticipatorily, acting not solely with respect to its 
short-term homeostatic maintenance and the sensory/environmental states that it 
is currently detecting (which otherwise might be considered a mere reflex-like 
response) but with respect to its homeostasis over the long-run and the sensory 
states that it is likely to encounter given the kind of model it embodies (i.e., the kind 
of organism it is).49 Given that S. cerevisiae has the stable expectation “I am 
 
 
48 Wang et al. (2015), write: “We now have shown that low or decreasing levels of a preferred 
nutrient can serve as a predictive cue for eventual depletion. Since this is inevitable when cells 
deplete a mixture of nutrients at unequal rates, and mixed-nutrient environments are ubiquitous in 
nature, environmental anticipation may be a more widespread regulatory strategy than previously 
recognized” (p.16). 
49 An important difference between sensorimotor (or biochemical) behaviour driven by weak 
intentional content and mere reflex-like response is that the former necessarily has a degree of 
flexibility whereas the latter may be reducible to homeostatic control loops. Reflex-like control 
loops drive responses to stimuli in virtue of sensory deviations from genetically encoded, 
‘expected’ setpoints (i.e., constant predictions that describe a limited range of values that states 
can take and remain conducive to the viability of the system). See Pezzulo et al., (2015). Flexible 
behaviour on the other hand (minimally) requires a level protracted (i.e., longer timescale) 
systemic integration of sensory pathway information on the part of the behaving system, allowing 
for context sensitive anticipatory response to future global changes in that system’s external and 
internal environment. Thus, future-oriented, weak intentionality-driven behaviour is ‘for’ 
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always in a nutrient rich environment”, it will behave in ways that make its soon-to-
be-encountered environment fit this expectation by inducing the galactose 
pathway. This expectation is a state of the whole organism, manifesting itself in a 
higher-order homeostatic influence. 
The fact that content is future-oriented exposes a further important fact: weak 
intentional content has a degree of independence from the influences of the 
environment. This degree of independence frees behaviour from being fully 
determined by the current states of the encountered environment; it opens up a 
space for a kind of primitive agency and motivation; rather than being “pushed 
around” by sensory stimuli, an agent’s behaviour is normatively constrained by 
maintaining certain long-term homeostatic steady-states that its persistence 
depends upon.  
 
Relatedly, representational content at the level of weak intentionality is action-
oriented (Clark & Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1997; Tschantz, 2020); it does not merely 
describe environmental/sensory states but imperatively guides action so as to 
bring preferred environmental/sensory states about. The descriptive content of the 
internal dynamics that cause the galactose utilization pathway to be induced may 
be something like “there will be an absence of local glucose in the near future, 
given the decreasing gradients of local glucose currently and in the immediate/near 
past”; the imperative content may be “start inducing the galactose utilization 
pathway now!”. 50 One characteristic of this action-oriented aspect of 
representational content that is particular to the level of weak intentionality is that 
it is action guaranteeing. In other words, where there is weak intentional content, 




homeostatic maintenance but is not itself homeostatic maintenance. It corresponds to allostatic 
control.  
50 Misrepresentation in this example may be understood as a case in which the induction of the 
galactose pathway occurs due to a small decrease in the sensed glucose concentration despite 
the overall tendency of the environment to be glucose abundant. 
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This notion of weak intentionality is implicated in BA. Recall that in both autopoietic 
theory and self-organizing complex systems theory cognition is conceptualized 
functionally in terms of those adaptive behavioural capacities underwriting a 
system’s viability maintenance. In order for behaviour to be adaptive it must be 
constrained in ways that are adequate to the viability of the kind of living system in 
question. It is only by being so constrained that behaviour qualifies as cognitively 
driven. The answer to the important question of “what constrains behaviour in ways 
that makes it adaptive for a particular system?” exposes how weak intentionally is 
implicated in BA. In self-organized complex system theory, it is in virtue of a 
system’s embodying an anticipatory model of itself and its environment (i.e., the 
states that define it physiologically) (Rosen, 1985/2012; Goodson, 2001) that its 
adaptive behaviour is appropriately constrained.51  
  
In autopoietic theory, the same important question may be approached from a 
different angle by asking: How does a system distinguish autopoietic-relevant from 
autopoietic-irrelevant objects/environmental state changes that it should interact 
with? Because the domain of autopoietic-relevant objects/environmental states 
that one interacts with is the “domain of the cognitive” (Maturana, 1980), answering 
this question addresses the question of what constrains cognitively driven 
behaviour. According to autopoietic theory, a system’s adaptive (and hence 
cognitively driven behaviour) is constrained by its organization. Organization may 
be understood as the stable dynamics of a system that defines it as the system it 
is and which, unlike its physical structure, cannot change without the system’s 
ceasing to be. Adaptive behaviour, according to both self-organizing complex 
systems theory and autopoietic theory, is thus constrained by the subset of a 
system’s internal dynamics (i.e., its model or its organization) that capture the kinds 
of objects/environmental state changes that are relevant to its continued survival. 
It should be clear by this point how weak intentionality is related to this account of 
 
 
51 For a self-organizing complex systems theory account of anticipatory cognition that rejects 
internal anticipatory models in favour of models that are physically embodied in a system’s 
dynamics see (Riegler, 2001).  
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cognition: weak intentionality follows from the fact that the activity of models and/or 
systemic organization is directed at those environmental conditions, the bringing 
about of which supports the continuation of that very model and/or organization; 
adaptive behaviour in BA is constrained by internal dynamics that, in virtue of their 
capturing phenotypic norms, are endowed with weak intentionality.    
 
An illustrative and worked out example of the kind of weak-intentionality-endowed 
internal dynamics in place in BA is provided by the Free Energy Framework 
(Friston, 2010, 2012; Friston & Stephan, 2007) and its notion of generative models. 
The Free Energy Framework is a powerful unifying framework in neuroscience and 
biophysics, in which both life and cognition (e.g., action, perception and learning) 
are explained in terms of the same fundamental imperative to minimize free 
energy. Free-energy is an information theoretic quantity that measures the 
difference between the sensory states that an organism expects itself to observe 
given its generative model and the sensory states that it actually observes. From 
a statistical perspective, a generative model may be cast as a network of highly 
integrated, ‘beliefs’ (i.e., joint probability distributions) that biophysically encode the 
causal structure of the environment that an agent should encounter (given its 
phenotype) and the effects of action on that causal structure. They are entailed by 
both the continuous (subpersonal) prediction of sensory states that any phenotype-
specific organism should expect itself to be in (e.g., a fish should continuously 
embody predictions that it is in water rather than on land if it is to survive) and the 
effects of its actions on the world and hence on its own sensory states. It is by 
bringing about the environmental causes of its own preferred sensory states that 
a biological system reduces the discrepancy between the phenotypic norms 
encoded by its generative model and the sensory states it observes. Weak 
intentionality in this context is none other than the phenotype-relative aboutness 
of the predictions engendered by the generative model that constrain free-energy 
minimizing behaviour. It is because an organism and its behaviour entail the kind 
of generative model that it does that the predictions answering to that generative 





1.4.3 From Weak Intentionality to Strong Intentionality 
 
 
Located on the opposite end of the intentionality continuum is the kind of 
intentionality that Adams identifies as a distinctive feature of cognition. Strong 
intentionality may be characterized as the aboutness of mental states rather than 
the aboutness of behaviour-driving internal dynamics of the organism. It is at this 
level of intentionality that representations with conceptual-level content (e.g., 
beliefs, desires, thought, etc.) arise that may be (but does not need to be) causally 
independent from the environmental states which an organism is currently 
encountering. For example, one can have a belief that “black widows are 
poisonous” and have access to one’s own belief “I believe that black widows are 
poisonous” despite the fact that there are no black widows present. What is 
distinctive about this notion of aboutness at the level of strong intentionality is the 
fact that its effects upon maintaining homeostasis occurs at slower timescales.52 
Having the belief that “black widows are poisonous” whilst living in Edinburgh is 
valuable to one’s adaptive behaviour even when such spiders are not native to the 
UK. For having such a belief could make the difference between careful and 
careless behaviour were one to encounter (and recognize) a black widow when 
visiting Los Angeles. In contrast, recall that weak intentionality is directed at 
environmental/sensory states that guide behaviour in the here and now. The 
effects of weak-intentionality-driven behaviour upon maintaining homeostasis 
occurs at faster timescales (e.g., the aboutness of an E. coli’s prediction that “there 
will be an increase in glucose concentration in THAT direction” is something that 
results in its immediately reducing the frequency of its tumbling behaviour and 
 
 
52 Strictly speaking, although this is one thing that’s distinctive about strong intentionality, self-
evidencing over increasingly longer timescales is a gradual property, a dimension along which the 
continuum runs. 
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bringing its actual sensory states in line with its expectations of observing nutrient 
rich sensory states). It is because the aboutness of mental states may operate 
over increasingly longer timescales, influencing both other mental states and 
actions, that it endows living systems with the ability to cope with the more 
variability in their niches. 
 
Content at the level of strong intentionality may be generated offline and (at least 
in principle) may be fully insensitive to the influences of environmental stimuli, thus 
serving to both control and select a range of future actions (i.e., policies) in virtue 
of representing action outcomes over longer timescales. This naturally places 
those living systems that have evolutionarily developed the capacity to engender 
mental states in the advantageous position of using aboutness to engage in 
counterfactual reasoning (e.g., if I locked myself out of my flat, I would execute 
such and such a course of action to re-enter). It is important to impress that 
although all content across the continuum of intentionality is future-oriented, it is 
only at the level of strong intentionality that content may come apart from causally 
bringing about behaviour. And as such intentional content at this level may be 
relevant to a range of different behaviours across varying timescales despite an 
agent never actually having to initiate any one of those behaviours (see Sterelny, 
2003 for a similar emphasis upon the relationship between what I am calling strong 
intentionality and content relevant to a range of behaviour). 
 
I would like to suggest that since weak and strong intentionality are located at 
opposite ends of a continuum, there is no sharp cut-off between them. Moreover, 
strong intentionality may be seen as grounded in the same anticipation-driven, self-
preserving processes that underwrite weak intentionality. To use a phrase coined 
by Godfrey-Smith (1996), that weak intentionality “shades off into” strong 
intentionality does not imply that the former does not play a role in underwriting the 
latter. On the contrary, without the kind of weak intentionality that drives adaptive 
behaviour at shorter timescales, it would seem that strong intentionality could not 
arise. Consistent with BA’s evolutionary assumption that ‘higher’ cognition has 
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evolved from simpler cognitive capacities, strong intentionality may be seen as an 
evolutionary achievement. I suggest that BA should construe strong intentionality 
as a variable trait that was built upon a foundation of weak intentionality and 
selected for because it allowed complex organisms to respond to selective 
pressures across progressively longer timescales and environments with more 
behavioural complexity. 
 
One may reasonably speculate that the arrival of strong intentionality and the 
biological hardware underpinning it on the biological scene was closely linked to 
the fact that meeting selective pressures placed new requirements on organisms 
as they began to inhabit environments with more complexity (or their niches grew 
in complexity) (Godfrey-Smith, 1996). One such requirement may have been being 
able to understand causal relationships without requiring that the agent itself be 
the cause. Intentional content that could be generated and monitored without 
entailing any behaviour at all, by allowing an agent to influence long-timescale 
dynamics and efficiently influence and predict other agents’ behaviour made 
complex environments less hostile. The conditions underpinning the transition 
from lesser to increased environmental-organismal complexity might very well be 
a matter of what Sterelny (2003) describes as move from inhabiting 
“informationally transparent environments” (i.e., environments in which there are 
one-to-one mappings between sensory cues and environmental resources) to 
inhabiting “informationally translucent environments” (i.e., environments in which 
there are many-to-one or one-to-many mappings of sensory cues to resources).53  
 
Strong intentionality and the conceptual representations that often accompany it, 
as I am envisioning them, allow organisms to exert influence upon the protracted 
and often informationally ambiguous environmental dynamics that are specific to 
 
 
53 Importantly, Sterelny suggests that the increased complexity of informationally translucent 
environments is partly due to presence of hostile agents (i.e., prey, predators, and competitors) 
which pollute environmental information for a given agent via the subversion of that agent’s 
efforts or concealment. This induces the possibility of false negatives, making the obtaining of 
resources expensive. 
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complex environments. They allow such organisms to utilize control states (i.e., 
conceptual-level representations) that become further and further removed from 
influencing and the influence of current environmental states. On the other hand, 
when simpler organisms are able to meet the selection pressures in their lesser 
complex environments, using conceptual representations that are suited to long-
timescale environmental dynamics to guide behaviour in the here and now falls 
short of being an adaptive strategy. For too much organismic (i.e., model) 
complexity (relative to the level of environmental complexity that ‘satisfices’ for self-
preservation) renders an organism’s responses inefficient, slow, and often 
detrimental to its survival. This illustrates what is known in the Free Energy 
Framework literature as the model-accuracy vs model complexity trade-off 
(FitzGerald, Dolan & Friston, 2014). Although this may be the case, a continuum 
of intentionality helps to illustrate how responding to shorter timescale dynamics 
and less complexity nonetheless involves behaviour that is driven by weak 
intentionality; behaviour that is driven by future-oriented and action-oriented 
representations which recapitulates the normativity intrinsic to an organism’s 
phenotype-relative internal dynamics (i.e., generative model). 
 
We can therefore agree with Adams that conceptual representations are distinct 
from sensory representation while rejecting that only conceptual representations 
demarcate the domain of the cognitive. As one moves from weak to strong 
intentionality, the content and the kinds of representations change from having 
content that is directed at target objects/gradients causally underpinning 
sensorimotor behaviour to having content that can be directed at one’s own mental 
states (e.g., a belief about one’s own belief – that it is false). As one moves along 
the continuum from weak to strong intentionality, there is also a move from 
representations that are behaviour entailing and influenced (but not fully) by 
impinging sensory stimuli to personal to representations that are behaviour 
contingent and possibly stimulus insensitive (i.e., content being immune to the 
influenced the impinging sensory stimuli) (see chapter 5). As the continuum 
approaches stimulus insensitive representation, agents acquire the capacity to 
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shift from behaviourally exploiting their environment to exploring their environment 
with no goal other than to reduce the complexity of their models through epistemic 






54 A further manner of understanding this transition across the continuum––at least along part of 
the continuum––is as a passage from minimal-perception to ‘maximal’ perception, such that one 
moves from content that is about changes in meaningful gradient intensity to content that is about 
the sources of the gradients (i.e., objects). A detailed account of minimal perception will be 





A continuum of intentionality: (Above) some of the various research programmes which 
might be seen to investigate forms of cognitive phenomena associated with a particular degree 
of intentionality; (below) some of the primary attributes of representational content as it is 






1.4.4 Overly Permissive or Not?  
 
 
The initial worry which set the stage for Adams’ classification methodology and its 
upshot, the argument from intentionality, was that BA is overly permissive. Now 
given what has been said regarding the intentionality continuum, is there any 
reason for thinking that this worry has been defanged? One may still be concerned 
that if the behaviour of all organisms is driven by weak intentionality and 
intentionality more generally is the mark of the mental, then the behaviour of all 
organisms is driven by cognition. If this is correct, then BA is still too liberal and 
thus has little explanatory currency. However, from what has been proposed 
above, there is no reason to think that weak intentionality is something which drives 
the behaviour of all living systems. If there are living systems which fail the capacity 
for higher-order homeostatic influence, then such systems are not driven by weak 
intentionality; they are mere reactors to their environment. The extent to which 
weak intentionality is a widespread feature of living systems is an empirical 
question that cannot be answered from the safety of an armchair.  
 
Given that evolution has endowed various forms of life with different (yet related) 
forms of cognition, the onus is placed upon the biogenic theorist to sharpen the 
concepts that delineate various forms of cognition (see for example van Duijn et. 
al., (2007) who develop one notion of minimal cognition; di Primio, et al., (2000) 
for a different notion of minimal cognition; Calvo & Friston (2017) who develop the 
hypothesis of plant predictive processing from within the Free Energy Framework). 
Part of this work, if the intentionality continuum thesis is on track, will include 
identifying the differences in the processes and mechanisms that map on to these 
various forms. These evolutionary transitions in cognition may be fuzzy, but this 








From the perspective of BA, a complete investigation of cognition does not involve 
relinquishing AA full stop, but rather rejecting the notion that all forms of cognition 
must satisfy human-based demarcation criteria. If what I have argued in this paper 
is correct, weak intentionality may serve as a common feature of cognition for both 
BA and AA; a feature that in ensuring that both approaches are not talking past 
one another, allows for the possibility of a complete investigation of cognition in its 
various expressions and degrees of complexity. As such, both BA and AA are valid 
starting points for investigating the related assortment of capacities that drive 
adaptive behaviour at various timescales. Whether or not a scientist starts with 
human capacities or with the weak-intentionality-driven behaviour of simple living 
systems depends largely upon her/his explanatory interests. The intentionality 
continuum thesis offers a coherent manner of bringing these starting points 
together. Far from being harmful to cognitive scientific enquiry, as Adams 
suggests, a rich biogenic programme offers a peek inside the possible evolutionary 
development of the predictive brain by way of its noncentralized predecessors.  
 
With having established the intentionality continuum thesis on behalf of BA as a 
plausible manner of linking biogenic and anthropogenic perspectives, let us now 
turn to the task of using FEF, PP, and EP to throw into relief one specific form of 










Minimal-Perception: Responding to the Challenges of 






Plant predictive processing (Calvo & Friston, 2017) suggests that plants 
anticipatorily perceive their environment. This hypothesis runs up against a 
challenge which takes the form of two constraints on perception advanced by Tyler 
Burge (2010): the veridicality constraint and the constancy constraint. This paper 
argues that satisfying the veridicality constraint falls out of assuming a general 
account of predictive processing. To show how the constancy constraint may be 
fulfilled, an ecologically informed account of invariant pick-up is developed and 
given place within plant predictive processing. It is concluded that, pace our 
anthropocentric folk-psychological notions of perception, there is reason to believe 









This paper takes as its starting point the hypothesis of plant predictive processing 
(PPP) (Calvo & Friston, 2017), an account of plant perception based upon a free-
energy principle-friendly predictive processing.55 PPP runs up against a notable 
challenge which takes the form of two plausible constraints upon perception 
offered by Tyler Burge (2010): 
 
(a) Perception necessarily involves the veridical or non-veridical representation 
of the environment.  
(b) Perception is constitutively characterized as involving the representation of 
constancies.  
 
A considerable problem arises for PPP if either of (a) or (b) cannot be satisfied. 
Namely, it would stand that plants would be an example of free-energy minimizing 
organisms that fail to perceive. So, unless some principled account as to how 
plants could veridically represent their environments and engage in constancy 
representation may be offered, the notion of perception used in PPP (and more 
generally in the Free Energy Framework) may be at best thought of as a mere 
heuristic; free energy/prediction error minimization in persisting biological systems 
does not imply the advent of anything perception-like.  
 
In responding to (a) I shall argue the veridicality constraint may be satisfied given 
that predictions are systematic and integrated states with accuracy conditions. In 
responding to (b), which I take to be the more formidable challenge, I will look to a 
 
 
55 PP and the FEF are independent frameworks and thus the truth of one does not hang upon the 
truth of the other. PPP however situates PP within the FEF in order to present a case for plant 
perception. 
 33 
feature of ecological psychology: invariant pick-up,56 suggesting that constancy 
representation may be unpacked as the behaviour enabling extraction of invariant 
structures in the environment; something that may be evidenced by the behaviour 
of plants in circumstances in which such pick-up is the best explanation for their 
anticipatory behaviour. Although the form of constancy representation that plants 
engage in is less complex than the kind that other more complex creatures might 
exhibit, it is nonetheless constancy representation and thus a kind of perception. 
This kind of constancy representation will be argued is part and parcel of simple, 
medium-bound invariant pick-up and marks the bounds of minimal-perception.  
 
This paper shall be organized as follows: Section 2.2 will briefly review PP and the 
FEF. Section 2.3 will provide a detailed explication of PPP as hypothesized by 
Calvo and Friston (2017). Section 2.4 shall introduce Burge’s veridicality constraint 
and show how it may be satisfied by plants.  Section 2.5 will expound upon 
constancy constraint and then offer an ecologically-inspired account as to how 
plants exercise constancies in terms of the pick-up of invariant environmental 
structure. I will then argue that the means by which both of Burge’s constraints are 
satisfied seems to suggest that plants exhibit a particular form of perception: 
minimal-perception. I will conclude with some brief remarks about what minimal-
perception means for the scope of model organisms considered relevant to 
psychological investigation. Lastly, a suggestion will be made as to how the 
minimal-perception/perception demarcation may possibly underlie a principled 





56 In what follows I will assume that the ecological apparatus of invariant pick-up can still be used 
within a perceptual theory that involves both representation and inference without rendering the 
latter two notions superfluous. It is not my aim to remain true in any strict sense to an ecological 
account of perception, but rather to bring some of the ecological mechanisms to bear upon the 
plant perception/cognition debate whilst attempting to respect many the motivations of ecological 
psychology. For a recent account of ecological cognitive architectures that remains strictly non-




2.2 Predictive Processing and Free Energy Framework 
 
 
The account of perception provided by predictive processing (PP) (Clark, 2013, 
2016a; Hohwy, 2013) places primary emphasis upon the hierarchical minimization 
of precision weighted prediction error.57  Let us unpack this claim. Predictions, or 
mock sensory signals, are engendered by a hierarchically structured generative 
model. Generative models may be roughly thought of as a highly integrated, 
context sensitive, statistical ‘knowledge’ stores that are the result of learning at 
both phylogenetic and ontogenetic timescales. Predictions are generated 
hierarchically such that at each level ‘top-down’ predictions attempt to 
accommodate incoming ‘bottom-up’ sensory signals at each level below, with 
those predictions generated at higher levels subsuming those at lower levels. 
Prediction generation itself over the long term is said to ‘approximate’ Bayesian 
inference (Friston, 2009; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Wiese & Metzinger, 2017). 
The signals at each hierarchical level which have been previously and successfully 
matched (i.e., those that have been incorporated into the generative model over 
time) act as empirical priors for the predictions about the current activity occurring 
in the respective levels below them. Any disparity between top-down predictions 
and bottom-up signals results in residual prediction error (PE) which propagates 
upwards and laterally and is met with further predictions. Prediction error 
minimization involves both updating predictions to match sensory signals (i.e., 
perceptual inference) and an organism’s initiating change in its relation to its 
environment, thereby sculpting sensory signals to match predictions (i.e., active 
inference). It is in virtue of this continuous and coupled process of bringing 
predictions in line with the world and the world in line with predictions that the distal 
causes of sensory stimulation, according to PP, come to be perceived. 
 
 




PP may be itself located within the broader Free Energy Framework (FEF). FEF 
states that all biological systems that maintain their structural integrity in the face 
of the 2nd law of thermodynamics must minimize free-energy (Friston & Stephan, 
2007; Friston 2009, 2013). Free-energy is an information theoretic measure which 
sets the upper bound on surprise (i.e., it is always greater than or equal to 
surprise). Systems that minimize free-energy must thereby minimize an upper 
bound on surprise. Surprise, or self-information, is the amount of discrepancy 
between the expected attractor states of a system (understood as the range of 
sensory states which when occupied result in homeostasis) and the actual states 
within which that a system finds itself. Thus, in avoiding surprise an organism is 
able to persist by remaining in the viable range of bodily states which are optimal 
for the functioning of its metabolic processing. Given that free-energy is prediction 
error under Gaussian assumptions (Friston, 2009),58 the relation between FEF and 
prediction error minimization is evident: a free-energy minimizing biological system 
is one which engages in perceptual and active inference in order to maintain its 
homeostasis and structural integrity despite the tendency of thermodynamic 
entropy in the universe to increase over time.   
 
Taking this into consideration, one primary feature of FEF becomes salient, viz. 
anticipatory behaviour (via active and perceptual inference) is the mechanism by 
which any organism maintains its homeostasis (Friston, 2009, 2013; Calvo, 
Baluška, & Sims, 2016) and thereby perceives the world subject to its influence. 
Thus, Free-energy minimization over time in any biological system implies some 
kind of perception.59 This claim is both striking and significant given that it, if 
correct, not only does it extend the scope of those organisms considered to be 
 
 
58 This is just to say that mathematically free-energy and prediction error can be both described in 
terms of probability distributions that map the difference between expected states and actual 
states. 
59 This is not the claim that anything that minimizes prediction error is a perceiver but rather that 
any persisting individual organism that minimizes PE is a perceiver. Thus, entire species, 
although minimizing prediction error over time via natural selection, do not qualify as perceivers. 
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perceivers far beyond that of the received view in cognitive psychology (i.e., the 
view that perception is limited to those organisms in  possession of central nervous 
systems), but it also challenges our inherently anthropocentric folk psychological 
views of perception. One possible consequence of taking an FEF friendly PP 




2.3 Plant Perception 
 
 
Although the notion of plant perception still remains a controversial one despite 
receiving some attention (Calvo, 2016), a reasonable case for it has been recently 
put forward by Calvo & Friston (2017), hereafter C&F. Their hypothesis, referred 
to as plant predictive processing (PPP), proposes that plants possess an 
anticipatory architecture that allows them to continuously look ahead, predicting 
the states of their environment “so as to adapt to local conditions via phenotypic 
plasticity” (Calvo & Friston, 2017, p. 4). This plasticity is expressed, for instance, 
in the process of nutation (i.e., the directed or non-directed movement of plant 
organs associated with non-reversible, non-turgor related growth). The argument 
for PPP is grounded upon the basic assumption that the FEF is true. The 
conclusion that plants (seem to) engage in prediction error minimization and hence 
perceive the environmental causes of their sensory perturbations may be drawn 
from assuming the FEF and the added uncontentious premise that plants are self-
organizing biological systems that persist. As C&F write: 
 
“But to survive [emphasis added] plants rely upon the veridical perception 
of their surroundings. To do so, predicting their own states of sensory 
stimulation, and not merely reacting to them proves crucial” (Calvo & 
Friston, 2017, p. 2). 
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Crucially, by predicting the impinging flows of sensory stimulation via continuous 
error minimization, a plant comes to perceive the causes of those very sensory 
flows. Plant perception is thus hypothesized as being an active anticipatory 
engagement involving endogenously generated top-down predictions in 
anticipation of incoming bottom-up signals rather than mere passive signal 





2.3.1 How Plants Perceive  
 
 
To make sense of prediction error minimization in plants, one must be able to firstly 
make sense of the notion of generative models ‘in’ plants. In illustrating how a plant 
might instantiate a generative model, C&F remind us that it is only necessary to 
start from the assumption that it is in virtue of minimizing prediction error a plant 
(or any other self-organizing system) maximizes model evidence (i.e., self-
evidence), thus enabling it to stay within its viable bounds. In this respect a 
persisting plant—or likewise any other biological agent—is (physiologically and 
functionally) a generative model of its econiche (Calvo & Friston, 2017).  
 
Perceptual inference in plants, like in animals, is postulated to come about by the 
generation of predictions about incoming sensory states which are likely to arise 
given the sensory states that have already been encountered and the gradual 
reduction of error through the updating of predictions. Importantly, PPP 
emphasizes that prediction error minimization is an anticipatory process: it is not 
the mere reduction of current error through the updating of predictions but a 
simultaneous process of gathering evidence for those environmental states most 
likely to be encountered in the future and behaving accordingly so as to pursue 
“trajectories that have the least free energy” (Calvo & Friston, 2017). These latter 
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processes are a description of active inference. In this context plant behaviour may 
be cast as a purposeful altering of morphology (i.e., nutation of plant organs such 
as roots, shoots, hypocotyls, flowers, etc.). Crucially, active inference includes 
exploratory behaviour (i.e., epistemic foraging) that is carried out for the sake of 
obtaining information relevant to the best error reducing future actions. C&F 
express this point when writing:  
 
“Plants are continually swaying their organs towards energy gradients, 
attempting to realize the most likely (least surprising) implications of sensory 
stimulation for subsequent engagement with the world” (Calvo & Friston, 
2017, p. 3). 
 
 
Bringing the notions of generative models and active/perceptual inference 
together, it is in virtue of the explorative sampling of their milieu that plants actively 
harness evidence for the generative models which they embody by confirming the 
predictions that such models generate. Harnessing such self-evidence and thus 
avoiding surprise over time by appropriately behaving entails homeostatic 
maintenance. 
 
Moreover, C&F present evidence that plants also satisfy various functional and 
physiological conditions required for PP. With respect to satisfying functional 
conditions, plants are able to contextually integrate various sensory 
signals/parameters so as to assess environmental conditions (Calvo & Keijzer, 
2011). Research by Gagliano et al. (2016) has shown that plants exhibit the 
capacity to learn, something required for adaptive generative model updating. By 
repeatedly exposing the garden pea, Pisum Sativum, to a fan generated air flow 
followed by a reward (i.e., exposure to light), such plants tend to grow towards the 
air movement even in the absence of light. This result provides striking evidence 
suggesting that plants have the capacity to engage in associative learning. It has 
also been shown that plants possess the ability to flexibly and anticipatorily 
behave. For example, Novoplansky (2016) has demonstrated that plant nutation 
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occurs in response to anticipated future competition of resources. In addition, 
studies by Karpinski & Szechynska-Hebda (2010) suggest that photosynthetic 
adjustment in plants occurs in response to anticipated changes in light conditions. 
 
With respect to satisfying PP’s physiological conditions, C&F suggest that the 
activity of the vascular system and plasmodesmata could allow for the kinds of 
functionally asymmetric message passing and hierarchical structure fundamental 
to the PP perceptual story. The vascular system, the conducting tissues consisting 
of the phloem and xylem that carry amongst other things water, sap and nutrients, 
possibly implements top-down and bottom-up bidirectional signalling.  
Plasmodesmata, channels that extend across cell walls of adjacent cells, are 
reasonable candidates for lateral signal passing. The action and variation 
potentials found in plants which underwrite signalling, like those of animals, have 
an electrophysiological profile of polarization, depolarization and hyperpolarization 
(Calvo & Friston, 2017; Calvo, Sahi & Trewavas, 2017).  Referencing earlier work 
(Calvo, Baluška, & Sims, 2016) C&F postulate that “the capacity to anticipate may 
be implemented for instance in temporal patterns of synchronous oscillatory firing 
of specific populations of plant cells” (2017, p. 6). Such oscillatory firings have been 
found to peak in the transition zone (TZ), an area in the root apex (Baluška & 




2.3.3 What Plants Perceive 
 
 
Assuming that plants do engage in the kind of prediction driven dynamics that PPP 
hypothesizes, then it follows that they perceive the distal causes of their proximal 
sensory stimulation. It is possible to interpret C&F as understanding such distal 
causes as the altering global structure of available resources. Such an 
interpretation is made explicit when C&F remark:  
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“[…] rather than responding to mere absolute resource availabilities, plants 
are able to perceive and integrate information regarding dynamic changes 
in resource levels and utilize it to anticipate growth conditions in ways that 
maximize their long-term performance. Roots don’t simply just grow. They 
constantly assess the (future) acquisition of minerals and water” (Calvo and 
Friston, 2017, p. 4, my emphasis).  
 
On this interpretation plant behaviour is directed at changes in resource intensities 
in the fluctuating heterogenous mediums with which they interact. Perception is 
not of instances of chemo, geo, thermo, mechano, magneto or photo-stimuli per 
se, but of the changing gradients of the relevant resources (i.e., stimuli decreases, 
increases or uniform distributions). In the case of nutrients, it is these stimulus 
gradients that are followed until the gradient’s peak is reached (A. Trewavas, 
personal communication, April 24, 2018).   
 
To sum up, if PPP is correct, plants, like animals, engage in a kind of perception 
of their distal environment. Although plant perception is quite unlike the perception 
of folk psychology, it is nonetheless perception. To be clear, one may at this point 
forcibly take the position that ‘perception’ as used by FEF (and thus PPP) is a mere 
heuristic. ‘Perception’ is a device that is put in place for the folk to come to grips 
with the mathematically complex computational underpinnings of the FEF and is 
not in any sense truly perception-like. In order to establish the claim that plants 
exhibit a kind of perception and hence that perception as used by PPP is not a 
mere heuristic, something other than our anthropocentric reactions must be used 
as a metric in reaching a warranted conclusion. For this purpose, let us now turn 






2.4 Burge’s Veridicality Constraint  
 
 
A first constraint on perception that Burge proposes is that it involves the possibility 
of representational success or failure.60 Burge grounds this claim in reasoning that 
whilst perception is the product of objectification, mere proximal sensory 
registration is not. Let’s unpack this. Burge postulates that the relation which holds 
in sensory registration between proximal stimulus and encoded state is one of 
statistical correlation. Transduced states, in virtue of a creature’s evolutionary 
history, have come to carry information about certain proximal states. This 
information carrying, although necessary, is not sufficient for perception because 
it occurs independently from certain processes which demarcate mere proximal 
idiosyncratic simulation from stimulation that has a high probability of being caused 
by distal environmental features. It is via the use of such processes or what Burge 
calls formation operations that objectification takes place.  
 
Formation operations are “law-like regularities in the perceptual systems that 
reflect or mirror law-like regularities in the distal environment” (Burge, 2010, p. 
346). Objectification is the “formation of a state with a representational content that 
is as of a subject matter beyond idiosyncratic, proximal, or subjective features of 
the individual” (Burge, 2010, p. 397). According to Burge, since the notion of 
content only makes sense in terms of its having veridicality conditions, and having 
such content is the result of objectification, the product of which is perception, 
issuing states with content that is veridical (or non-veridical) is a necessary 




60 Success according to Burge, is equated with veridical representation or having a high degree of 
correspondence to distal environmental states. Failure is equated with illusory states which result 
from the underdetermination of causes by proximal stimuli. 
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“Perception is a sensory capacity for objectified representation. 
Representation is a condition constitutively associated with veridicality 
conditions––for example, perceptual accuracy” (2010, p. 317). 
 
 
Crucially, perceptual capacities serve a distinct function, viz. to veridically 
represent distal entities via objectification processes. Burge grounds this constraint 
in the assumption that perceptual psychology’s use of representations (veridical 
and non-veridical) to account for the problem of perception and their role in 
perceptual psychological explanation has been a fruitful endeavour.61 This is 
contrasted to the function of biological explanations which aim to explain various 
processes in terms of their functional contribution to adaptive behaviour. And thus, 
for Burge, it is a category mistake to understand non-veridicality in terms of failing 
to function in a way that promotes survival. Veridicality and non-veridicality are 
strictly limited to the domain of psychological explanation. Sensory registration, on 
the other hand, is a process which does not admit of accurate or inaccurate beyond 
talk of biological functions. Veridicality applied to sensory registration is 
explanatorily superfluous.  
 
Assuming this constraint is reasonable, can any sense be made of going from the 
claim that plants register proximal stimuli to the claim that plants engage in 
veridical perception of their distal environment? A case may be made for 
answering this question affirmatively. Remembering that according to PP it is the 
distal environmental causes of proximal states that are perceived, any theorist who 
accepts that an FEF-nested PP offers a correct account of perception in animals 
also has reason to accept that plants accurately (or inaccurately) perceive their 
distal environments. The reason for this being that animals, according to PP, 
perceive distal causes in virtue of prediction driven hierarchical dynamics. Such 
dynamics importantly allow for prediction error minimization and depend upon 
 
 
61 This problem, often called the problem of underdetermination, asks how perception of particulars 
and properties could arise from underdetermining proximal stimuli. 
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having the right kind of physiological structure that supports the integration of 
multiple sources of sensory information and learning (i.e., updating generative 
models) and the ability to flexibly and anticipatorily behave. As we have seen, there 
is reason to believe that plants have such a structure and sufficient evidence that 
they engage in sensory integration, associative learning and anticipatory 
behaviour. Thus, there is also reason to believe that plants—like animals—have 
the structure and capacity to engage in processes which allow them to perceive 
the distal features of their environment.  
 
Furthermore, and crucially, the principles underlying prediction error minimization 
(e.g., hierarchical approximation of Bayesian inference, etc.) suggest that the error 
signal which results from the mismatch of sensory signals and prediction signals 
could act as the demarcation of perceptual objectification in Burge’s sense. For it 
is implicit in the notion of hierarchical prediction that there is systematic signal 
integration of sensory states and priors which allows for the statistical formation of 
the most probable sensory signals to come. Mere sensory registration occurs 
below the threshold of residual error signal generation. What occurs above this 
threshold is the formation of states with veridical (or non-veridical) content. This is 
supported conceptually in that the notion of X’s being a prediction (or mock signal) 
only makes sense in terms of X’s having the capability of being accurate or 
inaccurate.  
 
The Burgean, in response, is likely to argue that PPP nonetheless fails to respect 
the distinction between psychological function and biological function. This is 
illustrated clearly by the fact that the FEF underwriting PPP aims to provide a 
computational level framework that explains how biological systems resist entropic 
equilibrium. This response, however, falls short of threatening the claim that plants 
have states which are veridical or non-veridical. If the generation of prediction error 
marks off proximally registered sensory states from states that represent distal 
environmental features, then the fact that PPP pays heed to biological self-
maintenance as an aim in the formation of prediction signals and updating of the 
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generative model only shows that on Burge’s own account the line that he draws 
between psychological and biological functions is theoretically questionable. 
Furthermore, if PP/FEF offers consistent explanations for a plethora of 
psychological phenomena, as has been illustrated by the vast success in 
computational modelling and experimental research (Friston, 2009, 2010, 2013, 
2018), then a lack of explanatory success is not what stands in the way of 
biologically sensitive accounts from providing fruitful psychological explanations.62 
To conclude: if plants maintain themselves via prediction driven dynamics, and 
predictions are states with accuracy conditions,63 then as such there is no reason 
to suppose that plants cannot satisfy Burge’s veridicality constraint. Let’s now turn 




2.5 Burge’s Constancy Constraint  
 
 
Burge holds that objectification is a fundamental aspect of perception. It is the 
presentation of concrete objects, events, relations or attributes beyond the 
proximal sensory registrations of the organism; something which is perceived as 
distinct from the perceiver and the perceiver’s perspective. As a ‘rough’ necessary 
and sufficient condition on perceptual objectification, Burge introduces the notion 
of constancy perception. Constancies are “capacities to systematically represent 
a particular or an attribute as the same despite significant variations in registration 
of proximal stimulation” (Burge, 2010, p. 408). The idea being that sensitivity to 
 
 
62 Burge’s assumption that perceptual psychology is essentially concerned with 
accuracy/inaccuracy may be questioned for the reason that it seems to selectively ignore 
programmes such as ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Turvey et al., 1981; Warren, 
2005; Bruineberg et al., 2018) and enactivism (Varela et al., 1993; Chemero, 2009; Bruineberg 
et. al., 2016). 
63 Strictly speaking, Free-energy minimization itself needn’t be unpacked in terms of 
psychological states with accuracy conditions but may be described purely in terms of state 
dynamics (Friston & Stephan, 2007). 
 45 
constancies allows a perceiver to (re)identify a particular as the same particular 
despite changes in that perceiver’s perspectival relations to it.64 Constancies, as 
such, are “paradigmatic marks of objectification” (Burge, 2010, p. 413). It is my aim 
in what follows to provide the reader with an account as to how constancy 




2.5.1 Constancies as Gibsonian Invariants  
 
 
As a preliminary to laying out an account of constancy perception in plants, it is 
necessary to introduce the notion of environmental information which emerged out 
of J.J. Gibson’s (1966, 1979) programme of ecological psychology. According to 
Gibson, perception is a direct process (i.e., not involving awareness of mediational 
entities) by which an animal is able to extract environmental information from a 
perceptual medium (e.g., light, air, water, etc.) that its perceptual system has 
evolved a sensitivity to. Environmental information, or what Gibson called 
invariants, is the unchanging structure (e.g., ratios and proportions) in the medium 
disclosed under perspectival transformation. It is in virtue of an organism’s moving 
about in the environment (or something’s moving about in relation to the organism) 
that its perceptual system begins to ‘pick-up’ invariants amongst the many other 
changing stimuli registered. Importantly, invariants lawfully specify those 
environmental features that they structurally correspond to. It is by picking-up 
invariants that an organism perceives the environmental layout specified by those 
invariants. Moreover, it is not merely the layout that is perceived but rather the 
affordances (i.e., the species-relative opportunities for action offered by the layout) 
 
 
64 Some common examples of perceptual constancies explored in the perceptual psychology 
literature are those associated size, shape, distance, motion and colour. 
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that are perceived. Figure 4 illustrates the role that invariant pick-up plays in the 








Affordance perception beyond the medium: guided by behaviour, the perceptual system 
picks-up invariants which specify the environmental layout beyond the perceptual medium. In 
virtue of invariant pick-up, perception of the environmental layout and the affordances it offers 
is achieved. This perception in turn guides behaviour and controls the manner in which the 




In more than one place in Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Vison, he claims that 
invariants are gradients or “variables between two limits” (1979, p. 116). One of 
the limits being the perceiver’s current position, (i.e., here) and the other being the 
limit of the perceivable environment (i.e., there). Invariant pick-up goes beyond 
mere stimulus registration in that it is possible that an organism’s sensory 
receptors may be triggered by a particular stimulus and yet if this stimulus is 
homogenous in its distribution across sensory receptors and time, thus failing to 
be differentially structured, then it also fails to activate the perceptual system. The 
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availability or the unavailability of invariants in the medium thus marks “a clear 
distinction between stimulus information and stimulation” (Gibson, 1979, p. 64).  
 
To make this notion of invariant pick-up more concrete, let us briefly turn to one 
invariant that has received a fair amount of attention from ecological psychologists 
and those sympathetic to ecological constructs: tau. (See Lee & Reddish, 1981: 
Chemero, 2009: Calvo, 2016). Tau specifies the time-to-closure of a gap between 
two measurable states. It is mathematically equal to the ratio of the current gap 
magnitude between the state that an animal is currently in and the goal state it 
‘desires’ to be in and the current rate of closure (Delafield-Butt, Pepping, McCaig, 
& Lee, 2012). The astonishing diving practices of the gannet provide an illustration 
of tau in action (Lee & Reddish, 1981). These fish-eating seabirds capture their 
prey by diving from heights of over 90 feet at speeds sometimes reaching 100 
kilometres per hour, retracting their wings only at the last moment prior to striking 
the water’s surface. Failing to do so at such high speeds would prove fatal. How 
do gannets know the precise time to retract their wings? Lee & Reddish (1981) 
have proposed that these birds have perceptual systems that are sensitive to tau. 
By picking up tau and thereby perceiving the time-to-closure, gannets are able to 
retract their wings at just the right moment before contact with the water’s surface.   
 
Crucial to understanding the place of invariants such as tau in perception is 
grasping the notion of ‘pick-up’. Despite Gibson’s somewhat enigmatic use of this 
notion, I would like to suggest that one plausible interpretation of ‘pick-up’ is the 
behaviour enabling extraction of the available structure in the medium by the 
perceptual system. Extraction describes the process by which a perceptual system 
comes to calibrate itself to the structure in the world by modifying its 
electrophysiological profile. This modification is determined by phylogenetically 
and ontogenetically learned, contextually sensitive biases and available stimulus 
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information.65 Importantly this process enables behavioural response, which in turn 
controls further harvesting of stimulus information. If this construal is correct, then 
it entails that without enabling behavioural response—implying a minimal level of 
informational integration on the part of the perceptual system—or without at least 
some differential information in the medium, pick-up cannot occur.  
 
With this interpretation of invariant pick-up to hand, I would like to propose an 
account of constancy representation that puts it to work. My proposal begins by 
noting that, according to Burge, being able to represent perceptual constancies is 
just being able to represent concrete objects as the same particulars despite 
changes in perspective via the use of formation operations. Similarly, invariant 
pick-up, the extracting by the perceptual system of structures in the medium that 
remain constant over perspectival transformation, is a process which enables the 
representation of environmental features as the same particulars.66 Thus, both 
constancy representation as understood by Burge and invariant pick-up seem to 
be two different descriptions of how environmental particulars are perceived as the 
same particulars. The primary distinction between these two accounts being that 
the former makes use of internal computational operations, whilst the latter uses 
pick-up of environmental information to account for perception of the same 
particulars. Taking this into consideration, I would like to argue that if constancy 
perception can sufficiently come about in virtue of invariant structure pick-up, and 
there is reason to believe that plants exploit such invariant pick-up, then there is 
also reason to accept the claim that plants represent constancies. Assuming that 
the first premise of the antecedent is empirically tractable,67 I will now turn to 
 
 
65 Biases here need not be understood as stored states but rather as tendencies to 
electrochemically respond in ways that anticipate familiar structure in the world. For various 
accounts of biases in PP see Hohwy (2013) and Orlandi (2016). 
66 Gibson held that constancy perception is an act of invariant pick-up. That this is the case is 
clearly evident when Gibson postulates “The continuous pick-up theory of perception can assume 
that the apprehension of persistence [of places, objects, and substances] is a simple act of 
invariance detection” (1979, p. 247). 
67 The field of natural scene statistics (NSS), which has gained a fair amount of empirical support, 
may be seen as giving the notion of invariant pick-up of environmental information a statistical 
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support the second premise which will allow us to draw the conclusion that plants 




2.5.2 Invariant Pick-up by Plants 
 
 
In support of the claim that plants pick-up invariants, I shall firstly show that the 
conditions under which invariant pick-up may occur are fulfilled by plants and their 
milieu. The first of these conditions requires that plants have the kind of 
morphological structure to instantiate the kind of extraction which pick-up 
describes. Again, extraction involves systematic biasing of internal states which 
reflect regularities in the environment. That this condition may be satisfied seems 
to fall out of the fact that plants have been shown to engage in sensory integration, 
associative learning and flexible anticipatory behaviour. Possessing such 
capacities would seemingly demand the kind of structure supporting both biasing 
and the ability to integrate various kinds of stimuli systematically for contextually 
‘informed’ behaviour. 
 
The second condition requires an available perceptual medium that the organism 
is sensitive to. For the purposes of this paper, I will concentrate upon one kind of 
medium, which in principle may serve as a model for other medium kinds. One of 
the many stimuli which plants are said to register are chemical stimuli. Much of this 
registration occurs at root apices (Blauška & Mancuso, 2013). Moreover, it is 
thought that various cell types located at the root cap act as distinct types of 
sensory receptors (Trewavas, 2016). The most reasonable choice for a perceptual 
 
 
gloss. See Orlandi (2016) for an ecological analysis of NSS. Also see Warren (2005) for 




medium in this case is the compound mixture of water and inorganic chemical 
components which plant receptors are sensitive to. This mixture is conveniently 
referred to in plant biology as the soil medium. Importantly, plants, in order to 
absorb nutrients across their epidermal root layers, require such a mixture of 
inorganic nutrient and water. One such nutrient, one that is required for the 
production of amino acids and protein synthesis, is nitrate (NO-3) (Roycewicz et 
al., 2018; Forde et al., 2009). Nitrate, given the conditions under which it is 
produced—often by the decomposition of organic substances by 
microorganisms—may be found at varying concentrations in the soil medium. Like 
light, which according to Gibson is the visual medium, soil is the chemical medium 
for plants.  
 
In order for information pick-up to occur, however, there must not only be an 
available perceptual medium which the organism is sensitive to, but that medium 
must be structured. It is this invariant structure which is picked-up by the organism 
over transformation. I would like to suggest that the structure is the gradient pattern 
of chemical intensities as distributed in the soil medium. This suggestion itself 
should not be surprising to the ecological psychologist, given that Gibson himself 
advocated the notion of chemical invariants, which is made explicit when he writes: 
“there are also surely invariants in the flow of acoustic, mechanical, and perhaps 
chemical stimulation, and they may prove to be closely related to the optical” 
(1979, p. 311). Importantly, what may be described as invariant is not the intensity 
level at any one moment as proximally encountered but the slope of the gradient 
as a function of intensity and spatial location over time. This invariant may be 
recognized as the constant rate of change or closure (i.e., the denominator) of the 
tau ratio.  This objective pattern may be confirmed as the same pattern (i.e., having 
the same increasing or decreasing slope) under transformation. 
 
The last condition that shall be considered is that of having the capacity to induce 
transformation (i.e., perspectival change generated by movement) in the medium. 
How may such transformation occur given the fact that plants are sessile 
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organisms? To respond to this challenge, I would like to remind the reader that 
firstly plants, although sessile, exhibit root nutation behaviour. This means that 
over time when a root cap is exposed to a level of nitrate—or any other of the 
chemicals it is sensitive to—in the soil medium, as a result of growing in a direction 
towards (or away) from the concentration, it may initiate appropriate 
transformations for stimulus information harvesting.  
 
Secondly, a plant’s roots are a distributed system which together could be said to 
provide multiple ‘perspectives’ on a particular nitrate concentration simultaneously. 
In this sense, transformation is built-in to the organization of the root system as 
distributed in the medium. Here distinct root caps may register information which 
when integrated (i.e., compared with other kinds of stimulus information and 
conditioned on prior analogous ‘experiences’) is used to guide behaviour.68 The 
shoot system being the most probable “arbiter of the mess of signals arising from 
the roots” (A. Trewavas, personal communication, April 24, 2018). Invariants 
picked-up in the context of this type of distributed organization would be the 
mutually confirming nitrate gradient pattern from various spatial locations.69 
Analogous to this, one might imagine the difference between touching an 
engraving of a circle on a surface with many fingers as opposed to one. Using one 
finger, the circular structure may be revealed only by moving one’s finger along the 
engraving. However, such movement is unnecessary if multiple fingers are used. 
For although each finger comes in contact with a distinct part of the circle when 
many fingers are used, proximal tactile stimulus at each finger provides mutual 
information about the global circular structure relative to organization of the 
fingers.70 Each of the two aforementioned methods of transformation respectively 
 
 
68 Such integration, because it arises at the level of prediction and prediction error minimization, is 
distinct from the averaging techniques occurring during sensory registration. 
69 This might suggest that plants like animals possess a body model. 
70 A suggestive passage involving just this kind of multiple perspectives, built-in transformation 
that could give rise to constancy representation is offered by Burge himself when he writes of the 
touch system: “The touch system is capable of representing a given texture […] as the same 
even though the texture is rubbed against different parts of the body. Different parts of the body 
have substantially different sensitivities. So, the registration of proximal stimulation in the different 
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correspond to what I will call temporal intensity differentiation and spatial intensity 
differentiation.71 A mixture of temporal intensity and spatial intensity differentiation 
may occur due to changes undergone by the stimuli intensity and distribution in 
the medium itself, say, due to excessive heat or flooding. In such cases roots may 
remain still while gradients around them alter.  
 
Thus far I have provided support for the claim that plants and their environments 
satisfy the conditions for invariant pick-up to be possible. Satisfying these 
conditions, however, falls short of providing a reason to believe that plants do 
engage in invariant pick-up rather than, say, merely registering proximal stimuli 
available at the sensory periphery. To support the claim that plants do engage in 
pick-up I will now show that this process of extraction explains some accepted 
feature of plant behaviour that mere proximal stimuli registration fails to provide. 
Consider again the account of invariant pick-up suggested. It follows that plant 
pick-up can be characterized as the behaviour enabling extraction of the available 
structure in the perceptual medium. One way of going about adjudicating this claim 
is by scrutinizing the empirical predictions which would follow from its being true. 
One such prediction is that if plants engage in invariant pick-up, then root nutation 
should reflect—in the direction of growth—global stimulus structure picked-up on. 
As it so happens to be there is an abundance of empirical evidence that suggests 
just this. For example, the encountering of nitrate gradients results in growth along 
increasing concentration gradients and cessation when intensity peaks are 
reached (McNickle et al., 2009). Additionally, root territoriality, according to Calvo 
Garson and Keijzer “clearly illustrates the exploitation of the geometric structure 
itself, which in turn backs up the idea that the behaviour of plants is guided globally 




rubbings are quite different. The perception is nonetheless as of the same texture. This capacity 
is texture constancy” (Burge, 2010, p. 414). 
71 I will assume that these differentiation methods are distinct from what Burge calls beckoning 
and homing techniques. 
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Why think, however, that these behaviours are due to invariant pick-up? Is there 
reason to believe that, rather than behaviours, these responses are mere reflexes 
coming about as the result of sensory registration? One answer might be that if a 
plant’s behaviour were directed by mere proximal stimulus registration rather than 
distal structure, it might be expected that when encountering a particular chemical 
present in the medium a plant’s behaviour would be a reaction governed by a kind 
of conditional rule such as: <If chemical X with strength S is encountered at L, then 
continue growing at L>. Were plant behaviour merely a series of reactions 
governed by stimulus registration and such rules, then it would be reasonable to 
expect that a plant would continue to grow beyond the gradient peak and then 
cease. To the contrary, we know that when a plant encounters a gradient peak its 
growth ceases (McNickle et al., 2009). That this is the case buttresses an 
alternative explanation: plant behaviour is anticipatory (Karpinski & Szechynska-
Hebda, 2010; Trewavas, 2016; Novoplansky, 2016; Calvo & Friston, 2017).  
It must be remembered that a plant’s root nutation occurs within a heterogenous 
and fluctuating medium replete with both benefits and costs. In order to secure the 
highest biological value relative to the current state of the plant, behaviour that is 
guided by the anticipated globally weighted structure in the medium would seem 
to be more efficient in procuring a larger number of (biologically relevant) rewards 
over the long run while avoiding unnecessary energetic costs (i.e., avoiding 
surprise) than behaviour that is a mere reaction to proximal stimuli. An explanation 
of behaviour of this kind in terms of invariant pick-up seems to deliver just the right 
kind of anticipatory engagement with distal structure that matters for living 
organisms, the efficiency of which might be a matter of life or death. This response 
suggests that an explanation of gradient following when seen in the context of 
serving the integrity of a biological system seems to require more than mere reflex 
responses if the latter is not sufficient for efficient anticipatory behaviour.  
Taking all of this into consideration, along with the assumption that invariant pick-
up is a form of constancy exercise, brings us to the conclusion that there is reason 
to believe that plants represent constancies. At this point, one may raise the 
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question as to how the notion of invariant pick-up developed is consistently related 
to PP? For without being able to make such a connection explicit and illustrating 
how invariant pick-up is consistent with the tenants of PP, the account of plant 
perception in question, PPP, fails to gain any substantial traction from the 
argument presented above. Responding to this question will take up the last part 






I will now illustrate how pick-up of environmental structure may be consistently 
given place within PP by showing that invariant pick-up may be seen as 
underwritten by formation operations and formation operations are intrinsic to the 
prediction driven dynamics of PP. Invariant pick-up, as developed by Gibson, 
traditionally stands in contrast to the account of constancy representation by use 
of formation operations. This contrast may be explicated as the difference between 
viewing perception as an activity of detecting rich and abundant information in the 
environment as opposed to seeing it as a process of reconstructing accurate 
representations of environmental states from ambiguous sensory stimuli.72 These 
differences in view as to the starting point of perceptual analysis are not however 
irreconcilable.  
 
To see this one must only note that conceding to the claim that environmental 
information (i.e., structured invariants) is abundant and rich does not imply that the 
perceptual system is not plagued by environmental noise. We have already seen 
that Gibson distinguishes mere sensory stimulation from sensory information. This 
 
 
72 Burge (2010), as far as I understand, avoids making the claim that perceivers are aware of 
these internal representations rather than being aware of the environment. As such, to claim that 
perception involves the use of formation operations to construct such representations does not 
suggest that perception of the world is somehow indirect. 
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suggests that although invariants may be ubiquitous, there is still noise that the 
perceptual system must deal with. One might go so far as to think that it is because 
there is such an abundance of environmental information available, that some of it 
may act as noise given the particular behavioural aims of the perceiver and the 
specific kinds of information that is useful in guiding that behaviour efficiently. One 
way, and a very efficient way at that, of disambiguating noise from useful 
information is to move around. Another way is to ‘use’ formation operations.73 That 
there is no a priori reason why these two strategies cannot be used together flexibly 
and in varying degrees to suit dynamic environmental conditions suggests that 
such a dual strategy is possible. Possessing the property of adaptive flexibility in 
light of the challenges of a deeply dynamic environment suggests that it is also an 
efficient strategy. Thus, the motivations for a theory of invariant pick-up and for the 
use of formation operations may be consistently brought together in a cogent 
explanation of how invariants are marked-off from noise. 
 
I would now like to go a step further and argue that invariant pick-up involves 
formation operations. Let me start by emphasizing that Burge is committed to 
formation operations as being necessary for constancy representation. More 
important to point out, however, is that such a commitment does not imply anything 
about invariant pick-up, namely that formation operations are not part of how 
invariant pick-up comes about. With this in mind, one may reason that if invariant 
pick-up is sufficient for constancy representation, and formation operations are 
necessarily required for constancy representation, then invariant pick-up involves 
formation operations. 
 
Just what form might this involvement take? To see this, let us return to the notion 
of biases. The perception of constancies via invariant pick-up as developed above 
leans upon the notion of perceptual system biasing which occurs as the result of 
 
 




species (i.e., evolutionary) history and individual history. These biases are 
systematic in that they involve the whole perceptual system and as a result allow 
invariant-guided behaviour of the organism. Returning to the question as to how 
formation operations might be involved in the pick-up of invariant structure. The 
answer, I suggest, resides in how one understands the function of formation 
operations. Their function need not be to reconstruct accurate representations 
from impoverished stimuli, but rather to guide internal state biasing; thereby 
pruning the space of probable environmental structures relevant to guiding 
behaviour.74 Such biasing is a tuning of the internal states of the perceptual system 
to the environmental information that it anticipates as being relevant for successful 
behaviour.75 
 
This account of invariant pick-up is compatible with Burge’s conception of 
formation operations as generally taken to “describe law-like regularities in the 
perceptual system that reflect or mirror law-like regularities in the distal 
environment” (Burge, 2010, p. 346). What Burge seems to miss, or more 
specifically, what the starting point of his dichotomy between biological and 
psychological explanation will not allow him to consider, is that not all regularities 
in the environment are relevant for governing the kind of behaviour that will keep 
a biological system alive and thriving.  So, although formation operations may be 
construed as perceptual regularities (i.e., biases) that reflect environmental 
regularities, the larger set of perceptual regularities that may be contextually 
elicited at any one time is driven not by a need for accurate representation but by 
 
 
74 One way of construing contentful states is in terms of ‘action-oriented representations’ (Clark, 
1997). These states, rather than being merely accurate or inaccurate descriptions of the 
environment, also play the role of controlling action. This kind of conception of representation not 
only pulls its weight in explanatory power, but also bridges the gap between an active inference 
and an ecological account of affordance perception. 
75 The exact relation between bias formation and the ecological notions of education of attention, 
education of intention and calibration is an interesting topic, which given the scope of this paper 




the need to extract available environmental information that is most relevant to 
behaving in ways that keep an organism in its limited range of viable states.  
 
With this picture of formation operations at hand we may now locate them within 
the framework of PP. When formation operations are seen as (at least partly) 
constitutive of invariant pick-up, they may be construed as biasing operations that 
govern prediction error minimization; they steer how an organism’s inner dynamics 
model the statically probable and organism relevant external dynamics so as to 
enable behaviour and further pick-up. Biases, when situated in the framework of 
PP, might be seen priors with the highest degree of reliability. The effect of on-
going invariant pick-up involving prediction error minimization driven biases is a 
contextual pruning of the generative model to the anticipated, behaviourally 
relevant structure in the medium.  
 
Bringing PPP into focus again, the following account begins to take shape: it is in 
virtue of a learnt generative model, which both a plant’s phenotype and 
electrophysiological profile embodies, along with current sensory evidence (i.e., 
stimulus intensity changes that are registered at the sensory surfaces) that 
temporal and spatial intensity differentiation get a foothold. These forms of 
differentiation describe the conditions under which transformations lead to the pick-
up of invariant properties in the soil medium. The invariants being picked-up via 
hierarchical prediction driven dynamics are stimulus intensity vectors (i.e., patterns 
of increase or decrease in stimulus distribution in the medium). A plant, by 
engaging in the coupled process of perceptual and active inference, is able to 
extract invariants that specify features of its distal environment (e.g., the changing 
availability of resources). However, this in and of itself falls short of the ability to 
perceive the environmental layout beyond the medium. Typically, plants are 
perceivers exclusively of higher-order invariants in the medium and the 
affordances they offer. These higher-order invariants cause lower-order invariants 
and as such are lawfully specified by them. One might say that plants are blind to 
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causes external to the medium but are acute apprehenders of opportunities for 






Affordance perception in the medium: Rather than specifying the environmental layout 
beyond the medium, invariants that are picked-up by plant perceptual systems specify higher-
order invariants in the medium. These higher-order invariants and the affordances they offer 




For a root system, affordance-offering higher-order invariants are global resource 
structures within the fluctuating heterogenous soil medium. These higher-order, 
global structures are the distal causes of the lower-order structure (i.e., local 
intensity gradients). To perceive the higher-order invariant structure a plant must 
continually predict the transforming states of the more local structure that it 
anticipates contact with. For instance, as a rodent’s carcass on the surface of the 
medium slowly decomposes, the soil medium becomes structured with respect to 
nitrogen. The locus of the intensity gradient will be nearest to the carcass. As the 
nitrogen becomes slowly diffuse in the medium, the pattern of its distribution and 
its transformation into nitrate, the non-organic substance which is valuable to a 
plant’s survival, is dependent not only on the features of the carcass (i.e., size, 
location, etc.) but upon other changing properties of the soil (e.g., the presence of 
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soil microbe populations, water, mineral concentrations, other nearby competing 
roots, etc.).  These latter properties, higher-order invariant structures, contribute 
as causes of the lower-order invariants (nitrate gradient intensities) in the medium. 
As such, the global structure of the medium is perceived in virtue of the local 
structure of the medium given that the latter is a reliable indicator of the former. By 
coming to anticipate the global conditions under which various valuable resources 
are made available, a plant can steer its behaviour in order to adapt the best global 
strategy for minimizing long-term prediction error.  
 
The notion that plants perceive affordances is also nothing new to ecological 
psychology. Turvey et at., (1981) were early to suggest that the seedlings of the 
arboreal vine Monstera Gigantea perceives trees as climb-upable things. More 
recently, the perception of climb-ability by bean plants has been explored in 
relation to the detection of tau (See Calvo, Raja & Lee, 2017). Although 
affordances may be subject to accurate perception or misperception (Gibson, 
1979), the fact that their existence depends upon species-specific phenotypic traits 
illustrates that the subjectivity of the organism cannot be cleanly pulled apart from 
the objectivity of its world. As such, “an affordance cuts across the dichotomy of 
subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy” (Gibson, 1979, p. 
129). To the degree that constancies are marks of objectivity (Burge, 2010), if 
understood in terms of both lower-order and higher-order invariants, then 
constancies are marks of organism-environment mutuality. To conclude: invariant 
pick-up may be consistently given place within the framework of PP given that 
invariant pick-up involves formation operations and those operations are nothing 
other than context elicited, highly reliable priors in PP.  Therefore, the use of 
invariant pick-up in fulfilling the constancy constraint is a tenable move on behalf 
of PPP.  
 
Invariant pick-up as understood by the ecological orthodoxy is a process, the 
nature of which is to specify particulars in the environment external to the medium. 
This law-like specification relation comes about in virtue of the environmental 
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features being causes of the structured medium.76 However, on the account 
developed here, plants perceive higher-order invariant structures in the medium. 
One worry that might come about is that limiting perception to the structure in the 
medium places a veil between the environment and the (plant) perceiver. This 
worry is largely unfounded. For the medium and its properties are concrete 
particulars in the extra-organismic environment. Thus, in picking-up on the global 
structure in the soil medium, a plant is perceiving its environment. I would like to 
now suggest that one thing which might largely distinguish plant perception from 
the kind of perception which cognitive psychology has traditionally been at ends to 
study is that while plants typically perceive only those properties of their perceptual 
medium, animals, in contrast, may in addition to this perceive the causes of those 
properties external to the perceptual medium.77 This type of medium-bound higher-
order invariant pick-up is what I call minimal-perception.  
 
I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the qualification ‘typically’ as used to 
describe the different perceptual capacities that plants and animals may possess. 
This qualification is important for the reason that the perceptual capacities of some 
plants may not be exclusively minimal. Take, for example, the Venus fly trap 
(Dionaea muscipula). This insect eating plant captures its prey in virtue of keeping 
track of the number of times that the tiny hairs resting upon the inner surface its 
folding, trap-like leaves are triggered (Böhm et al., 2016). A certain strength of 
mechano-stimulation when applied to the hairs elicit action potentials and if there 
are more than two of them within 30 seconds of one another, the leaves close, 
capturing what could be possible prey. However, it is only as a result of continued 
subsequent triggering––no less than five action potentials in total––that the leaves 
remain closed and the process of digestion via enzyme secretion is initiated (Böhm 
et al., 2016). In this case, the pattern of mechano-stimuli over time specifies the 
 
 
76 See Bruineberg et al., (2018) for an account of specification that is reliable and yet not law-like. 
 
77 That animals also perceive properties of the perceptual medium has been advanced by some 
perceptual analyses of olfaction. Millar (2018) holds that what is smelled is not the object emitting 
the odour but the chemical odorant itself. 
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biologically relevant cause of that kind of pattern.  Five action potentials or more 
specify moving, ensnarement-resisting, nutrient providing prey, and this is just 
what the Venus fly trap’s behaviour anticipates and is geared towards. In the 
context of minimal-perception, what this example seems to illustrate is this: 
although it is not a defining feature of plants, exclusively engaging in minimal-
perception may nonetheless be seen as a typical feature of plants. Similarly, 
possessing non-minimal perceptual capacities may be said to be a typical feature 
of animals rather than being a defining feature. Sponges (Porifera), for instance, 
may be minimal perceivers tout court, picking-up on invariant properties of water 
flow gradients. (See Ludeman et al., 2014 for an account of cilia as sensory organs 
in sponges).78 
 
Given that it is medium-bound, the spatial and temporal scales which minimal-
perception tracks although reaching out distally, are less protracted and spatially 
nested than those which are tracked via non-minimal-perception. In other words, 
minimal-perception does not exhibit “temporal thickness” (Bronfman et al., 2016; 
Friston, 2018). That minimal-perception need not reach beyond invariants in the 
medium to track their causes external to the medium might be given explanation 
when considering what Clark (2008) has called “the 007 principle”. This principle 
of cognitive economy states that we should expect a cognizer to only expend as 
much cognitive energy as is necessary to get the job done. In other words, overly 
complex solutions are to be avoided where more frugal ones are available that 
provide the same results. Considering this, if all that exclusively minimal-
perceivers, like some plants, must behaviourally adapt to—in order to persist—are 
the higher-order invariants in the medium and doing so is avoiding surprise, then 
the 007 principle suggests that there is no need for minimal-perceivers to also pick-
up on the causes external to the medium. Perception of higher-order invariants in 
 
 
78 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the capacities of minimal-
perception and non-minimal-perception may not be used in any straightforward manner to 
distinguish plants from animals. 
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the medium often gets the job done for simpler organisms where the level of 
complexity of what is minimally-perceived and acted upon comes to match (i.e., 
reflect) the level of complexity of the processes by which the organism’s viable 







In this paper I have argued that PPP does not buckle under the weight placed upon 
it by Burge’s two constraints on perception.80 Emerging out of the account of 
constancy representation explicated here is a new picture of the kind of perception 
which plants (and other organisms without nervous systems) may possibly engage 
in. Rather than perceiving the temporally-thick distal causes of proximal sensory 
perturbations, plants perceive the temporally-shallow global structure in the 
perceptual medium; structure that is nonetheless distal enough to allow for 
constancy representation and hence a form of objectification. If something like 
minimal-perception is correct, then it may be concluded that the notion of 
perception used in PPP (and more generally in the FEF) is not a mere heuristic but 
rather a description of various perceptual abilities which might range from minimal 
to ‘maximal’. Minimal-perception urges us to adopt a more unified view of 
perception and action, giving weight to the continuity of mind and life. This being 
the case warrants serious reconsideration of the scope of model organisms 
considered relevant to the psychological investigation. This is methodologically 
 
 
79 This kind of “complexity matching” illustrates how the environmental complexity thesis (ECT) 
may be leveraged across a wide problem space that involves different degrees of heterogeneity. 
This space invites cognitive strategies that are sensitive to the degree of heterogeneity that must 
be dealt with.   
80 What my argument has not shown is that plant predictive processing stands up to other 
conditions placed upon perception. In fact, it might be the case that what I have succeeded in 
showing is that Burge’s constraints are too weak. 
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important insofar as by observing the processes under which minimal-perceivers 
come to adaptively respond to the dynamics of their environments, it may be 
possible to extract and refine common cognitive principles which span the gamut 
of self-maintaining organisms (Calvo et al., 2011).  
 
Two questions naturally arise given these considerations. Firstly, how ‘low’ does 
minimal-perception go? It could very well be that simple organisms such as 
prokaryotes may engage in the same kind of predictive dynamics that allows them 
to perceive and anticipatorily behave with respect to the invariant structures in their 
perceptual medium. This is an open and interesting empirical question for future 
research. Secondly, at what point does minimal-perception become full-blown 
perception? The distinction between minimal-perception and perception might not 
only demarcate shallow vs deep pick-up of spatio-temporally nested causes, but 
importantly, this distinction, I conjecture, may mark out a transition between non-
conscious and conscious perception.81 The arrival of conscious perception may be 
bound up with the emergence of a pronounced sensitivity to increasingly protracted 
and complex causal dynamics, granting those organisms that embody deep 
generative models the ability to reason counterfactually. Drawing this latter 
conclusion is, however, overtly premature. This being said, the need for further 
research—both theoretically and empirically—as to the mechanisms underlying 
minimal-perception and how such mechanisms might be implemented in plants 
and other classes of nervous-system-less, free-energy minimizing organisms is 
certainly warranted if there is a possibility of drawing conclusions about the 
transition between non-conscious and conscious perception. 
 
Lastly, further research into minimal-perception might be of particular significance 
for the ecologically inclined psychologist when attempting to understand how 
perception of affordances (i.e., opportunities for action) arises from the pick-up of 
 
 
81 This falls in line with Friston (2018), who distinguishes conscious agents from non-conscious 
adaptively responding organisms in terms of the formers’ capacity for temporally-thick inference 
making.  
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invariants. It is clear that minimal-perception in plants is a research programme 
with much to offer. It is also clear that engaging fully with such a programme 
requires the overturning of a deeply rooted anthropocentric view on what it is to 
perceive the world. On that note, plant predictive processing might provide us with 
a principled place to begin.  
 
Thus far we have seen that ecologically informed and FEF embedded PP can 
provide the apparatus for thinking about the notion of minimal perception. In the 
next chapter I will use FEF and its Markov blanket formalism to consider how 
another surprising form of cognition could arise from the integrated activities of 
multispecies cooperative associations. Thinking about what it takes to be a 
symbiotic biological cognizer throws into relief at least one possible manner in 









How to count biological minds: symbiosis, the Free-





The notion of a physiological individual has been developed and applied in the 
philosophy of biology to understand symbiosis, an understanding of which is key 
to theorising about the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to 
multi- cellularity. The paper begins by asking what such symbiotic individuals can 
help to reveal about a possible transition in the evolution of cognition. Such a 
transition marks the movement from cooperating individual biological cognizers to 
a functionally integrated cognizing unit. Somewhere along the way, did such 
cognizing units simultaneously have cognizers as parts? Expanding upon the 
multiscale integration view of the Free Energy Framework, this paper develops an 
account of reciprocal integration, demonstrating how some coupled biological 
cognizing systems, when certain constraints are met, can result in a cognizing unit 
that is in ways greater than the sum of its cognizing parts. Symbiosis between V. 
Fischeri bacteria and the bobtail squid is used to provide an illustration of this 
account. A novel manner of conceptualizing biological cognizers as gradient is 
then suggested. Lastly it is argued that the reason why the notion of ontologically 
nested cognizers may be unintuitive stems from the fact that our folk-psychology 
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notion of what a cognizer is has been deeply influenced by our folk-biological 







Symbioses82 are cooperative heterospecific associations in which each symbiont 
partner mutually benefits from (e.g., gaining nourishment, shelter, etc.) the 
presence of the other partner(s). These associations have presented an interesting 
problem case for the notion of biological individuality. What it is to be a biological 
individual refers to what it is that makes a living system a well delineated whole. 
Symbiosis raises the ontological question of whether beyond classifying each 
symbiont as a biological individual, there is a non-arbitrary manner of classifying 
the symbiotic assemblage itself as a well delineated biological unit. And if so, how 
can this non-arbitrary manner be spelled out? Answering this question is 
particularly important for at least two reasons; the first being that symbiosis is 
ubiquitous in nature; getting clear on the conditions under which a symbiotic 
association qualifies as a countable biological individual allows biological 
explanations to parse the world up in ways that ontologically cohere with the kinds 
of entities that populate the world. The second reason is that conceptualizing 
symbiotic associations as well delineated biological units plays a significant role in 
coming to understanding (and offer explanations of) the move from multi-
organismality to multicellularity, an example of what has been called a major 
transition in evolution (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 1995). Under the assumption 
that multicellular organisms evolved from multi-organismal ensembles and that 
 
 
82Throughout this paper, I will use the term symbiosis to refer specifically to mutualistic 
associations and not commensalism or parasitism.  
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some of these ensembles were likely symbiotic associations, understanding this 
major transition in evolution requires a way to conceptualize biological individuals 
that is not restricted to units of reproduction or what are otherwise known as 
“Darwinian individuals” (see Godfrey-Smith, 2013).  
 
One way that philosophers have recently addressed this question is by 
conceptually developing and applying the notion of a physiological individual. A 
biological individual of this kind is a highly integrated functional unit, the 
heterogeneous parts of which cohere together through regulatory processes (e.g., 
metabolic, 67mmune-tolerance, etc.) so as to maintain the system’s integrity and 
resist environmental forces of decay (Pradeu, 2011). Applying the notion of a 
physiological individual to symbioses suggests that at least some symbiotic 
ensembles qualify as biological individuals in their own right (Queller & Strassman, 
2009; Pradeu, 2011; Godfrey-Smith, 2013; Bouchard, 2018). What qualifies some 
of these ensembles as physiological individuals is the high degree to which the 
symbionts are functionally integrated with one another. A fascinating and 
somewhat counterintuitive result of parsing biological world up in this manner is a 
kind of nesting of biological individuals in biological individuals; not only are the 
symbionts understood to be physiological individuals but also the symbiotic 
association comprised of those symbionts qualifies as a physiological individual.  
 
This paper examines a related interesting question for any biologically informed 
cognitive science that takes two ideas seriously. The first idea is that cognitive 
processes are an enrichment of the organizational principles and properties 
definitive of living processes or what is called “the strong life-mind continuity thesis” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1996). The continuity thesis suggests that mind, because it is an 
enrichment of life, might be exhibited in biological processes that prefigure those 
which cognitive science typically studies. It opens up the possibility that simple 
organisms (e.g., some bacteria and plants) may engage in cognitive processes 
that are not different in kind but different in degree to those processes that are 
paradigmatic of human cognition. The second idea is that some symbiotic 
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associations actually do qualify as physiological individuals. Putting these ideas 
together the following question arises: if mind is an enriched version of life and 
some symbiotic associations indeed qualify as physiological individuals, is there 
any reason to think that some of these living associations might themselves be 
enriched enough so as to qualify as bio-cognizers?83 This is not merely a question 
regarding a possible application of the extended mind thesis (i.e., the idea that 
cognitive processes can loop outside of a cognizing agent to envelop the use of 
external artefacts as scaffolding) (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Rather, this is a 
question about the kinds of physiological individuals that we can reasonably 
ascribe the term “cognizer” to. It is a question about how to count biological minds. 
The significance of this question lies in the fact that its answer may be used to 
shed light upon a possible major transition in cognition. Perhaps there are many 
such transitions: the move from reflex behaviour to sensorimotor coordination; the 
move from non-sentience to sentience; the move from individual intentionality to 
group intentionality. However the question which this paper will investigate 
concerns the transition away from short-term, slightly integrated cooperative 
interaction between simple cognizing physiological individuals towards the long-
term, highly integrated cooperative interaction of the component parts of a complex 
cognizing symbiotic whole; each of the parts becoming more specialized in the 
function it plays in driving the behaviour of the whole integrated system.  
 
Given the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to multicellularity, 
and assuming that at least some of those component organisms that eventually 
constituted multicellular organisms were cognizers, symbiosis provides an 
opportunity to think about how an ensemble of minded physiological individuals 
became a single physiological individual with one mind. Like the nested-ness of 
physiological individuals, the possibility of a symbiotic mind suggests that a 
symbiotic cognizing unit may be comprised of nested symbiont cognizers. And 
 
 
83 This paper’s scope will be strictly limited to investigating biological cognizers or what I will often 
call “bio-cognizers”.  
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much like the nested-ness of physiological individuals runs counter to our folk-
biological conception of biological individuality, this idea that cognizers can have 
other cognizers as constituent parts seems to go against the grain of our folk-
psychological conception of what cognizers are. One aim of this paper is to argue 
that the possibility of symbiotic minds provides a reason to believe that our folk-
psychological conception of “cognizer” may be in need of serious revamping in this 
regard. 
 
To support the notion of symbiotic minds and the notion of nested biological 
cognizers that falls out of it, this paper will develop and deploy the notion of 
reciprocal multiscale integration from within the Free Energy Framework. 
Reciprocal multiscale integration describes the case where each of two (or more) 
cognizing systems uses the other to provide evidence for its own model of the 
world (and itself acting in that world). It is when each cognizer reciprocally 
contributes to the cognitive processes of the other that an emergent action capacity 
arises. This is a capacity to act upon the environment which outstrips the individual 
action capacities of each partner; the capacity of the whole being more than that 
possessed by the sum of its parts. It is this emergent action capacity that allows a 
symbiotic unit to provide evidence for its own model of the world and hence for its 
own continued existence. Reciprocal multiscale integration builds upon the 
multiscale integrationist view of the Free Energy Framework (Ramstead et al. 
2019; Hesp et al., 2019). This view uses the notion of nested Markov blankets to 
demonstrate that cognitive systems have a plurality of ontological boundaries, 
each relevant to the study of cognition. Reciprocal multiscale integration, on the 
other hand, is a manner of accounting for the nested boundaries of cognizers as 
opposed to the integrated boundaries of the nested non-cognizing constituents of 
cognitive systems. Like the multiscale integration view, reciprocal multiscale 
integration deploys the Markov blanket formalism ontologically. As it will be 
discussed in section 2, the Free Energy Framework (FEF) (Friston, 2010, 2013) is 
a framework that sees both life and cognition as coming about in virtue of 
minimizing the quantity variational free energy (henceforth free energy). The 
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reason for using FEF to investigate and argue for a symbiotic mind is not only 
because the quantity “free energy” provides a measure of cognition across spatio-
temporal scales (Ramstead, et al. 2019; Friston, et al., 2015; Kirchhoff & 
Kiverstein, 2018a), but because FEF and its various corollaries suggest a plausible 
criterion for identifying biological cognizers across various spatio-temporal scales. 
In other words, the theoretical apparatus that falls out of FEF may be used to arrive 
at an account of the kind of enrichment of living processes that are required for 
those processes to qualify as cognitive processes ascribable to physiological 
individuals; thus, making good on the project of strong life-mind continuity.  
 
As a case study in support of the notion of symbiotic minds I will look at the 
symbiosis of Vibrio fischeri bacteria and the bobtail squid. I will argue that the 
Vibrio-squid assemblage constitutes a functionally integrated cognitive whole, the 
Markov blanket of which constrains those of the Vibrio and the squid. In showing 
how the notion of a symbiotic mind can be supported by reciprocal multiscale 
integration within FEF, this paper contributes to the philosophy of cognitive 
science, demonstrating that our folk-psychological conception of what cognizers 
are requires rethinking. Moreover, if the account of symbiotic cognizers presented 
is tenable, by bringing into relief and accounting for at least one possible transition 
in cognition, this paper contributes to a more complete understanding of the 
evolution of cognition. 
 
This paper shall proceed as follows: In Section 2, after briefly reviewing FEF and 
exposing its criterion for being a cognizer, adaptive active inference, I will explicate 
the multiscale integrationalist approach as a manner of individuating the 
boundaries of cognition. In Section 3 I will look at the symbiosis of Vibrio fischeri 
bacteria and the bobtail squid before turning to some philosophical implications of 
this symbiosis that are significant to thinking about symbiotic minds. In Section 4, 
building on the multiscale integration view, I shall provide an account of reciprocal 
multiscale integration and argue that some symbiotic associations and their 
symbiont constituents may simultaneously be construed as biological cognizers 
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when reciprocally integrated. This paper concludes when some brief remarks 




3.2 The Free Energy Framework – a short overview 
 
The Free Energy Framework (FEF) (Friston, 2010, 2013, 2019a, 2019b), an 
ambitious unifying cognitive framework that may be applied to any biological 
system, starts from a particular view of life that is grounded in statistical physics. 
In nature, most systems self-organize to thermodynamics equilibrium. This means 
that all energy gradients for such systems have been consumed; something that 
entails death for living systems. Staying alive on the other hand requires that the 
states of a system behave in ways that counter the dissipative effects of random 
fluctuations. In other words, a biological system is one that self-organizes to a 
limited set of attracting states that is far from thermodynamic equilibrium (Nicolis 
& Prigogine, 1977; Friston, 2013). This set is referred to as a system’s 
nonequilibrium steady state density (NESS) (Seifert, 2012; Friston, 2019b; Friston, 
Wiese & Hobson, 2020; Palacios et. al., 2020). Importantly, the NESS density, 
towards which an organism’s dynamics flow, corresponds to its phenotype (i.e., its 
regular patterns of behaviour, morphology, and physiology), to find itself in its 
characteristic or phenotypic states provides the organism is evidence that its 
behaviour is countering dispersive effects of random fluctuations. Hence, for a 
biological system to remain alive is for it to revisit the states defined by its NESS 
and to remain statistically separate from the environment in which it is embedded. 
Statistical separation is cast in terms of a conditional independence exhibited 
between the system’s internal states and the external states of its environment. 
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This brings us to the second primary feature of FEF: the Markov blanket 
formalism.84 
 
The Markov blanket formalism as used in the context of FEF and biological 
systems describes a particular kind of statistical organization of a system relative 
to that which the system is not. Namely, it describes the statistical partitioning of 
internal states I and external states (φ) by sensory (s) and active states (a), these 
latter states being the states of the Markov blanket. The behaviour of the internal 
states may be predicted fully from knowing the states of the Markov blanket and 
as such the external states are rendered uninformative. Internal and external 
states are thus conditionally independent. This conditional independence falls out 
of the partitioning rule: internal states influence active states, which influence but 
are not influenced by external states; external states influence sensory states, 
which influence but are not influenced by internal states (Friston, 2010). These 
dependencies/independencies do however allow for like states to influence like 






84 The notion of a Markov blanket (Pearl, 1988) was originally introduced in the context of graph 
theory, where it describes a set of topological properties of a Bayesian nets. Specifically, a 
Markov blanket is the smallest set of nodes in a larger set of nodes, which if given information 
regarding their states would allow for the prediction of the unfolding states of a target node. This 
set of nodes includes parents, children and co-parents. The conditional independence between 
the target node and the nodes outside its Markov blanket mean that the latter are rendered 
uninformative or informationally redundant by the Markov blanket. The description of this set of 
nodes in terms of active, and sensory states is specific to FEF and its corollary active inference.  
 73 
            
            Figure 6 
Markov blanket partitioning rule: sensory states (s) influence but cannot be 
influenced by internal statI(r). Active states (a) influence but cannot be influenced by 
external states (φ) This relation results in a conditional independence of internal and 
external states, where if one knows s and a at time, t-1, the knowledge of φ at time, t-





Active and sensory states create a statistical partition between internal states of 
the system and external states of the environment, forming “a surface or boundary 
that defines the thing that exists (e.g., a cell membrane) (Friston, 2019a, p. 176). 
Although this conditional independence implies that the internal states remain 
statistically distinct from external states it should not however be taken to imply 
that such a system is causally isolated from the environment. Biological systems 
are self-organizing thermodynamically open systems that operate far-from 
equilibrium. (Turner, 1982). The manner which biological systems resist dispersive 
effects of fluctuations in their external milieu, and hence remain far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium, is by exchanging matter and energy with their 
environment (Friston, 2013; Demirel, 2014). These exchanges are mediated by a 
system’s Markov blanket via circular causality: external states causally influence 
internal states by way of sensory state changes and internal states causally 
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influence external states by way of active state changes. As such, although the 
system individuated by its Markov blanket is statistically independent from its 
environment, the formalism as used within FEF suggests that such systems remain 
tightly coupled to the dynamics of the environment (Friston, 2013, 2019a). This 
brings us to a third essential feature of FEF: the notion of a generative model. 
A generative model is a probabilistic model that describes how the evolution of 
sensory states of a Markov blanket could be caused by external states; it captures 
prior ‘beliefs’–in the form of probability distributions–about unobserved external 
states, and a likelihood mapping external states to the evolution of sensory states. 
Such models are “implicit in the dynamics of internal states” (Palacios, et al. 2020 
p.2).  Importantly, a system’s generative model may be cast in terms of its NESS. 
To see how this is the case requires understanding the notion of dual information 
geometry of self-organizing systems (Friston, 2019b; Parr et al., 2019; Friston, 
Wiese, & Hobson, 2020) 
FEF describes the long-term dynamics of a self-organizing system in one of two 
mathematically equivalent ways that depend upon such a system’s having a 
Markov blanket and, hence, its existing at nonequilibrium steady state. The 
evolution of a system’s states (i.e., its flow) may be described dually in terms of (1) 
its phase space dynamics or (2) its statistical manifold dynamics. With respect to 
its phase space description, every instantaneous state of the system is 
represented by a point in phase space (i.e., a space of all possible states that a 
system could occupy), every variable in the system corresponds to a dimension of 
the phase space, and the evolution of states over time corresponds to particular 
trajectory in phase space. Under this description, the probabilistic flow of a 
system’s states over time is known as its intrinsic information geometry (Friston, 
Wiese, & Hobson, 2020). A system’s extrinsic information geometry describes the 
probabilistic flow of a system’s states over a statistical manifold, upon which each 
manifold coordinate corresponds to the sufficient statistics (i.e., the mean and the 
variance of a Gaussian) defining a probability density (i.e., a probabilistic ‘belief’ 
about external states). Adjacent points on a statistical manifold represent densities 
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that are alike, and the distance between points (i.e., “information length”) along a 
manifold path scores distances between probability densities encoded as points 
on that path respectively (Friston, 2019b; Friston, Wiese, & Hobson, 2020). In 
short, while intrinsic information geometry is a description of the probabilistic 
evolution of states system itself, extrinsic geometry is a description of ‘belief’ 
distributions over external states that internal states of a Markov-blanketed system 
encode.  
FEF suggest that as long as a system possess a Markov blanket, rendering the 
system (i.e., its internal and active states) conditionally independent from its 
embedding environment, the  flow in phase space towards the NESS density can 
be expressed as a probabilistic flow towards ‘belief’ distributions about external 
states. As a result, FEF allows for the remarkable observation that the NESS 
density towards which any self-organizing system tends to flow is that system’s 
generative model. Given the presence of a system’s Markov blanket, its intrinsic 
and extrinsic geometries coincide, meaning that a biological system’s phenotype 
dually corresponds to its NESS density and to its generative model.85 How does a 
system’s generative model contribute to the continued maintenance of its Markov 
blanket? This brings us to the fourth primary feature of FEF: active inference.  
 
Remaining alive (i.e., statically separate from the environment) is a continuous feat 
that is accomplished despite the tendency for all systems to approach 
thermodynamic equilibrium. As such, living systems appear to resist the second 
law of thermodynamics. FEF proposes that living systems are able to do this in 
virtue of avoiding sensory states which are deleterious and actively bringing about 
those sensory states which allow them to maintain their structural and functional 
integrity. These latter kinds of phenotypically determined sensory states describe 
those which an organism expects itself to be in––given its generative model––and, 
 
 
85 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to the importance of the 
phenotype’s dual aspect.  
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as such, act as evidence for its existence (Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019b). This is 
just to say that an organism must thus pursue those actions which bring about 
evidence for itself over the long run (this includes exploration) and avoid those 
situations which could possibly result in its systemic dissipation. How does an 
organism accomplish this?  
 
The free-energy principle that states that for any biological system to remain alive, 
it must minimize a quantity known as variational free energy. Variational free 
energy86 (henceforth, “free-energy”) is an upper bound on the information theoretic 
surprise87 (i.e., the negative log probability of sensory states) and is a function of 
probabilistic ‘beliefs’ encoded by internal states of a Markov-blanketed system. 
Free-energy may be thought of as the difference between the sensory states an 
organism expects to observe given its generative model (or equivalently, its NESS 
density) and those that it actually observes at its sensorium. According to FEF, 
free-energy can be minimized by (1) inferentially optimizing the internal states of 
the Markov blanket so as to accommodate sensory states (i.e., perception), and 
(2) inferentially optimizing active states of the blanket (i.e., action) to sample 
sensory states that are expected given its phenotype.  It is by engaging in this 
coupled process of active inference88 that an organism minimizes not only current 
free energy encountered but expected free energy (i.e., the free energy that would 
arise were a particular action policy selected and followed). It should be impressed 
that the inference of active inference does not presuppose personal level 
 
 
86 Free energy is under some simplifying assumptions––the details of which I cannot treat in this 
paper––is mathematically equivalent to the quantity “prediction error” (Friston, 2010) that is 
typically referred to in predictive processing. In what follows I shall use both free energy and 
prediction error to refer to the same quantity unless noted otherwise. 
87 Surprise (i.e., negative Bayesian model evidence) is itself a computationally intractable quantity 
because it requires that biological systems have access to something that they generally do not 
have access to. Namely, it requires access to all the possible ways in which sensory states could 
have been caused (Friston, 2010). Since free-energy is an upper bound on surprise (i.e., free-
energy is always equal to or greater than surprise) and because it is something that biological 
systems do have access to (i.e., it is a function of a generative model), it may be used as a proxy 
quantity for surprise. That is to say that by minimizing free-energy an organism can minimize 
surprise and maximize model evidence.  
88 It should be impressed that “inference” as it is used within FEF is understood as a subpersonal 
process.  
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inferential processes; rather, it describes the dynamics which underwrite the 
optimization of internal states and prediction driven sensory feedback control.  
 
Minimizing free energy over time is the same as maximizing Bayesian model 
evidence (i.e., self-evidence) (Friston, 2013; Hohwy, 2016). This is because when 
an organism’s generative model is well-tuned to its environment the discrepancy 
between the kinds of states that the organism expects to observe (i.e., states that 
confirm its own existence) and those that it does observe is at a minimum; its 
internal states may be thus understood as a model of the external states of its 
niche (Friston et al., 2015). It is thus by minimizing the free energy bound on 
surprise via active inference that biological systems “maximize the lower bound on 
the evidence for an implicit model of how their sensory samples were generated” 
(Friston, 2013, p.2). An interesting result of casting the NESS density as the 
generative model is that the gradient ascent of a system towards its NESS density 
may be described “as if” that system is minimizing variational free-energy and 
hence harvesting evidence for its generative model. To say that a system will 
behave “as if” it is performing a gradient descent on free-energy is a description 
that falls out of the fact that there is a dual information geometry (i.e., one can 
interpret a system’s gradient ascent on an attracting set through phase space in 
terms of its flow towards a generative model on a statistical manifold). In sum, to 
minimize free-energy is to maximize evidence for a generative model which is just 
maximising evidence that the flow of the system’s internal and blanket states is 
approaching its NESS density (i.e., flowing towards the system’s attracting states 







3.2.1 Enriching Life with Autonomy - Adaptive Active Inference 
 
 
There are two important points about FEF that are worth noting. Firstly, FEF is not 
only a theory of cognition but a theory of life; mind and life are both underwritten 
by the same fundamental principle of free energy minimization and come about via 
the kind of Markov blanket-preserving adaptive behaviour that is expressed by 
active inference. FEF as such is ideally placed as a framework within which to 
investigate the notion of enrichment that is central to the strong life-mind continuity 
thesis. Moreover, because FEF does not specify the manner in which active 
inference is physically implemented, this framework may be used to theorize about 
cognition in a range of living systems of varying complexity (see Auletta, 2013; 
Calvo & Friston, 2017; Kirchhoff, 2018; Sims, 2019).  
 
This brings us to the second point of importance. FEF falls short of making the 
claim that all Markov blankets draw a line around cognizers. It has been suggested 
that what determines whether a living Markov blanketed system is cognizer is 
whether or not it is the kind thing which engages in “adaptive active inference” 
rather than “mere active inference” (Kirchhoff et al. 2018). Adaptive active 
inference requires that a system autonomously engages in active inference, 
maximizing sensory evidence for its own existence (Kirchhoff & Kiverstein 
2019a/2019b). Autonomy may be understood as the capacity for systemic self-
evidencing through “actively monitor[ing] and react[ing] to perturbations that 
challenge homeostatic variables” (Kirchhoff et al. 2018, p.5). Cells, tissues and 
organs, although they are self-organizing, free energy-minimizing systems, fail to 
rise to the level of bio-cognitive individuals because the manner in which they 
provide evidence for themselves (i.e. for their generative models) is highly 
dependent upon the machinery of and their interaction with other components of a 
global system (Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019a). As such, FEF (or more specifically 
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its corollary adaptive active inference) boldly suggests that one manner in which 
life may be enriched so as to rise to the status of mind is tied to the increased 
degree of autonomy of the living Markov blanketed system 
 
The distinction between adaptive active inference and mere active inference offers 
a manner of addressing a prima facie worry that active inference (and FEF more 
generally) might be thought to face: ascribing Markov blankets to all living systems 
is intuitively unattractive if it brings with it the claim that all living systems engage 
in active inference. If something like a red blood cell actually engages in active 
inference, then despite the fact that inferences are understood as subpersonal 
descriptions of internal dynamics this result seems to make active inferential a 
trivial notion. This trivialization worry however may be avoided when recognizing 
that although every living thing is enshrouded by Markov blanket, this does not 
entail that every living thing engaged in the kind of adaptive active inference that 
is required to be a cognizer. In other words, one can understand the Markov 
blanket formalism as a genuine manner of individuating all living systems (it is not 
merely way of modelling them)89 while distinguishing the highly autonomous 
manner in which bio-cognitive systems maintain and preserve themselves and the 
highly interdependent manner that non-cognizing living systems maintain and 
preserve one another. The distinction between adaptive active inference and mere 
active inference demonstrates that active inference if far from a trivial notion – the 
devil’s in the detail.  
 
To sum up: FEF (or more specifically its corollary adaptive active inference) boldly 
suggests that one manner in which life may be enriched so as to rise to the status 
of mind is tied to the increased degree of autonomy of the living Markov blanketed 
system. With this understanding of FEF and adaptive active inference in hand, let 
 
 
89 That FEF holds Markov blankets to be ontologically robust may be supported by Friston when 
he writes that a Markov blanket  “is not some statistical device by which we come to observe or 
model the world—it is a necessary attribute of a universe that can be carved into things (that are 
distinct from other things)” (Friston, 2019a, p. 176).   
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us now briefly look at the multiscale integration view, which lays much of the 
theoretical ground upon which the notion of a symbiotic mind (and nested bio-




3.2.2 Multiscale Integration 
 
The multiscale integrationalist view (Ramstead, Kirchhoff, Constant, & Friston, 
2019; Hesp, Ramstead, Constant, Badcock, Kirchhoff, & Friston, 2019) is a 
pluralist theory about cognitive boundaries; it uses the notion of nested Markov 
blankets to demonstrate that cognitive systems have a plurality of ontological 
boundaries, each relevant to the study of cognition.90 Cognition is seen as falling 
out of active inference that spans across and integrates various nested Markov 
blankets at different spatio-temporal scales (Ramstead et al., 2019). To support 
this position, the multiscale integrationalist view offers a nuanced manner of 
spelling out just how the boundaries of cognitive systems are both nested and 
multiple via the process of multiscale integration. Take for example a human 
cognitive system which is composed of a brain; which is itself composed of cortical 
layers; which is composed of a collection of neurons; which are composed of 
individual neurons, etc. According to the multiscale integrationalist view each of 
the spatio-temporally nested components of this cognitive system may be 
ontologically picked out by deploying the Markov blanket formalism at different 
scales. Any one Markov blanket located at one spatio-temporal scale is 
simultaneously composed of other nested Markov blanket constituents at the scale 
below and is itself a constituent of a larger Markov blanket at the scale above it. 
 
 
90 If the multiscale integrationalist view is correct, then cognition can be a spread-out endeavour, 
the kind which often involves not only the brain but the dynamic and every-changing involvement 
of the body along with aspects of the environment – a view that is consonant with 4E theories of 
cognition (Clark, 2008; Chemero, 2009; Gallagher, 2005).  
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The temporal dynamics between scales differ such that the smaller the scale is, 
the faster the dynamics are. The slower dynamics of macroscale systems 
constrain the faster dynamics of the microscale Markov blanketed systems, in 
effect acting as an order parameter91 (Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Ramstead et al., 
2019). The structure across scales is governed by the same conditional 
(in)dependencies described by the partitioning rule (Allen & Friston, 2018; Clark, 
2017; Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Ramstead et al., 2019; Friston, 2019b).  Since free 
energy is an additive quantity, the free energy which arises at the macroscale is 
the only free energy that there is for the ensemble and it may be quantified by 
summing the free energy associated with each constituent microscale Markov 
blanketed system. Minimizing free energy at the level of the composite system thus 
means minimizing free energy at the level of the constituent systems. 
The process of multiscale integration may be generally understood in terms of 
inferences made on the part of individual Markovian partitioned microscale 
components (e.g. cells) of a macroscale system (e.g., a multicellular organism) 
that share the same generative model (see Friston, Levin, Sengupta, & Pezzulo, 
2015; Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston, & Kiverstein, 2018; Palacios, Razi, Parr, 
Kirchhoff, & Friston, 2020; Veissière, Constant, Ramstead, Friston, & Kirmayer, 
2019).  The idea of sharing a generative model may be construed in two manners 
given what has been said above (Section 2.0) regarding the dual information 
geometry of self-organizing Markov blanketed systems. When an organism’s 
phenotype is cast in terms of its generative model, all component particles of the 
composite system will have the same expectations about the free-energy 
minimizing sensory states that should be encountered in addition to the kind of 
active states which are most likely to give rise to such sensory states. This means 
having the same set of priors (‘beliefs’) acquired via evolution (Palacios, et al., 
2020). Integration, from the perspective of extrinsic information geometry, thus 
 
 
91 An order parameter is a notion taken from synergetics (Haken, 1985) and used dynamics 
systems theory. It denotes a measure of a global system’s macroscale unstable (slow) dynamics 
that enslaves the fast dynamics of microscale component systems and results in a globally 
emergent pattern.  
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boils down to active inference on the part of those component particles, each 
instantiating a generative model with the same expectations as other integrating 
particles. The expected kinds of interaction (sensory feedback) are constrained by 
the partitioning rule that governs the organization of Markov blankets at any scale 
(e.g., If I infer that I am in an internal state of a larger blanketed system, then I 
expect to be influenced by all other states with the exception of external states). 
To minimize its free energy, and thus provide sensory evidence for itself as a 
constituent of the larger system, a microscale system allows itself to be enslaved 
to the dynamics of that macroscale system. The whole Markov blanket ensemble 
is integrated in virtue of the free-energy minimizing, self-evidencing dynamics 
occurring across/between each spatiotemporal scale (Ramstead et al., 2019), 
resulting in the emergence of a composite system that possesses a new 
generative model at the superordinate level. 
 
When taking the intrinsic perspective, where an organism’s phenotype is cast as 
its NESS density, sharing a generative model may be seen as a case in which all 
of the subordinate level Markov blanketed particles of a superordinate system self-
organize to a shared attracting set in phase space (i.e., a shared NESS density). 
From this perspective, the mechanics of the multiscale integration view may be 
understood as the idea that any living system may have multiple NESS densities, 
nested in successively larger spatio-temporal scales.92 Because a Markov blanket 
in the case of living systems statistically maps onto a system as defined by its 
NESS density, multiscale integration can be understood as the idea that the 
coupled dynamics of multiple Markov blanket particles over time result in a new 
attracting state in their shared phase space. The emergence of this new attracting 
set is just the emergence of a system with a new NESS (i.e., a new generative 
model) at the superordinate level – a system that enslaves the dynamics of Markov 




92 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.  
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In providing a model of the integrated dynamics of Markov blankets across different 
spatio-temporal scales, the multiscale integration view offers an account of how 
the boundaries that compose cognitive systems are mutable, enveloping different 
component parts that contribute to the process of cognition as needed by the 
cognitive system. Multiscale integration of living systems that fail to possess the 
high degree of autonomy required of adaptive active inference (and hence fail to 
be cognizers) continue to engage in mere active inference at fast time scales (e.g., 
a mitochondrion in a cell).93 On the other hand, multiscale integration of the nested 
systems that subtend the scale of a cognizing organism occurs in virtue of 
hierarchically “downward reaching” adaptive active inference; the behaviour of 
constituent nested Markov blanket systems are enslaved to the slower dynamics 
the autonomous cognizing organism; the subtending Markov blanketed systems 
become resources for the cognizing system to minimize the summated free energy 
across all nested blankets that compose it.94 This integration in such a case is 
unidirectional; it is the adaptive active inference at the slower scale of the cognizing 
system that drives the continued integration of the nested Markov blankets at 
scales below it and not vice versa. Similarly, multiscale integration between 
cognizers and non-living artefacts (e.g., spiders and their webs) may be construed 
in a similar fashion. Such integration is unidirectionally driven; it is the active 
inference dynamics of the biological cognizer that drives integration with the non-
living Markov blanked system and not vice versa. 
 
This sets up the question which will occupy us for the remainder of this paper: what 
happens when the component parts of a biological system are themselves highly 
autonomous biological systems that engage in adaptive active inference? In other 
words, what happens in the case where integration involves physiological 
 
 
93 This is not to suggest that mitochondria do not exhibit some degree of autonomy and 
adaptivity. However, a mitochondrion’s ability to seek out energy gradients required for its 
continued existence has become severely limited due to the evolution of the highly dependent 
relationship between it and its embedding cell.  
94 Inferring from large scale to small scale thus recapitulates the kind of adaptive active inference 
which would drive organogenesis (or morphogenesis) (see Friston et al., 2015). 
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individuals that are cognizers in their own right? Whatever answering this question 
asks for, it most certainly requires something more than mere unidirectional 
integration. It requires a kind of reciprocal integration that I will argue undergirds 
the transition from a collection of cognizing physiological individuals to a symbiotic 
mind.  
 
However, before presenting this account of reciprocal integration, it is important to 
understand just what kind of natural case in the world that the notion of a symbiotic 
mind might apply to. So, let us briefly look at one particular striking example of a 




3.3 Vibrio-squid Symbiosis: a case study  
 
 
The Hawaiian bobtail squid Eurprymna scolopes is a nocturnal predator of the 
shallow reef of the Hawaiian archipelago that rests, buried in the sands, during the 
day and hunts at night (McFall-Ngai, 2008). It is also prey to various marine 
predators. Whether or not it is preyed upon, however, is influenced by its 
association with bioluminescent bacteria Vibrio fischeri. The juvenile squid recruits 
V. fischeri into the epithelial-lined crypt spaces of its light organ by entraining 
seawater into itself with ciliated appendages (Nyholm & McFall-Ngai, 2004) 
Subsequently the host promotes its colonization by V. fischeri  and only V. fischeri 
via the production of mucus (i.e., bacteria food), the elimination of competing 
bacteria through hemocyte defences of its innate immune system (McAnulty & 
Nyholm, 2017) and the eventual shedding of the ciliated appendages and the 
swelling of the crypt membranes preventing further entry into the light organ.95 
 
 
95 The squid is able to control the amount of light emitted by its light organ by both contraction 
and expansion of the ink sac diverticula and by withholding oxygen to the Vibrio colonies which 
limits the amount of light the bacteria produce (McFall-Ngai, 2008).  
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Following gradients of chitin which they feed upon, V. fischeri migrate deeper into 
the crypts of the light organ, colonizing it, and causing (after reaching a sufficiently 
high density) a biochemical reaction resulting in their emission of bioluminescent 
light. This occurs just in time for the bobtail’s nightly hunt for prey. Because of the 
counterillumination against the light of the moon and stars that the 
bioluminescence allows, the squid casts no shadow and is thus camouflaged from 
potential predators on the seafloor below it whilst it hunts (McFall-Ngai & 
Montgomery, 1990; Jones & Nishiguchi, 2004). The bacteria also benefit from the 
bioluminescent reaction. The process consumes oxygen and induces hypoxic 
conditions in the squid’s crypts that bring about the exocytosis of cytoplasmic 
substances out of the epithelial membrane (Visik et al., 2000). It is hypothesized 
that bioluminescence results in the production of nutrients for V. fischeri (Visik et 
al. 2000). 
 
The particular population of V. fischeri that inhabit the light organ of the squid is, 
however, temporary. For the bobtail, cued by the light of dawn, vents up to 95% of 
the bacteria every morning (Nyholm & McFall-Ngai, 2004). During the day, as the 
squid rests in the sand, V. fischeri that have not been expelled reproduce, 
repopulating the crypts so that by evening their density is high enough for the 
biochemical reaction that results in bioluminescence to occur again. After the initial 
colonization, this bacterial venting-repopulating cycle continues for the extent of 




3.3.1 Philosophical Implications of Vibrio-squid Symbiosis 
 
 
There are three philosophical implications that are exposed by this striking 
association that are significant to the account of symbiotic minds which follows. 
Firstly, the Vibrio-squid association is a clear example of a symbiotic physiological 
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individual. What makes this association a symbiotic physiological individual 
opposed to a collection of physiological individuals? When deploying either an 
immunological criterion of physiological individuals (Pradeu, 2011) and/or a 
metabolic criterion of physiological individuals (Godfrey-Smith, 2013), given the 
high degree of immunological and/or metabolic functional integration between 
each symbiont, the Vibrio-squid association qualifies as a symbiotic physiological 
individual.96 But does the fact that the assemblage is temporary (i.e., that some of 
the Vibrio are expelled everyday) present a challenge to the status of the Vibrio-
squid association as a symbiotic physiological individual? Does this daily expelling 
suggest that a proliferation of symbiotic individuals? This brings into relief a second 
crucial philosophical implication: physiological individuals are matters of degree; 
over time the same living system can be more or less of a (symbiotic) physiological 
individual (Bouchard, 2018).  
 
The last important philosophical implication may be thrown into relief when asking 
the critical question: what is it that produces the bioluminescence – the squid, the 
bacteria, or the temporary assemblage of these organisms? Fredric Bouchard 
(2016) argues that the bioluminescence is an emergent property of the Vibrio-squid 
assemblage. His reasoning is based upon the following facts about this case of 
bioluminescence. V. fischeri only begin to emit light when they sense a high 
concentration of autoinducers (i.e., a bacterial metabolic product) in the 
surrounding medium of the crypt (Miller & Bassler, 2001). This process of quorum 
sensing induces the transcription of the lux gene that results in the bacterial 
bioluminescent light emission (Nyholm & McFall-Ngai, 2004). Although V. fischeri 
 
 
96 The immune criterion emphasizes (in)tolerance to elements with both exogenous and 
endogenous origins––relative to the system in question––as necessary for the kind of functional 
integration that a physiological individual requires. The metabolic criterion holds that a 
physiological individual must minimally possess its own core metabolic machinery (i.e., the 
machinery that results in processes of energy harvesting and energy breakdown). This machinery 
may also include external machinery (other environmental realizers) which regularly and closely 
influence those metabolic core processes. For considerations in favour of the metabolic criterion 
see Dupre & O’Malley (20009) and Godfrey-Smith (2013/2014). For a detailed account of the 
physiological criterion see Pradeu (2011/2016). 
 87 
populations in the seawaters could grow to such density as to quorum sense and 
generate light independently of the squid, V. fischeri do not actually do this in the 
wild (Bouchard, 2016). The light organ provides just the right conditions (i.e., 
shelter and food) for exponential population growth (McFall-Ngai, 2008) required 
of quorum sensing. The bobtail, similarly, cannot generate light itself without being 
colonized by V. fischeri. If this is correct, then it is not either the squid or V. fischeri 
that glow alone but rather “what glows is a temporary assemblage of species 
interacting in the right way” (Bouchard, 2018, p. 190).  
 
With this case study and these philosophical implications in mind, let us now return 
to the notion of reciprocal multiscale integration and to ultimately answering the 





3.4 Unidirectional vs Reciprocal Multiscale Integration 
 
 
To understand what is meant by reciprocal integration, I will now contrast it with 
unidirectional integration. To make this contrast apparent I will deploy the 
terminology of users, Ui, and resources, Ri.  Users are those living systems, the 
internal states of which inferentially generate subpersonal predictions that allow 
them to use other Markov blanketed systems that are external to them. A 
necessary characteristic of users is that they have the capacity to engage in 
adaptive active inference and use Markov blanketed systems that are external to 
them in order to minimize long-term free energy. Where being external is relative 
to the Markov blankets that play an essential role to the user’s autonomous self-
evidencing. Resources, on the other hand, are those external Markov blanketed 
systems that given their structure and behaviour provide a means for users to 
minimize their long-term free energy but are themselves not required for 
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autonomous self-evidencing. Importantly, resources can, but need not, have the 
capacity to engage in adaptive active inference; they can but need not be enriched 
enough so as to qualify as cognizers according FEF. As such, a Markov blanketed 
system can be both a user and a resource.  
 
In unidirectional multiscale integration, the internal states of U1 generate 
predictions about the role that R1 plays (e.g., sensory, internal or active state) in a 
superordinate level Markov blanket in which it also plays a role. In order to 
minimize short-term free energy that results from such predictions, U1 acts in ways 
to bring about the kind of feedback that would result were it the case that both it 
and R1 played those inferred roles. On the other hand, R1 does not (and perhaps 
cannot) generate predictions about U1. In contrast, reciprocal multiscale integration 
describes the process whereby a user, U1, is simultaneously a resource, R2, for a 





                 
a.               b. 
 
Figure 7 
Unidirectional multiscale integration vs reciprocal multiscale integration: Plate a. 
illustrates small/fast scale to large/slow scale unidirectional integration. It is unidirectional in 
terms of being driven by an inferential procedure, the source of which is the user and not the 
resource. Here R1 is used by (represented by the arrow) a prediction generating cognizer U1 
but is not itself a cognizer (i.e., although R1 has a Markov blanket, it does not engage in 
adaptive active inference). Plate b. illustrates reciprocal integration from small/fast scale to 
large/slow scale and vice versa. It occurs when users, U1 and U2, are each bio-cognizers and 
inferentially generate predictions about the sensory states that would be encountered were 
they playing different roles in the same larger Markov blanketed system. Resources, R1 and 
R2, are used by U2 and U1 respectively as the users engage in adaptive active inference, 
adapting their generative models to one another. Because U1 is R2 and U2 is R1, the 




U1 generates inferences about the role that R2 plays in a larger Markov blanket 
that it also plays a role in, and U2 does the same with respect to R1. U1 acts as a 
resource contributing to the adaptive active inference of U2 and vice versa such 
that from the increasingly coupled state space of U1 and U2 a new shared (U1/R2 
+ U2/R1) NESS density emerges at the superordinate scale, enslaving both U1 and 
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U2. A new generative model emerges that not only encodes priors about the 
‘preferred’ states of U1 and U2, but also encodes priors concerning the kinds of 
environmental conditions in which the superordinate level unit thrives in addition 
to the kinds of actions which bring these conditions about. The result of reciprocal 
integration is an extended symbiotic phenotype that authors the conditions for its 
own existence; by behaving in ways that optimize action, sampling the world that 
it expects, the integrated symbiotic unit tends to provide evidence for its own 
generative model. 97   
 
To be clear, each constituent bio-cognizer continues to engage in adaptive active 
inference, acting in ways that ensure it remains statistically separate from its 
environment. That two individuals are enslaved by a state attractor at the 
superordinate scale does not imply that they must renounce their autonomy to the 
degree of forfeiting their status as bio-cognizers. Symbiosis is an effective means 
of cooperatively sustaining the Markov blankets of both U1/R2 and U2/R1 separately 
and as a unit. Importantly, the integration of U1/R2 and U2/R1 into a unit determines 
a new shared Markov blanket where external states are defined by everything that 
is not (U1/R2 + U2/R1).  It is the unit which infers the states external to its blanket, 
differentially interacting with them in order to persist as a unit. Crucially, the manner 
in which (U1/R2 + U2/R1) interacts with its environment cannot be reduced to the 
differential operations at the level U1/R2 and U2/R1. It is when they are reciprocally 
integrated that an emergent action capacity arises. This is a capacity possessed 
by a unit to behave in a manner which outstrips the combined individual 
behavioural capacities of each user. I would like to suggest that such an emergent 
action capacity is evidence that adaptive active inference is occurring at the level 
 
 
97 This kind of reciprocal multiscale integration between two (or more) cognizing systems may be 
interestingly interpreted as a form of niche construction (Constant, Ramstead, Veissière, 
Campbell, & Friston, 2018; Veissière et al., 2019), whereby U1 and U2, co-evolve and come to 
play the role of exo-genetically inherited (i.e., non-genetically specified) resources for each other.  
Inheritance, spanning long enough timescales, becomes consolidated in the emergence of a new 
(U1/R2 + U2/R1) NESS density at the superordinate level. I would like to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for bringing this insightful interpretation of reciprocal multiscale integration to my 
attention.  
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of the symbiotic physiological individual.98 In other words, when the reciprocal 
integration of symbiont partners that have been evolutionarily (i.e., adaptively) 
coerced into following a long-term reciprocal free energy minimizing strategy do 
result in an emergent action capacity, this capacity is possessed by a symbiotic 
cognizer.  
 
To be sure, an emergent action capacity is a property of the reciprocally integrated 
(U1/R2 + U2/R1) unit that constrains and affects the behaviour of the symbiont 
components U1/R2 and U2/R1. As such, how symbiotic cognizers and their action 
capacities arise is best characterized as a form of ontological emergence. 
Ontological emergence refers to two joint ideas: (1) some properties possessed by 
a composite macro-level system cannot be reduced to the structural (i.e., intrinsic) 
properties of its component parts and their governing micro-dynamics and (2) 
because of these new irreducible properties, a macro-level system has ontological 
status (e.g., is an entity) in its own right. (Santos, 2015). Such emergent properties 
at the macro-level are more than the properties of their component parts in the 
sense that macro-level properties have causal powers that their component parts 
fail to possess, enabling a macro-level system to both facilitate and constrain the 
very micro-level parts and dynamics that give rise to it – what is referred to as 
‘downward causation’. Taking into account however that both new environmental 
influences are specific to each hierarchical level (Gilbert & Sarkar, 2000) and that 
causation involved in ontological emergence is diachronic (i.e., macro-levels of a 
system affect micro-levels and vice versa at different sequential timesteps) (see 
O'Connor & Wong, 2005) emergence may be more accurately––and less 
mysteriously–– analysed in terms of circular causation.99,100  In fact, this circular 
 
 
98 The emergence of an action capacity is distinct from the realization of an emergent action 
capacity. For example, although I may not be able to do 20 push-ups now after a long workout at 
the gym, I certainly still have the capacity to do so when I am rested.   
99 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify more about the notion of 
emergence being used in this paper. 
100 The contemporary notions of emergence are both various and nuanced (see for example 
Winning & Bechtel, 2019). Although providing a more detailed analysis of the kind of emergence 
involved in reciprocal multiscale integration is an interesting and valuable philosophical 
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causation should be expected in FEF given an understanding of the kind coupled 
dynamic exchanges between self-organizing open systems and their external 
milieu that  are required for such systems to resist dispersive effects. That is, 
because system (U1/R2 + U2/R1) is causally coupled to its environment in a way 
that neither U1/R2 or U2/R1 are individually, (U1/R2 + U2/R1) has causal powers that 
neither U1/R2 or U2/R1 possess individually. The emergent system has action 
capacities that, via facilitating free-energy minimizing exchanges with its 
environment at the superordinate scale, constrain the behaviour of components 
U1/R2 and U2/R1 at subordinate scales.  
 
Let us now concretize this somewhat abstract description of how reciprocal 
integration might occur at the level of the symbiotic unit and return to the case 




3.4.1 Vibrio-squid Reciprocal Integration 
 
 
The Vibrio-squid reciprocal integration might unfold as follows: the internal states 
of V. fischeri, U1 and those of the bobtail system, U2, come to generate the same 
inferences about the sensory effects that should be observed were both of the to 
play the role of sensory and active states in a superordinate blanketed system.  
For example, both U1 and U2 might expect sensory feedback in the form of a 
 
 
endeavour, for reasons of limited space, the more general description of ontological emergence 
will have to do for the purposes of this paper. 
101 The description of symbiotic cognitive integration that follows is admittedly simplified in that I 
shall treat the V. fischeri colony as a single individual. Vibrio-squid symbiosis, although only 
involving two species, involves more than two organisms (e.g., a colony of Vibrio may reach 10^9 
inside the light organ of a bobtail). Moreover, given that scale refers to spatio-temporal scale, on 
intuitive grounds I will stipulate that the V. fischeri system and the bobtail system live at different 
scales; the former, being smaller and faster, is nested in the latter.  
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reduced ambient oxygen gradient in the bobtail’s light organ (i.e., an increased 
hypoxic state). The squid system, in order to reduce the free energy that arises as 
result of its inferences, acts to bring about that very pattern of protracted feedback 
that it expects. To do this, the squid harvests V. fischeri, R2, and only V. fischeri 
and thereafter provides conditions for their thriving from which these protracted 
sensory patterns may arise. When all goes well, reducing free-energy associated 
with the expected hypoxia allows the squid system to further influence the evolving 
states of its light organ; these evolving light organ states reflect the evolution of 
two convergent flows on a shared squid-Vibrio state space.  
 
Similarly, in order to reduce the free-energy that arises from the Vibrio system’s 
inferences about expected sensory states, the bacteria migrate further into deep 
crypts of the light organ, shed their flagella (reducing a degree of their own 
autonomy), and bring about a decreasing ambient oxygen gradient over time as 
both their density and quorum sensing increases. In this reciprocal manner, the 
generative models of the squid and V. fischeri adapt to one another, each user 
acting as a free-energy minimizing resource for the other. Crucially, as a result of 
the continued and increasing squid-Vibrio coupled activity, a new attractor 
emerges at a superordinate scale on their shared state space. This emergent 
NESS density corresponds to a new generative model that is distinct from the 
squid and Vibrio models that gave rise to it. Thus, by reciprocally behaving in ways 
to bring about the kinds of feedback that would accompany their inferred roles in 
a superordinate Markov blanketed system, U1 and U2 integrate across spatio-
temporal scales, harvesting evidence for an emergent phenotype (U1/R2 + U2/R1) 
(see Figure 8). Via its influence upon the environment, this new symbiotic bio-
cognitive individual both constrains and facilitates the continued behaviour of its 






Reciprocal multiscale integration: the squid system, U1/R2, infers (indicated by the wavy 
arrows) that V. fischeri system, U2/R1, plays the role of sensory states (indicated by yellow 
nodes) and that it plays the role of active states (indicated by orange nodes) in a superordinate 
level  Markov blanketed system (U1/R2 + U2/R1).  U1/R2, becomes further coupled to the 
dynamics of U2/R1, actively bringing about the kind of sensory feedback that would 
accompany each of the subordinate level system’s playing its respective inferred role in the 
larger blanket. Similarly, the V. fischeri system, U2/R1, integrates with the squid system by 
inferring that U1/R2 plays the role of the active states and that it plays the role of sensory 
states in (U1/R2 + U2/R1). U2/R1, then acts in ways to bring about the kinds of sensory 
feedback that would be observed were the two systems to play these inferred roles. The 
bacteria (user) system does this by engaging in tightly coupled behaviour with the 
squid(resource) system. This reciprocal integration over time results in the emergence of a 
new NESS density, the dynamics of which enslave those of U1/R2 and U2/R1. The resulting 
global emergent action capacity possessed by the symbiotic unit (U1/R2 + U2/R1) allows for 
a downwards causal influence upon those very systems which give rise to it. Modified from 




The notion of environmental influence may be understood in terms of the effects 
of an emergent action capacity that is a property of the symbiotic bio-cognizer and 
not of its component parts. More precisely, as U1 and U2 become further 
integrated, flowing towards the new squid-Vibrio NESS density, the new system 
acquires a new action capacity, controlled bioluminescence, that only reaching 
maturation, is actualized nightly at the peak of integration. 
 
This reveals a crucial point: Markov blanket integration (reciprocal and 
unidirectional) as located in FEF is a matter of degree. That this is the case is 
implied by the fact that Markov blankets can be more or less integrated over time 
and that integration does not happen instantaneously but is something that can 
increase (and decrease). The spider system that rebuilds its web after being forced 
to relocate to a different location is likely to integrate with its newly constructed 
web to a high degree only after interacting with it; this a process where internal 
states of the spider system calibrate to the sensory feedback that arises as 
external states (e.g., wind, prey, its own actions) affect the web (i.e., the resource). 
Integration between the bobtail and V. fischeri systems is a rolling diel process 
(i.e., a cyclical process that occurs over the course of a 24-hour period). For 
subsequent to the initial colonization, reciprocal integration peaks nightly with the 
emergence of controlled bioluminescence. This high degree of integration lasts 
until the symbiotic bio-cognitive individual that is evidenced by the emergent action 
capacity expels 95% of the Vibrio back into the water when cued by the first light 
of dawn. At this point the integration drops in degree to its lowest value of the diel 
cycle and the process of reciprocal integration begins anew from this lower degree 
until the unit, with the emergent bioluminescence, actively generates evidence for 
its own existence again.  
 
Does this drop in the degree of integration that accompanies the diel cycle result 
in a problem of proliferating bio-cognitive individuals; short-lived individuals that 
spring into existence nightly and are the cause of their own dissipation at each 
dawn venting? I would like to argue that this problem is may be avoided when it is 
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recognized that being a bio-cognitive individual is a matter of degree.102 Even when 
the squid-Vibrio unit is not integrated enough to realize its capacity for controlled 
bioluminescence (by its glowing and using it), this does not mean that the squid-
Vibrio unit is not integrated enough to possess the capacity. The long-lived bio-
cognitive squid-Vibrio unit, through a continuous process of adaptive active 
inference retains this capacity and when enough free energy is minimized in the 
reciprocal integration process, the symbiotic unit may deploy the capacity. This 
suggests that when the capacity for controlled bioluminescence is not realized, the 
symbiotic unit is less of a bio-cognitive individual rather than losing its status full 





102 This solution is consistent with the idea that a being a physiological individual is a matter of 
degree (Queller & Strassman, 2009; Godfrey-Smith, 2014; Bouchard, 2016); the degree of 
physiological individuality is proportional to the degree of functional integration. As such, then 
although after the venting of the Vibrio the squid-Vibrio association is less of a physiological 
individual it is still functionally integrated (metabolically and/or immunologically) enough to retain 









This kind of ebb and flow of the degree of cognitive individuality is familiar in our 
own case. For although when sleeping we fail to use our capacities to fully engage 
in the kind of self-evidencing active inference, we remain bio-cognizers. What I am 
suggesting is that in such cases we may be bio-cognizers to a lesser degree. 
Moreover, the daily expelling of the Vibrio may be seen itself as an instance of self-
evidencing of the integrated symbiotic cognizer! For if the Vibrio were not vented, 
the existence of the unit would be at risk. Venting is an active way of fostering a 
condition in which Vibrio quorum sensing will continue effectively in the future by 
keeping Vibrio in an active growth phase (Visick & McFall-Ngai, 2000). As such 
venting on the part of the symbiotic unit may be construed in terms of actively 
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reducing expected free energy. Moreover, venting prevents the symbiotic 
association from becoming harmful to the squid (too high of a Vibrio density over 
a long period may result in Vibrio bringing about pathogenic responses).  
 
If this picture of reciprocal integration of the squid and Vibrio is correct, then the 
Vibrio-squid physiological individual via reciprocal multiscale integration becomes 
a model of its niche; a model that is different from that of its individual symbionts. 
Both the existence of the symbiotic cognizer and the pattern of controlled 
bioluminescent masking that occurs over the course of night is evidence for the 
specific range of environmental conditions that have evolutionarily come to have 
Vibrio-squid-association-relative value. Expressing this point deploying the 
ecological notion of affordances (Gibson 1979), while the moonlit waters of the 
Hawaiian reef may afford safety for the integrated Vibrio-squid association, it fails 
to offer an affordance of this sort to either of the lone symbionts.  
 
To sum up: I have argued that a symbiotic unit (e.g., Vibrio-squid association) that 
is constituted of cognizing symbionts at different scales may itself be a biological 
cognizing system when the symbiont partners that compose it engage in a high 
degree of reciprocal integration, a form of Markov blanket integration that falls out 
FEF. If what I have argued is correct, it is possible that in some restricted cases 
symbionts can maintain their status as bio-cognizers whilst simultaneously giving 
rise to a new NESS density that corresponds to a symbiotic cognizing individual in 







I began this paper by flagging a particular concern that arises when considering 
the notion of a symbiotic mind. The idea that cognizers may have other cognizers 
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as nested constituent parts is an idea that seems to run counter to our folk-
psychological intuitions about what it is to be a cognizer. This concern I noted 
reiterates a similar worry for the physiological account of biological individuality: 
the hierarchically nested ontology of physiological individuals in physiological 
individuals flouts out folk-biological intuition that an organism cannot be a 
constituent of another organism.103 This worry for the physiological account can be 
defanged however by pointing out that physiological individuals are distinct from 
Darwinian individuals (i.e., units of reproduction) and that it is the nesting of the 
latter that is intuitively problematic.104 As such, folk-biological intuitions cannot be 
used when adjudicating the claim that physiological individuals can be nested in 
other physiological individuals in symbiotic associations (Godfrey-Smith, 2014). 
With this in mind, I would like to suggest that the worry that cognizers cannot be 
nested in other cognizers may stem from a similar failure on behalf of folk-
psychology to distinguish physiological individuals from Darwinian individuals, 
overlooking the former. For if our folk-psychology implicitly models the notion of 
cognizers upon that of Darwinian individuals––a much more scientifically old and 
ingrained conception of biological individuals––then it would seem that the notion 
of nested cognizers would remain as unintuitive as the notion of nested Darwinian 
individuals. However, by reconceptualizing our folk-psychological notion of 
“cognizer” to include physiological individuals the notion of nested biological 
cognizers is no more unintuitive as that of nested physiological individuals. 
Moreover, given that the conception of cognizers as physiological individuals is 
already implicit in FEF, this framework and its corollary active inference (mere and 
adaptive), offer an ideal programme for bringing our folk-psychological intuitions in 




103 See S. Chauvier’s (2017) “the formal indivisibility principle” for an expression of this concern 
which is also called “the exclusion principle” (Godfrey-Smith, 2014). 
104 Aphid-Buchnera bacteria symbiosis presents an interesting case in which the symbiotic 
association may indeed qualify as both a Darwinian individual and a physiological individual (for 
more on this see Godfrey-Smith, 2013). This suggests that our intuitions should not have the final 
say in biological ontologising. 
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In this chapter I have argued for the notion of a symbiotic cognizer, a concept that 
provides a way of understanding the possible evolutionary transition from multi-
organismal collections of minimal cognizers to multicellular and specialized 
cognitive agents. In the next chapter, concentrating on context sensitive affordance 
perception in humans, I will introduce the notion of historical context sensitivity, 
using it to reveal a possible marker for a different form of cognition that is distinctive 
of organisms like us whose wellbeing is often tied up with information acquired in 









Ecological in Spirit? Predictive Processing and the 





Affordance perception is receiving lots of attention in cognitive science. Action-
oriented predictive processing, one theoretical framework for making sense of this 
literature, views affordance perception and its context sensitivity as an indirect 
process involving the use of stored representational states. However, affordances 
as originally introduced by ecological psychology are taken to be directly 
perceivable. This presents a conflict between ecological psychology and predictive 
processing over the issue of the role of priors in affordance perception and the 
necessity of information processing and representation in the explanation of 
affordance perception. In this paper I shall introduce one form of context sensitive 
affordance perception, “Historical context sensitivity” as a positive argument for the 
appeal to computation and representation by showing how predictive processing 
can elegantly handle this phenomenon with its mechanism of precision weighting. 
It is argued that an ecological theory of direct perception, however, lacks the 
resources to account for historical context sensitivity. The analysis of how action-
oriented predictive processing accommodates historical context sensitivity, it shall 
be argued, allows for a much-needed closer look at how the predictive processing 
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framework implicitly deploys the core ecological notion of environmental 
information exploitation. It is suggested that prediction error minimization can be 
cast as a mechanism for tuning to ecological information over time. As such, 
although predictive processing is not compatible with an ecological direct theory of 




4.1 Introduction  
 
 
What range of flexible and context sensitive intelligent behaviour may be 
accounted for without recourse to intervening information processing states? This 
general question has been one of longstanding interest in the philosophy of 
cognitive science (Turvey, Shaw, Reed & Mace, 1981;  Clark, 1998; Keijzer, 2001; 
Noe, 2004; Wheeler, 2005; Chemero, 2009; Clark 2008; Barrett, 2015; Bruineberg, 
Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2016; Orlandi, 2016; Hatfield, 2019). Its importance for 
information processing and non-information processing accounts of cognition alike 
is rooted in the thought that due attention to the role of environment-body 
interactions reduces––if not does away with altogether––the need to posit 
cognitively demanding internal operations on representational states. In order to 
make progress on the more general question, this paper will go about investigating 
a more specific one; namely, can context sensitive affordance perception be fully 
accounted for without appealing to information processing. Since their introduction 
by ecological psychologist Gibson (1979/1989), affordances (i.e., perceivable 
opportunities for action that the environment offers) have populated the 
explanatory toolkits of numerous non-information processing accounts (Turvey, 
Shaw, Reed & Mace, 1981; Chemero, 2009; Van Dijk, Withagen, & Bongers, 2015; 
Bruineberg, Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2016; Heras-Escribano, 2019). Such ecological 
direct perception accounts, emphasizing the abundance of environmental 
information for perception, reject that inner representational states (i.e., knowledge 
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states) play any explanatory role in accounting for affordance perception (or 
perception more generally). More recently, affordances have been incorporated 
into cognitive scientific frameworks such as action-oriented predictive processing 
(PP) (Clark, 2013/2016a). Contra to direct perception accounts, PP views 
affordance perception as a generative process, one involving the brain’s 
generating representations of highly probable action outcomes conditioned on 
current sensory evidence (Linson, et al., 2018).  
 
To answer the more specific question, in this paper I shall introduce what I call 
historical context sensitivity (HCS). HCS is the perceptual phenomenon in which 
current perception of an event/object’s affordances continues to be influenced 
(temporarily) by a past encounter with that event/object despite there being an 
interruption in sensory contact with that event/object. I will argue that HCS presents 
at least one case where affordance perception demands recourse to the use of 
information processing. Notably, the analysis of how action-oriented predictive 
processing accommodates HCS provides an opportunity to expose and 
understand an important feature of PP: environmental information exploitation is 
implicit in PP’s prediction error-minimizing dynamics. I will go on to demonstrate 
how prediction error minimization can be cast as a mechanism for tuning to 
ecological information over time. As such, although PP is not ecological in letter, it 
is still––at least in some important respects––ecological in spirit. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 briefly introduces the notion of 
affordances and affordance perception and explicates two different accounts of 
affordance perception: the direct perception account offered by ecological 
psychology vs. the representational account proposed in cognitive science. In 
Section 4.3, after providing an overview of action-oriented PP, the specific manner 
in which affordance perception is construed in PP is taken up. In Section 4.4 HCS 
is introduced. I argue that this form of context sensitive affordance perception 
presents a genuine problem for direct perception theory, but that PP can elegantly 
account for HCS in an ecologically indirect manner.  Section 4.5 aims for a partial 
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reconciliation of PP and ecological psychology by making explicit how 
environmental information exploitation is already present in action-oriented PP. 
Lastly, the limits of direct perception are used to consider where and when the kind 
of precision weighting-based working memory becomes more relevant to context 




4.2 Affordances  
 
 
Originally introduced by the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson (1966), 
affordances have remained a major area of research in ecological psychology 
(Warren, 1984; Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981; Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, 
Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Turvey, 1992; Stoffregen, 2002; Michaels, 2003; Lee, 
2009; Franchak, Celano, & Adolph, 2012; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Harrison, 
Turvey & Frank, 2016; Rader, 2018; Wagman, Stoffregen, Bai, & Schloesser, 
2018; Heras-Escribano, 2019) and have inspired an ever-growing and important 
area of investigation in cognitive science and experimental psychology (Witt, 
Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004; Cisek, 2007; Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & 
Committeri, 2010; Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; Borghi, Flumini, 
Natraj, & Wheaton, 2012; Ambrosini, Scorolli, Borghi, & Costantini, 2012; Borghi, 
& Riggio, 2015; Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). As understood by all, affordances are 
organism-specific opportunities for action that the environment offers (Gibson, 
1979). They may be understood as relational properties of the environment-agent 
systems in the sense that affordances may only be specified in terms of  the 
physical structure of the environment in reference to the capacities possessed by 
their perceivers (i.e. morphological features, physiological states and skills) (Heft, 
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1989; Stoffregen, 2003).105 However, this is not to say that affordances fail to be 
ontologically objective; affordances exist whether or not some agent perceives 
them - they are “facts of the environment” (Heft, 1989, p.3). It is in this sense that 
affordances challenge the traditional “objective-subjective” philosophical 
dichotomy (Gibson, 1979 pp. 120-121). 
 
Affordances imply that the environment, beyond being a home to objects, is 
endowed with value or significance that is relative to the capacities that a creature 
possesses. As such, they refer to both the environment and the agent (Gibson, 
1979). They are an expression of one of the central assumptions of ecological 
psychology: organism-environment mutuality. This is the notion that there is a 
complementarity between organisms (i.e., their capacities and morphology) and 
their environment (think of the sensitivity of bee vision to ultraviolet colour and 
ultraviolet reflecting flowers that depend upon bees for their pollination). This is to 
say that neither organism nor an environment could exist in the absence of the 
other. As such, the opportunities for action that an environment offers a particular 
organism are an expression of their mutual historical and on-going influence upon 
one another. What has been said thus far pertaining to affordances is generally 
accepted by both ecological psychology and cognitive scientific views of 
affordances. Now let us move on to a primary area of divergence with respect to 
affordances between the ecological psychology tradition and cognitive science: 
affordance perception. In order to grasp the nature of this divergence it is 
necessary to first understand the details of ecological psychology’s more general 





105 For example, although a tree branch might generally afford perching for a bird, it does not do 
so for humans due to differences in body scaling (among other things). 
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4.2.1 Direct perception  
 
 
Ecological psychology views perception as a direct process. This may be positively 
defined as the claim that perception can be sufficiently accounted for in terms of 
the detection of ubiquitous and rich information in the environment that perceptual 
systems are sensitive to (Gibson, 1979).106 Environmental information is construed 
as invariantly structured stimulus energy (e.g., arrays of light, vibration, chemicals 
etc.) that perceptual systems have become sensitive to over evolutionary 
timescales. For example, organs that are sensitive to patterns of electromagnetic 
radiation have been selected for in environments where electromagnetic radiation 
is present and where using differentiated patterns of light to direct behaviour has 
provided selective advantages. In this sense, the qualification of stimulus energy 
as information––and hence direct perception itself––depends not only on aspects 
of the environment but also on aspects of the agent’s perceptuo-motor system.  
 
Environmental information lawfully specifies the layout of the environment in a one-
to-one manner.107 The specification relation obtains due to the nature of the causal 
relations existing between the structured energy in the medium and the 
environmental layout (e.g., the geometrical structure and texture of a surface being 
a cause of the structure in the light reflecting from it and/or diffracting around it). 
When a perceiver moves about in the environment (or conversely when the 
environment changes with respect to the perceiver), this transformation with 
respect to the perceiver’s spatial position changes some of the light array 
 
 
106 Although Gibson’s description of direct perception varied, in what follows direct perception 
exclusively refers to the positive and negative characterizations of it that I provide below. I will 
assume that these characterizations would be accepted by many ecological psychologists as 
representative of Gibson’s theory of direct perception. 
107 Although there are other accounts of neo-Gibsonian specification which allow for non-lawful 
yet regular specification relations (See Bruineberg et al., 2018), in what follows I will assume that 
direct perception involves one-to-one specification relations.  
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(stimulus) structure while some of it remains invariant. When revealed and 
detected, such invariant energy patterns lawfully specify the non-fleeting layout of 
the environment. An agent can come to perceive, for example, the unchanging 
geometric structure of a table due to invariant patterns in the light reflected by the 
table’s surfaces as they move around it.  
 
Crucially, environmental stimulus information is distinct from mere sensory stimuli 
arising at the inputs of afferent nerves. For example, the optic nerve can be 
stimulated by light at the retina but if that light fails to be differentiated, and hence 
fails to be structured, such sensory stimuli carry no information about the structure 
of the environmental layout (Gibson, 1979). It is important to note the more general 
point that the detection of environmental information for perception is a process 
that occurs across time. The idea is that perceptual systems (i.e., the perceptual 
organs in the active body), due to the ubiquitous presence of environmental 
information, continuously sample and actively adjust to the flow of environment 
specifying stimulus information. This may be contrasted with what Gibson 
identified as the traditional (i.e., indirect) view of perception. On such a view the 
notion of environmental information is absent altogether and instead perception is 
based upon the enrichment of current sensory stimuli (i.e., discrete ‘snap shots’) 
given stored snap shots of past stimuli and computational rules for combination 
and enrichment. Perception for ecological psychologists on the other hand is not 
based upon impoverished, discrete sensory stimuli but rather upon the flow of rich, 
environment-specifying stimulus information. Hence, the fact that direct perception 
involves action-driven transformation of the ambient energy array in order to detect 
environmental information means that present perceptual experience is not 
something that can be neatly separated from past perceptual experience, or as 
Gibson writes:  
 
“There are attempts to talk about a “conscious” present, or a “specious” 
present, or a “span” of present perception, or a span of “immediate 
memory”, but they all founder on the simple fact that there is no dividing line 
between the present and the past, between perceiving and remembering. 
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A special sense impression clearly ceases when the sensory excitation 
ends, but a perception does not. It does not become a memory after a 
certain length of time. A perception, in fact, does not have an end. 
Perceiving goes on” (1979, p. 242).  
 
Direct perception is seen as an exploratory activity of detecting information in the 
environment over time – information that is not only determined by the structure of 
the environment but by the very organization of an agent’s perceptuo-motor 
system.  
 
Defined negatively, perception is direct just in case it does not involve the use of 
mediating information processing to enrich and/or disambiguate impoverished and 
sparse sensory stimuli with knowledge states. Knowledge states may be 
interpreted as those stored internal representational states that reflect a system’s 
past sensory encounters with its environment, and which may be deployed in 
inferring current states of the environment. Gibson, identifying a commonality 
amongst indirect theories of perception writes: 
 
“All [indirect] theorists seem to agree that past experience is brought to bear 
on the sensory inputs, which means that memories are somehow applied 
to them (Gibson, 1979, p.253). 
And again, pointing out what he takes to be the common flaw in indirect theories, 
Gibson suggests: 
 
“The error lies, it seems to me, in assuming that either innate ideas or 
acquired ideas must be applied to bare sensory inputs for perceiving to 
occur. The fallacy is to assume that because inputs convey no knowledge 
they can be made somehow to yield knowledge by “processing” them”. 




A key insight of ecological psychology is that the availability of behaviourally 
relevant environmental information obviates the need to deploy knowledge states 
(e.g., memory states) from which to infer the structure of the environment or the 
agent-relative value of what is perceived.108 The pragmatic values of objects in the 
environment for a particular agent are not something that is added to or derived ex 
post facto from the objects perceived. The possibilities for action that an object 
offers – its pragmatic value or significance – is directly perceived via picking-up the 
appropriate self-environment information. Direct detection of information thus 
contrasts with the use of knowledge states to distil information from impoverished 
sensory stimuli. In other words, direct perception theory “does not have to have as 
a basic postulate the effect of past experience on present experience by way of 
memory” and hence an account of direct perception “does not need memory” 
(Gibson, 1979, p. 243).   
Although representational memory states play no role in direct perception theory, 
the role of perceptual “learning” is acknowledged. Perceptual learning refers to “the 
improvement of perceiving with practice and the education of attention, but not by 
an appeal to the catch-all of past experience or to the muddle of memory (Gibson, 
1979, p. 243). This kind of learning has been more recently fleshed out Jacobs & 
Michaels (2007) in their theory of direct learning. 109 The idea here is roughly that, 
like information for perception, there is detectable information in the environment 
for improving one’s perception – information for learning that specifies the most 
useful invariants to detect relative to a given task. Learning and hence the 
improvement of perception and task performance is the result of the perceptual 
system’s becoming attuned to better task-specific information. This results in the 
 
 
108 In what follows I will focus upon memory states (short-term, working and long-term memory) 
as definitive of the kinds of acquired knowledge states that a theory of ecological direct 
perception bans in perceptual explanation. As such, I will hereafter use the terms memory states 
and knowledge states interchangeably unless otherwise stated. Moreover, knowledge states 
(memory states) should be distinguished from knowledge. In particular, where knowledge states 
are representational and are rejected as constitutive of perceptual processes, procedural 
“knowledge how” is thought to be compatible with direct perception (cf. Heft, 1989). 
109 The theory of direct learning is intricate and complex. Offering a detailed account of the theory 
however is beyond the limited scope of this paper.  
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new ability to perceptive features that were hitherto indistinct or that went 
unnoticed, a process which Gibson & Gibson (1955) described as the “education 




4.2.2 Affordance Perception – direct vs indirect 
 
 
To see how the definition of direct perception––in conjunction with the theory of 
environmental information––applies to affordance perception, remember that 
affordances are defined by the structural and dynamically interacting aspects of 
the environment and the agent. Because affordances are properties of agent-
environment systems, and assuming that both an agent’s capacities and the layout 
of objects in the environment are specified by information that an agent can––and 
does––detect,  perceiving affordances directly is a matter of the mutual detection 
of self-information and information about the environment; detection of “higher-
order invariants” (Gibson, 1979). For instance, one might detect invariant 
information in the light array specifying a certain horizontally situated flat surface 
with a particular surface area. Simultaneously, one detects invariant information 
from one’s own proprioceptors specifying one’s own weight, size, relative bodily 
position. Detecting these invariants together, depending upon whether the 
perceived area of the surface is compatible with the perceived bodily features, one 
may directly perceive that the surface affords sitting or lying down upon.  
 
Direct perception of affordances, like perception more generally, according to 
ecological psychologists is something which does not involve the use of mediating 
memory states or information processing but is sufficiently accounted for by the 
pickup and exploitation of environmental information by perceptual systems. 
Perception of affordances and the layout of the environment are dependent upon 
both the structure of the environment and aspects of the agent-perceiver. 
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Moreover, perception of affordances, like perception of the environmental layout, 
may be improved via the process of direct learning, a process in this case where 
there is a change from the detection of less useful to more useful higher-order 
invariants to improve the performance of a given task.   
 
In contrast to ecological psychologists, cognitive scientists remain silent on the 
notion of environmental information and its exploitation when investigating and 
theorizing about affordances. They have focused on affordance perception as a 
representational and contextually-biased process. Let’s take each of these 
characteristics in turn.  
 
A crucial distinction between indirect and ecologically direct affordance perception 
(and perception more generally) is the manner in which the notion of detection is 
spelled out. According to the direct view, when a perceptual system detects 
environmental information (and self-information), internal (brain) dynamics are 
said to resonate with that information much like a radio receiver resonates with 
certain frequencies bands of radio waves.110 As Gibson writes: 
 
 
“Instead of supposing that the brain constructs or computes the objective 
information from a kaleidoscopic inflow of sensations, we may suppose 
the orienting of the organs of perception is governed by the brain so that 
the whole system of input and output resonates to the external 
information. (Gibson, 1966. P. 5). 
 
 
Rather than using the non-representational notion of resonance, cognitive 
scientists studying affordances view the detection of affordances as enabled by 
causally responsive neuronal activation patterns in sensorimotor regions in the 
brain that represent affordances. As we shall see in more detail below, this 
 
 
110 For a recent example of how the notion of resonance has been spelled out non-metaphorically 
see for example Raja (2018).  
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representational view of affordance perception is clear in Clark’s characterization 
of predictive processing (2016a):  
 
“Here different (but densely interanimated) neuronal populations learn to 
predict various organism-salient regularities obtaining at many spatial and 
temporal scales. In so doing they lock on to patterns specifying everything 
from lines and edges, to zebra stripes, to movies, meanings, popcorn, 
parking lots, and the characteristic plays of offence and defence by your 
favourite football team. The world thus revealed is a world tailored to human 
needs, tasks, and actions. It is a world built of affordances––opportunities 
for action and intervention” (p. xv.). 
 
 
One important motivation for representational accounts of affordance perception 
is that they appear well-placed to answer the question of how agents come to act 
upon only one of the many perceptible affordances that a particular object/event 
offers. The proposed solution brings us to the second characteristic of affordance 
perception (representation being the first) as construed by cognitive science: top 
down contextual biasing. To be sure, that affordance perception is sensitive in 
various ways to changing environmental and organismic conditions is agreed upon 
by both ecological psychologists (Heft, 1990; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; 
Wagman, Stoffregen, Bai, & Schloesser, 2018) and cognitive scientists 
(Ambrosini, Scorolli, Borghi, & Costantini, 2012; Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, 
Sinigaglia, & Committeri, 2010; Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; 
Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). It is understanding the precise manner of how affordance 
perception is influenced by the manipulation of various contextual parameters that 
reflects the pronounced distinction between the perspectives of ecological 
psychology and PP towards affordance perception. Providing a direct perception 
account of context sensitivity is an important task for ecological psychology (Heft, 
1990). This task is one of offering an explanation as to how the degree to which 
an object is perceived as affording some action is subject to contextual influences 
in a manner that avoids the use of mediating memory states in the explanation. On 
the other hand, context sensitive affordance perception from the perspective of 
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cognitive science is explained by an ecologically indirect process of contextual 
biasing. This is a top down process whereby activated inner representations of 
affordances are modulated by acquired (subpersonal) knowledge stores and goals 
to determine which of the many available affordances in the environment will be 
acted upon.  
 
For example, according to the “affordance competition hypothesis” (Cisek, 2007; 
Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016), affordance perception involves both the generation of top-
down signals within the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia which convey the most 
desirable actions and the representation of affordances activated along the dorso-
ventral stream. The top-down signals, in addition to continuous bottom-up 
feedback concerning an agent’s current physiological state(s) (e.g., fatigued vs. 
not fatigued), mediate the competition for behaviour control between the many 
automatically activated affordances, resulting in the selection of one ‘winning’ 
affordance. Let us now look closely at a particular cognitive framework, action-
oriented predictive processing, which exemplifies how a conception of affordance 
perception as representational and contextually biased (such as we find in the 
affordance competition hypothesis) may be implemented at the information 
processing level. This will put us in a better position to adjudicate, in section 4, the 
kinds of sensorimotor behaviours that are and are not susceptible to explanation 




4.3 Action-oriented Predictive Processing – a brief overview 
 
 
Action oriented predictive processing (hereafter referred to as predictive 
processing or PP) (Clark, 2013/2016a/2016b), is a cognitive framework which 
accounts for perception, action, learning, and decision making with the same 
overarching process of hierarchical prediction error minimization. According to PP, 
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the brain instantiates a hierarchical generative model of the external causes of 
sensory state flows that are observed at the sensorium (including the sensory 
effects of the agent’s acting upon its world). The brain’s generative model, through 
a process of approximate Bayesian inference, engenders ‘top-down’ predictions 
about the kinds of sensory signals that are most likely to be encountered given the 
empirical priors (statistical ‘beliefs’) which the model has come to statistically 
encode over both phylogenetic and ontogenetic timescales. Predictions in higher 
cortical levels are generated and compared to ascending ‘bottom-up’ sensory 
signals at each respective level below. When predictions fail to accommodate 
sensory signals, residual prediction error (mismatch between the top-down 
prediction and the bottom-up signal) propagates upward and laterally along the 
cortical hierarchy. Prediction error is minimized in an ongoing and environmentally 
coupled process involving both altering predictions to accommodate error signals 
(known as perceptual inference) and altering one’s relative bodily position in the 
environment so as to control and avoid sensory signals that would result in high 
levels of prediction error or to bring the sensory/error signals in line with current 
proprioceptive and exteroceptive predictions by engaging classical reflex arcs 
(known as active inference) (Clark, 2016a). Counter to the modular views of 
perception and action found in classical input/output models of cognition, 
perception and action in PP are viewed as a tightly coupled, inseparable process.  
 
Although the fine-tuning and nuancing of predictions allows the generative model 
to capture the causal structure of the world, this process is not geared towards 
high-fidelity veridical perception of the world. Rather, the minimization of prediction 
error over the long run allows organisms to meet the dynamics of their milieus with 
adaptive, model-confirming behaviour. Unlike ‘conservative’ interpretations of 
predictive processing (see Hohwy, 2013), action-oriented PP sees “the prediction 
engine as fundamentally tuned to affordances and geared to the use of body, 
world, and action as means of simplifying inner processing” (Clark, 2019, p. 278).  
By showing how bodily, world-engaging action can often do much of the cognitive 
heavy lifting in error minimization, PP is claimed to offer a cognitive architecture 
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that is consistent with many of the insights of both embodied and action-based 
theories of cognition (Clark, 2016a).  For example, active inference in PP fits well 
with the notion common to both embodied cognition and action-based theories that 
cognition is not a process of reconstructing an inner model of the world that can 
be (eventually) traded-out for the real world. Rather, cognition for both PP and 
embodied and action-based theories is often a matter of the agent’s coupling to 
the environment so as to bring about the kind of adaptive engagement required of 
a given task. Prediction error minimization in PP is fundamentally in the game of 
finessing successful adaptive behaviour. 
 
In addition to hierarchical prediction error minimization, the central feature of PP 
that we will be concerned with is the notion of precision weighting. Sensory/error 
signals, when estimated to be reliable, are amplified (i.e., precision weighted) via 
the modulation of synaptic gain (Clark, 2016a). ‘Reliability’ here consists in having 
a higher signal to noise ratio and thus a higher measure of statistical certainty. 
However, given that what qualifies as noise and what qualifies as informative 
signal may be a relative to an agent’s contextually driven goals, precision weighting 
may be understood as the encoding of context (Friston et al., 2012). Precision-
weighted sensory and error signals drive model selection, controlling the relative 
contribution of various sensory modalities, in addition to controlling “the relative 
influence of prior expectations at different levels” (Friston, 2009, p. 299). It is in this 
manner that precision weighting determines which sensory channels are selected 
to influence (perceptual and active) inference and how endogenously generated 
predictions are balanced with incoming sensory signals (Parr & Friston, 2019)111. 
For example, if one has been primed to see faces and is then shown an illustration 
that ambiguously presents a face or the rear perspective of an Inuit in a parka 
(Figure 10), the visual data that has the greatest effect on model selection (face or 
 
 
111 For a detailed account of the important distinction between precision weighting (i.e., gain 
control) and attentional salience see Parr & Friston (2019).  
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Inuit in parka) will typically confirm the priors that have been updated by priming: 
one will see a face as a result of the contextualization of the visual data harvested.  
 
 








       
Figure 10 




Precision weighting thus (when all goes well) helps to ensure that the sensory 
information that reaches higher levels of the generative hierarchy is the most 
“newsworthy” (Clark, 2013). Crucially for our purposes, precision weighting is not 
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only relevant to model update for the task of inferring the causes of sensory signals 
but, also, for realizing preferred action outcomes through action policy selection. 
An action policy is a particular sequence of actions that is indexed across multiple 
timesteps.112 Where there might be many action policies that would result in some 
preferred future outcome, only one of them might be the most effective at keeping 
long-term prediction error to a minimum. For example, there may be many actions 
that one could take to cross a busy street. Walking to the crosswalk, pressing the 
button, waiting for the pedestrian signal to turn green and then crossing however 
is more likely to avoid unwanted long-term prediction error than walking into the 
street, and dodging oncoming traffic. By integrating current sensory information 
with information harvested in the past through the updating of the priors upon 
which the best action policies are conditioned, precision weighting guides action in 
ways that are less likely to incur high debts of (possibly irreducible) prediction error 




4.3.1 Predictive Processing and Affordance Perception  
 
 
PP, like ecological psychology, construes affordances as opportunities for action 
that the environment (i.e., objects and events) offers an organism; they are 
relations obtaining between organism-environment systems (Linson et al., 2018). 
PP, however, views affordance perception as a representational process involving 
the hierarchical prediction driven dynamics of the generative model. An affordance 
as represented by the internal dynamics of the agent encodes a high likelihood 
with respect to an action outcome conditioned on a given action policy “such that 
 
 
112 More technically, action policies describe transitions from one state of the generative model to 
the next future state and are evaluated by how much their outcomes reduced the expected long-
term average prediction error. 
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“affords” amounts to “offers a relatively sure bet”” (Linson et al., 2018, p.12; cf. 
Franchak & Adolph 2014). A particular chair is perceived as sit-on-able for a 
human agent because there is a high likelihood that, given the anatomical features 
and capacities of that agent (as encoded by the generative model), the chair 
perceived would support her/his weight were she/he to sit in it. Such automatic 
activation of multiple affordance representations may be construed as a process 
of responding to and picking-up sensory information that confirms the high 
likelihoods of action outcomes, allowing an agent to perceive the probable 
outcomes of possible actions as salient features of the environment. Such 
activation is, for PP, the result of a continuous, nuanced and active coupling 
between agent and environment; it is only through acting upon the world – 
minimising prediction error via active inference – that the kinds of causal structure 
that serves as evidence for affordances (and hence for the organism-environment 
system) is revealed.  PP thus offers an implementational account of the contextual 
biasing of affordance perception, suggesting how an agent, despite the automatic 
activation of multiple represented affordances, comes to act only on one. By 
engendering top-down predictions elicited on the basis of priors about the most 
desired and probable action outcomes and current sensory evidence, the one 
affordance of the many available offered by an object in the environment that best 
suits the context is perceived as salient and acted upon. 
 
The differences between the direct perception view and the view of affordance 
perception in PP appear pronounced. According to the former, environmental 
information specifying affordances is detected directly by the perceptual system, 
resonating with its internal dynamics without the need for representations and top-
down modulation. According to the latter, affordance perception involves inner 
representations of affordances and contextual biasing of those representations by 
priors of the generative model – that is, it involves precisely the kinds of 




Having shown how PP can deal with context sensitivity, let us now turn to a 
particular case of context sensitivity that will be instrumental in adjudicating 
whether direct perception approaches can explain context sensitive affordance 




4.4 Historical Context Sensitivity  
 
 
I shall define historical context sensitivity (HCS) as the influence upon current 
affordance perception by a past encounter with an event/object that persists after 
an interruption in sensory contact with that event/object. The challenge that HCS 
poses to ecological direct perception is that there appears to be cases where 
differences in the perceiver’s sensitivity to environmental affordances cannot be 
explained solely by appeal to the interacting dynamics of the current environmental 
information and the agent’s capacities.113 Instead, such sensitivity is most plausibly 
explained by appeal to the modulation of current perception by past environmental 
information, in a way that seems to require appeal to memory states that modulate 
the perceiver's sensorimotor relation to their environment. 
 
 
To see what I have in mind, consider the following scenario. An empty ceramic 
coffee mug is heated to finger-searing temperature in an oven. It is then removed 
 
 
113 To be clear, the distinction between “current” and “past” affordance perception here does not 
suggest that perception occurs at an instant; the ecological commitment to the claim that perception 
is a temporally extended process is compatible with HCS. These temporal indexes may be 
understood intuitively as marking perceptual episodes. Perception may “go on” as Gibson claimed 
but perceptual episodes as determined by the environment specifying information available to a 
perceptual system does not. For example, when walking through the park 15 minutes ago, I saw a 
black poplar tree. After having passed the tree and exited the park, there is no sense in which I still 
perceived that tree, nor do I currently perceive it; I did perceive it in the past, during the period in 
which its structure was impinging upon my sensorium. 
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by someone wearing oven mitts, placed on a serving tray, then brought and placed 
before two subjects – Mara and Mike – in a separate room. Crucially, only Mara 
has seen, via video monitor, the mug being heated in the oven and removed with 
mitts. There is, let us suppose, no visual information or other sensory variables in 
the environmental information available to Mara and Mike that specify the mug’s 
hot temperature. Mike, having failed to see the mug being retrieved from the oven, 
will perceive it as graspable. On the other hand, to Mara, the mug will not be 
perceived as graspable per se but will be perhaps only perceived as graspable 
with oven mitts or graspable in the near future or more generally as to-be-
avoided.114 Moreover, suppose that while the mug was temporarily out of Mara and 
Mike’s sight, it was swapped for a duplicate. Any mug sharing the same gross 
sensible features as the mug which Mara perceived on the video-monitor will be 
seen by her as to-be-avoided. What accounts for this difference between Mara and 
Mike in the way the mug is perceived given that there is no current visual 
information that specifies the temperature of its surface and that they both have, 
ex hypothesi, the same capacities? Can proponents of direct perception 
accommodate this difference in what the subjects perceive without appeal to 




114 A neo-Gibsonian might object to this description, countering that the grasp-ability of the mug is 
still perceived, but not as inviting or soliciting (cf. Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). This counter 
however merely re-describes, rather than removes, the difference between the two subjects that 
are in need of explanation.  
115 This is intended as a thought experiment. The characterizations of what the subjects will and 
will not perceive are intuitions that, I take it, should be shared among proponents of affordance-
invoking views of perception across the board. This being said, there are ways of operationalizing 
affordance perception that could be used to see whether these characterizations apply. 





4.4.1 Functional Context and the Nested Affordance Strategy 
 
 
Among extant direct perception strategies for accommodating the context-
sensitivity of affordance perception, it seems to me that the most promising when 
it comes to accommodating HCS appeals to the notion of nested affordances (Heft, 
1999; Wagman et al., 2018).116 On this notion, Heft writes:  
“If an object’s affordance can be based at times on its relationship to another 
environmental feature, it becomes clear that this higher-order relationship 
between ‘focal’ object and surround can specify the functional significance 
of the object on a particular occasion. Accordingly, ‘context’ can be viewed 
as potential higher-order information in the ambient array, which is available 
to be picked up, as opposed to assuming that contextual meaning is 
imposed on an object by means of mediating, cognitive processes” (1990, 
p. 281).  
Due to the fact that affordances are relational properties of the agent with respect 
to the environment, as changes in both the environment and an agent’s capacities 
take place, new affordances become perceivable (or hidden) to the agent. 
Moreover, different object configurations in the surrounding environment (relative 
to a focal object and perceiver) often result in higher-order relationships between 
 
 
116 Another direct perceptual strategy that might be suggested to accommodate HCS relies upon 
direct learning (Jacobs & Michaels, 2007). It might be argued that Mara, when seeing the mug 
taken from the oven, learns which information specifying the mug’s affordances is the best to use 
for completing the given task of appropriately handling the mug. However, the temporariness of 
Mara’s perceiving the mug as to-be-avoided presents a problem for this response. For instance, 5 
minutes after being taken from the oven, Mara would not see the mug as to-be-avoided any 
longer. Given that there is no environmental information that specifies the changing temperature 
of the mug in the scenario as described, such a change must be specified by changing self-
information (i.e., a change in inner dynamics) in relation to environmental information. However, 
in suggesting that changing self-information specifies the mug’s change in temperature over time 
(and hence change in affordances offered by that object) one suggests something that starts to 
look a lot like an ecologically indirect perceptual strategy – a strategy that helps itself to the use of 
temporarily sustained memory states to explain HCS. 
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those focal objects and other objects/events in the surrounding environment. 
These higher-order relationships specify nested affordances. For example, a 
spoon sat next to a bowl of soup might afford eat-with-ability, however the same 
eat-with-ability affordance is not available when a spoon is perceived next to a hole 
in the ground.117  
How are such higher-order relationships perceived without deploying mediating 
knowledge of the associations between the environmental relata? The following 
passage from Gibson provides a clue:  
 
“[…] a unique combination of invariants, a compound invariant, is just 
another invariant. It is a unit, and the components do not have to be 
combined or associated. Only if percepts were combinations of sensations 
would they have to be associated. Even in the classical terminology, it could 
be argued that when a number of stimuli are completely covariant, when 
they always go together, they constitute a single "stimulus."” (Gibson, 1979, 
p.140-141). 
The general idea here is that nested affordances can be specified by compound 
invariants, which need not involve additional processes of combination or 
association between the invariants standing in relation to one another. Rather, 
such compound invariants are extracted as units. The capacity to extract invariants 
as units itself may result from direct learning. Although invariants and affordances 
differ in that the former are not what are perceived but are what enable perception, 
we may apply a similar notion of being perceived as units to affordances that are 
specified by compound invariants as anchored in the agent’s capacities. 
The nested affordance strategy suggests that HCS may be explained in terms of 
functional context: Mara perceived a configuration of interacting affordances (i.e., 
a higher-order relationship). Assuming that the mug was the focal object (towards 
 
 
117 This example is used in Heft (1999) to illustrate the notion of nested affordances and 
functional context sensitivity.  
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which her attention was primarily directed) and both the oven and oven-mitted-
retriever were the surround, a higher-order relationship between the mug and the 
surround with reference to Mara’s capacities specified the mug functionally on the 
occasion as affording heat and as currently to-be-avoided with bare hands. 
However, given that the earlier configuration of objects perceived on the monitor 
and the subsequent configuration of objects that both participants perceive are 
distinct, what is it about the current configuration that specifies – for Mara only – 
the mug as something that is to-be-avoided?  
 
An empty mug on a tray is not the kind of nested affordance configuration that 
specifies the mug as to-be-avoided (this is why one of subjects perceives the mug 
as graspable). The perception of the mug in the prior configuration as to-be-
avoided must influence how Mara perceives it in the current configuration. Pointing 
to this influence, however, shifts but does not solve the problem that HCS poses 
for direct perception theory.  The difficult question for direct perceptual theory to 
answer is how perception of the prior configuration influences the perception of the 
current configuration. To claim that Mara’s perception of the mug as to-be-avoided 
in the prior configuration is ‘sustained’ in perceiving the new configuration, is as 
unhelpful as the claim that after perceiving a spoon in relation to a bowl of soup as 
eat-with-able, the same eat-with-ability is sustained in virtue of subsequently 
perceiving that spoon next to a hole in the ground. The nested affordance strategy 
offers a convincing manner of accounting for how the affordances of objects 
depend upon and change with objects’ surrounds; new higher-order relationships 
are obtained between objects and their surrounds in new configurations relative to 
an agent’s capacities. What it does not offer is a manner of accounting for how 
previously perceived affordances are sustained over time despite the obtaining of 
new higher-order relationships amongst focal objects and their surrounds in new 
configurations. It does not account for HCS.118 
 
 
118 Although direct learning may provide an account for why Mara perceives the mug as to-be-
avoided in relation to its surround configuration (i.e., because her perceptual system has become 
attuned to picking up higher-order invariants in a particular object configuration) it fails to account 
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One potential response on behalf of direct perception approaches might be to 
combine the nested affordance strategy with an appeal to the spatio-temporal 
nesting of perceptible events. The idea here is that some events, like objects, offer 
affordances (Stoffregen, 2002). Given that events may be spatio-temporally 
nested within other global events (the global event of climbing to the top of a ladder 
may be parsed into component events of climbing each rung), the affordance that 
the global event offers (e.g., changing a light bulb) may be parsed into nested 
affordances that each of its constituent events offer (climbing upon third rung 
affords avoiding contact with a spider on second rung). Completing the global 
event often brings with it the affordances of its functionally nested components 
(climbing to top of the ladder affords avoiding contact with a spider on the second 
rung). With this in mind it might be suggested that the event observed on the 
monitor (the removal of the mug from the oven) and the subsequent event (the 
placing of the tray with the mug on the table) are both nested within a global event 
(the serving of the mug). Because the first component event affords being burnt by 
the mug, the global event within which that component event is nested also affords 
being burnt by the mug. Mara thus perceives a different global event and 
affordances than Mike does. 
 
What however makes it the case that the event perceived on the monitor is part of 
one and the same event that ends with the mug on the tray being placed before 
the participants and not two separate unrelated events? For the nested affordance 
strategy with respect to events is only as good as our best account of what non-
arbitrarily makes one event a component of a larger global event. One reasonable 
answer is the continuity of the events as perceived. In response to this suggestion, 
it may be asked what it is about the former event in the HCS example (the removal 
of the mug from the oven) that makes it a component of the global event (the 
 
 
for why perceiving the mug as to-be-avoided is sustained when the particular nested configuration 
of invariants that she has become sensitized has ceased to be.  
 
 125 
serving of the mug)? The common invariants between the event perceived on the 
monitor and the subsequent placement of the tray with the mug before the 
participants are those in the visual array specifying the structure of the mug itself 
(its shape, texture, colour, etc). These common mug-specifying invariants however 
are not enough in any obvious manner to render the two events in which the mug 
is embedded as part of the same perceivable global event. Without another non-
arbitrary way to account for what makes the former event a component of the 
higher-order relationship in the HCS experiment as described, there is no reason 
to think that two consecutive events form a global event. As such, neither applying 
the nested affordances strategy to objects nor to events explains why Mara and 
Mike perceive different affordances when presented with the same object or event 
configuration. 
 
There is thus reason to think that HCS reveals an explanatory limit of direct 
perception approaches. This explanatory limit is particularly relevant to theories in 
cognitive science like PP which import the ecological notion of affordances and yet 
analyse affordance perception as a representational process. Rather than being a 
reason for such accounts to dismiss the concepts of (and motivations behind) 
direct perception theory altogether, HCS and the explanatory limit it identifies offers 
an opportunity for PP to re-evaluate the degree to which lesser demanding cases 
of affordance perception (e.g., relative to HCS) require the kind of top-down 
modulation that HCS demands. Understanding how PP accounts for HCS provides 
PP with an opportunity to not only look more closely and critically at its deployment 
of ecological concepts but, as I will argue, throws into relief some of its implicit 
ecological assumptions that accompany using ecological concepts along the way. 








PP accounts for HCS in the following manner: past perceived objects and events 
affect the amount of current gain on sensory signals in virtue of the updating of 
priors and precision estimates. The perceptual effects of precision estimates as 
regulated by updated priors are tantamount in this case to the effects of working 
memory. Working memory involves the transient maintenance of a representation 
of an initial sensory stimulus that can be used in the service of an ongoing task 
(Baddeley, 1986). This maintenance can be sustained even when sensory contact 
with that stimulus has been temporarily lost. In the PP setting, this functional 
characterization of working memory may be spelled out as a process of 
hierarchical, temporally structured prior ‘belief’ update. As Parr and Friston (2017) 
write:  
 
“working memory updating requires a belief that sensory data is precise, but 
that maintaining a representation in memory in the presence of distractors 
requires believing new sensory data is noisy and volatility is low. Another 
way to conceptualise this is to consider that [precision] modulation biases 
updating of beliefs (working memory) towards either the current beliefs 
about the environment, or towards the current incoming data from the 
sensorium. This fits comfortably with the view that working memory is an 
attentive process as resistance to distracting stimuli occurs when there is 
‘attentive’ biasing towards current beliefs, ensuring the posterior beliefs are 
kept close to prior beliefs” (p.17). 
 
 
When Mara sees the mug being taken from a hot oven with an oven mitt, her priors 
(with respect to the mug) are updated to reflect the increased likelihood of its 
surface radiating heat. It may be reasonably speculated that not only the kind of 
visual sensory signals expected from the mug will be given more precision, but 
also that the current flow of sensory signals originating from thermoreceptors are 
given more gain due to their being reliable indicators of the hot condition of the 
mug. Reframed in terms of sensory signal modulation, the mug’s appearing 
graspable to Mike but not to Mara ––despite the fact that the same visual 
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information is available to both of them––is a consequence of Mara’s having 
updated priors that make a difference to the precision weighting of sensory signals. 
Given the definition of working memory above, the difference that estimated 
precision makes in this context is a difference encoded in working memory.  Like 
the effect that priming with faces has on what one sees in a bi-stable image of a 
face-Inuit, Mara’s memory states act to disambiguate the cutaneous membrane-
damaging mug that is present to her from a mug that affords ‘grasp-ability’.  
 
One might think that this is a straightforward victory for PP over ecological direct 
perception. In the remainder of the paper, however, I will argue that the discussion 
so far sets us up to see how PP is best construed as exploiting just the kind of 
environmental information that is at the heart of ecological psychology. This opens 
up a vision of PP as ecological in spirit, if not in letter. Getting clear on the role of 
environmental information exploitation in PP is important because it offers a way 
of making sense of how action-oriented PP, despite its use of inference, 
representation and models, may nonetheless fit with aspects of embodied and 




4.5 Ecological Information Exploitation and Prediction Error Minimization 
 
 
Given what has been said thus far regarding PP, it may be difficult to see where 
the notion of environmental information exploitation fits into its explanatory 
scheme. Scratching below the surface, however, reveals that PP, far from denying 
that interaction with a structured environment plays a role in perception and action, 
 
 
119 To be sure, if environmental information exploitation is implicit in the PP story, then it stands 
that there is some kind of relationship between detected environmental information and the kind 
of (Shannon) information that is used to quantify prediction error in PP. Getting clear on the 
nature of this relationship is an extremely important task but one that unfortunately, for reasons of 
limited space, cannot be taken up here. 
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presupposes it within the kinds of prediction error minimization processes it posits. 
Recall that active inference, one part of the coupled process by which prediction 
error is minimized, is characterized as the controlled sampling of sensory 
information so that it conforms to proprioceptive and exteroceptive predictions. 
Such controlled sampling leads to prediction error minimization, however, partly in 
virtue of the fact that there is regular structure in the environment which predictive 
systems can exploit to control what is sensed. Clark (2016a) suggests as much 
when he writes:  
 
“The flow of sensation (bound, as we saw, in constant circular causal 
commerce with the flow of action) is predictable just to the extent that there 
is spatial and temporal pattern in that flow. But such a pattern is a function 
of properties and features of the world and of the needs, form, and activities 
of the agent. Thus, the pattern of sensory stimulation reaching the eye […] 
is a function of the lighting conditions, structured scene, and the head and 
eye movements of the observer” (2016a, 171). 
 
The pattern of sensory stimulation carries information about the regular structure 
of the environment given that it is a function of the environmental properties and 
features.120 Only by having regular effects upon an environment which itself is 
invariantly structured, can action states influence sensory states such that those 
sensory states have predictable (structural) trajectories. 
 
To exploit the regular structure in the environment is, I suggest, to initiate actions 
that systematically reveal detectable invariant patterns of stimulus information. 
Detecting such information in turn nuances top-down feedback via updating 
predictions, making available affordances salient and influencing which 
 
 
120 One manner of fleshing out the notion of ecological information as regular environmental 
structure is by using the methods of natural scene statistics (NNS) (see Orlandi, 2016). Much 
more can be said about how Orlandi’s analysis of NNS relates to the notion of environmental 
information exploitation in PP that I present here, however, given reasons of space this task 
cannot be taken up here.  
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affordances are exploited given current context. Thus construed, exploitation of 
environmental information is an implicit feature of the circular and coupled 
organism-environmental dynamics which underwrites the kind of prediction error 
minimization that active and perceptual inference describe (cf. Kirchhoff & 
Kiverstein 2019). Environmental information in the context of PP may be cast as 
the stable causal structure of the environment that generative models come to 
statistically capture via continuous coupled organism-environment interaction. The 
idea that organismic structural features (in this case hierarchically organized brain 
activity and morphology) come to capture nested structural features of the 
environment and that the environment comes to bear the mark of active agents 
could not fit more neatly with the Gibsonian idea of organism-environment 
mutuality. In other words, organism-environment mutuality may be cast simply as 
the fact that an organism is a generative model of its environment (Friston, 2013). 
  
One might think that the attempt to incorporate a Gibsonian/ecological idea of 
environmental information into action-oriented predictive processing is in tension 
with the fundamental role of prediction error in the latter. The presence of 
prediction error suggests that sensory stimulus is ambiguous rather than 
something which specifies the structure of the environment in a one-to-one 
manner. For ecological psychologists sensory information is considered 
informative because of the lawful specification relation that exists between the 
structuring environmental layout and the structured properties of the ambient 
energy arrays; ecological information lawfully specifies such that if ecological 
information is picked up this guarantees direct perception of some invariant 
property of the environment by an organism. Because direct perception cannot go 
wrong (Michaels & Carello, 1981; Heras-Escribano, & de Pinedo, 2016), there is 
no encoded error and no need for processing that corrects error. If this is the case, 




This kind of worry however fails to recognize that perceptual inference is 
inseparable from active inference (Clark,2016a; Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013). 
In other words, although some of the stimulus energy (i.e., stimulation) that is 
detected might result in prediction error, that error may be reduced by moving 
around and engaging the perceptuo-motor system accordingly. With respect to 
affordances one might say that stimulation remains merely a potential higher-order 
informational relatum without the kind of extero-proprioceptive traffic that 
prediction-error-nuanced action that allows. Perception-action is a continuous and 
interrelated process in PP that couples the active agent with the environment 
(Clark, 2016a). This is very much in line with Gibson’s claim that perceiving is a 
continuous “exploratory activity” of actively making the environmental information 
that is there available to detect (cf. Chemero & Anderson, 2019). Minimizing 
prediction error via perceptual and active inference is nothing other than actively 
harvesting potential environmental information and revealing available one-to-one 
relations between sources of information and the sea of structure in the energy 
array over time and as needed.   
 
Extracting environmental information at some time step, tn, I am suggesting,  takes 
place as a result of reducing prediction error at multiple scales arising from (a) the 
detection of sensory stimulation at some earlier time step, tn-1, that does not 
uniquely determine its cause and/or (b) the extraction of environmental information 
at tn-1 that is less relevant to one’s current goals. Coupling to the rich environmental 
information that is both available and relevant to one’s current goals is a feat, one 
that requires continuous engagement with a world that is constantly being 
revealed, sustained, and altered as a result of action. Inferential prediction error 
minimization may thus be cast as a multilevel and multiscale means of refining the 
pick-up of environmental information by which a perceiver comes to detect the kind 
of environmental information that is estimated to be most relevant to its current 
goals and physiological conditions. The PP story of perception-action does not end 
with error or with the pick-up of environmental information for that matter. It is an 
ongoing, world-engaging, circular process that is refined, adjusted and optimized 
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along the way via the mechanism of prediction error minimization; action begets 
better perception and perception begets better action.  
Despite these important commonalities, the nature of ecological information 
exploitation that I am arguing is implicit in PP departs from that in ecological direct 
perception in an important manner. Although minimization of prediction error may 
bring an agent closer to extracting information that lawfully specifies the features 
of the environment, prediction error needn’t be fully minimized across all 
hierarchical levels and timescales in order for it to guide behaviour. Potential 
environmental information that merely has a high likelihood of specifying the 
environment’s layout (with respect to an organism’s capacities), can––and often 
does––get the job done for guiding goal-directed behaviour. The synthesis I am 
proposing suggests that PP agents often engage with the world via anticipating the 
obtaining of affordances prior to actually perceiving them -  thanks to the 
probabilistic nature of generative models. Nonetheless, the kind of environmental 
information I have argued is usefully seen as implicated in PP is just the same 
relational, pragmatically meaningful and directly-specifying information we find in 
ecological psychology – only the way in which this information is revealed and 
exploited differs in PP. Thus, although PP is not ecological in letter given the 
central role of representation within the framework, the kind of environmental 
information exploitation which I have suggested is implicit in active and perceptual 







If what I have argued above is valid, and HCS does represent a limit of ecological 
direct perception, this of course has ramifications for ecological psychology, 
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namely that its programme of direct perception cannot account for all cases of 
context sensitive perceptual phenomena. This claim is significant in its own right, 
challenging ecological psychologists to respond to HCS with other direct 
perception strategies than those I considered above. However, the above view of 
the relationship between PP and ecological psychology has potentially interesting 
implications for PP that I would like to close by considering. 
 
The first implication is this: that HCS is an explanatory limit for direct perception 
may suggest that in cases where objects and their spatial configurations are less 
temporally nested, precision weighting in the form of working memory has 
substantially less influence upon how affordances are perceived. For example, 
seeing the affordance of tofu-eating via the visible configuration of two chopsticks 
and a small piece of tofu in a bowl may require less of this kind of precision 
weighting than perceiving a mug as to-be-avoided shortly after having seen it being 
removed from a hot oven. In the tofu case, something similar to the ecological 
nested affordance strategy may account for why the perceptible configuration 
specifies an affordance of tofu-eating: one perceives the configuration of two 
chopsticks as affording a manner of picking up food and delivering it to one’s 
mouth. One perceives the affordances in this case as a unit.  
 
From the perspective of PP this process may be re-described in terms of the 
engagement of a generative model that has been updated so as to be the 
predictive nexus between visual and proprioceptive information (i.e., kind of visual 
and proprioceptive information flow that would be most likely to arise given the kind 
of current visual and proprioceptive information flow conditioned on an eating 
action policy). The information in the visual array caused by the two chopsticks is 
extracted via perceptual and active inference over time in relation to proprioceptive 
information about one’s own motor skills. This is not to say that precision weighting 
has no part in this process but that precision weighting in the form of working 
memory demanded by HCS is not required to perceive the functional affordance 
of the configuration as a unit; the generative model, through a process of active 
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and perceptual inference, may extract the available invariant compounds as a unit. 
As we saw above, however, the extended temporality involved in the mug case 
rules out its straightforward treatment via the nested affordance strategy. Whereas 
cases of context-sensitive affordance perception involving limited temporal nesting 
may depend primarily upon fast and computationally inexpensive coupling to 
environmental information, we saw above that HCS demands a shift towards the 
use of updated prior ‘beliefs’ to drive behavioural response.  
 
This brings us to a second and related implication. The idea that shifts in cognitive 
strategies– from direct coupling with environmental information to precision-
weighted prediction error– can occur in response to varying contexts not only 
presupposes certain mechanisms are in place but that responding to these varied 
contexts is something that is adaptive for the kind of agent in question. The limits 
of direct perception are thus of interest for PP because they may help demarcate 
where distinct (yet interacting) kinds of mechanisms and processes get a foothold 
relative to the kinds of increasingly complex niches that predictive agents have 
evolved with. The use of precision weighting to increase the impact of priors on 
object perception over time I suspect may very well represent a kind of cognitive 
“transition marker” (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019), a feature that demarcates 
biological systems with working memory from those without it. This transition 
marker picks out a difference in the degree and manner in which environmental 
information is used relative to the degree and manner in which precision weighted 
prior ‘belief’ drives adaptive behaviour. Understanding the limits of direct 
perception might thus provide a valuable opportunity to come closer in 
understanding the kinds of environmental challenges that, to be met, require 
something more than online perceptual coupling with the structured environment. 
Environments that not only reward the perception of spatially nested affordances 
as units (or events) but the temporally distributed reidentification of nested 
affordances might thus exert a selection pressure on organisms to develop the 
more sophisticated modes of precision-weighting and behavioural control with 
which I have suggested that PP can accommodate HCS. 
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Let me sum up: one of the central tenets of ecological psychology is that all 
perception is direct. Action-oriented predictive processing however views such 
affordance perception and its context sensitivity as an indirect process involving 
the use of stored representational states. I introduced a particular case of context 
sensitive affordance perception, historical context sensitivity, and demonstrated 
how it may be elegantly accounted for with predictive processing’s mechanism of 
precision weighting. I then argued that an ecological theory of direct perception 
lacks the resources to account for historical context sensitivity. Despite this being 
the case, the analysis of how predictive processing accommodates historical 
context sensitivity provided an opportunity to look more carefully at how action-
oriented predictive processing implicitly deploys the core ecological notion of 
environmental information exploitation. I then suggested that prediction error 
minimization can be cast as a mechanism for tuning to ecological information. I 
closed by suggesting that the explanatory limits of direct perception as revealed 
by HCS should be of independent interest to PP. Understanding the limits of direct 
perception may very well help to understand a subtle and gradual transition in 
predictive processing – a transition  from the use of fast and frugal environmentally 
coupled cognitive mechanisms as a means of dealing with the uncertainty of the 
‘here and now’ to the deployment of decoupled working memory to cope with 
increasingly complex environmental conditions.  
 
This chapter has thrown light upon the phenomenon of HCS and has argued that 
the kind of precision weighting required to account for it may very well demarcate 
a distinctive mode of cognition that may not be shared with simpler organisms, the 
adaptive behaviour of which relies to a larger degree upon online coupling to 
environmental information. In the next chapter, I turn to mental imagery, a 
phenomenon that is typically assumed to be exclusively offline. Elucidating a 
particular kind of mental imagery generation, “comparative mental imagery 
generation”, I argue that this assumption may be challenged when the ecological 







Coupling to variant information: an ecological account 






Action-based theories of cognition place primary emphasis upon the role that 
agent-environment coupling plays in the emergence of psychological states. Prima 
facie, mental imagery seems to present a problem for some of these theories 
because it is understood to be stimulus-absent and thus thought to be decoupled 
from the environment. However, mental imagery is much more multifaceted than 
this “naïve” view suggests. Focusing on a particular kind of imagery, comparative 
mental imagery generation, this paper demonstrates that although such imagery 
is stimulus-absent, it is also stimulus-sensitive. Exhibiting stimulus-sensitivity is 
sufficient for a process to qualify as coupled to the environment. The notion of 
variant coupling is explicated as the coupling of a cognizer’s perceptual system to 
variant environmental information. By demarcating the categories of stimulus-
absent and stimulus-sensitive cognition, and variant and invariant coupling, this 
paper expands the conceptual apparatus of action-based theories, suggesting not 
only a way to address the problem that comparative mental imagery generation 








Action-based theories of cognition (Gibson, 1979; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 
1991; Clark, 1997,2016a; Ballard, 1997; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo & Cisek 
2016) conceive of perception, cognition, and action as a continuous and mutually 
influencing process, the ‘function’ of which is to guide interaction with an 
everchanging yet structured environment. Action-based theories may be 
contrasted to traditional serial information processing views, which conceive 
cognition primarily as a means of constructing an accurate description of 
environmental states. Although there is disagreement amongst action-based 
theories as to how (and the degree to which) agent-environment interaction is 
involved in the emergence of cognitive states, these approaches are unified in the 
importance they bestow upon coupled interaction with the environment. Some 
forms of action-based theory (e.g., traditional ecological approaches and some 
enactive theories), taking a wide explanatory scope, attempt to account for the 
majority of cognitive processes in terms of ongoing agent-environment coupling.121 
At first blush, these wide-scope action-based theories are faced with a serious 
problem when attempting to account for mental imagery. Like other offline 
phenomena, mental imagery provides cognizers with the means to explore 
possible behavioural outcomes prior to engaging in action, thus arriving at an 
‘optimal’ behavioural choice (relative to one’s goals) in an energy efficient manner. 
Given its status as an offline phenomenon, mental imagery is commonly seen as 
 
 
121 Those theories which I am calling wide-scope action-based theories go beyond making the 
weak claim that agent-environment coupling mediates higher forms of cognition (i.e., that higher 
forms of cognition such as thought or imagination come about in virtue of the covert, ‘as if’ 
deployment of the same sensorimotor mechanisms that would occur were actual agent-
environment coupling were occurring). In contrast, wide-scope action-based theories claim that, 
like perception and action, many cases of higher cognition emerge from agent-environment 
coupling.  
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stimulus-absent122 and thus decoupled from the environment (Pezzulo, 2017; 
Foglia & Grush, 2011). For this reason, any action-based account of imagery in 
which ongoing coupling is deemed essential seems deeply flawed.  However, 
mental imagery is much more multifaceted than this “naïve” view suggests. 
 
The multifaceted nature of mental imagery is exemplified particularly well when 
considering one intriguing form which involves the deployment of imagery in the 
service of visual comparison tasks with features of perceived objects. For example, 
one might be given the task to look at an object, generate an image with the same 
dimensions and then compare image dimensions with those of another perceived 
object. Such a task, for instance, might involve comparing the size of one box 
located in the left corner of a room to another similarly sized box located in the 
right corner of a room in order to know whether or not the leftmost box would fit 
inside of the other. This particular kind of image generation, what will be referred 
to as comparative mental imagery generation (CMIG), is striking for the reason 
that, upon close analysis, it challenges the orthodox view in cognitive psychology 
that all mental imagery generation is environmentally decoupled. In the first part of 
this paper I will argue that, because the imagery generated during CMIG remains 
sensitive to the stimulus dynamics of the environment, CMIG is both an offline and 
coupled process.  
 
To do this, this paper argues that CMIG is both influenced by incoming sensory 
stimuli and may prompt image maintaining behaviour. Possessing this behaviour-
eliciting sensitivity to environmental stimuli is sufficient for this kind of mental 
imagery generation to qualify as what I will call the process of variant coupling. 
Building on the notion of stimulus sensitivity, this paper offers an ecological 
account of the kind of coupling involved in CMIG. By illustrating how perceptual 
systems may couple to variant information in the environment, thus allowing for 
continued imagery maintenance despite ongoing encounters with disruptive 
 
 
122 More will be said about the notion of stimulus absence below. 
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stimuli, the ecological account of CMIG demonstrates that action-based accounts 
should adopt a richer taxonomy of cognitive processes than a standard 
online/offline bifurcation, if they are to make sense of phenomena like CMIG. By 
demarcating the categories of stimulus-absent and stimulus-sensitive cognition, 
and variant and invariant coupling, this paper expands the conceptual apparatus 
of action-based theories, suggesting not only a way to address the problem that 
stimulus-absence presents for comparative mental imagery generation, but also a 
way that action-based theories may possibly account for other forms of stimulus-
absent imagery.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: after defining on and offline cognition from the 
theoretical perspective of action-based cognition, section 5.2 provides an example 
and an analysis of CMIG. Using this CMIG example, section 5.3 introduces the 
notion of stimulus-sensitivity and argues that exhibiting stimulus-sensitivity is 
sufficient for a mental state/process to be coupled to the environment. Section 5.4 
proposes an ecological account of variant coupling involved in CMIG.  Section 5.5 
sketches a more fine-grained taxonomy of offline and online cognitive phenomena 
based upon the notions of variant and invariant coupling/decoupling and 





5.2 Online and Offline Cognition  
 
 
Within the context of action-based theories, as in the rest of cognitive psychology, 
the terms online and offline are readily accepted to demarcate two distinct 
cognitive modes (Clark, 1997: Pezzulo, 2017; Bickerton, 1996). Online cognition 
is characteristically understood to be stimulus-based (Pezzulo, 2017) or equally, 
causally dependent upon the task relevant stimulus features in the environment. 
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One might understand causal dependence here in the context of experiential 
states or processes as follows:  
 
 Some psychological state, S, is causally dependent on state of affairs, O if: 
 
a. were O not present, S would have failed to arise & 
b. were there a registerable difference in O, then there would be a difference 
in S 
 
Where (a) expresses a Lewisian (1973) counterfactual condition on causal 
dependence and (b) narrows the relevant causal dependence down to covariation 
of psychological states with environmental states by introducing a counterfactual 
conditional that takes a registerable difference123 in O as an antecedent and a 
difference psychological state as a consequent.124  
 
Importantly, action-based theories characterize online cognition as a kind of 
causally coupled interaction with the environment. An agent may be said to be 
coupled to the environment when her behaviour with respect to some task-relevant 
environmental feature brings about changes in the environment (or changes in 
relation between environmental features and the agent), which in turn modulate 
that agent’s sensory states (i.e., input) acting to guide subsequent behaviour and 
constraining subsequent sensory states.125  Coupling requires mutually ongoing 
causal activity between two or more systems over time. In the case of online 
cognition, those two systems are the external environment and the cognizer whose 
 
 
123 Registerable difference is determined by the sensitivity of the type of perceptual system in 
question. It will suffice for the purposes of this exposition to assume this to be individuated by 
species. 
124 This is a mere suggestion as to how one may construe causal dependence of experiential 
states upon environmental states. If one is not satisfied with these particular conditions, then one 
is free to replace them with one’s best conditions on causal dependence. 
125 Mathematically, this may be described in terms of a series of differential equations in which 
the changes in any one of the variables that is a constituent of one equation are reciprocally 
describable as a function of the changes in the other equation’s variables. See Chemero (200) for 
an in-depth account of agent-environment coupling using the variable tau.  
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continuous state changes–– understood respectively as environmental states and 
internal, action and sensory states––are mutually influencing and hence provide 
mutual information about one another (Jost, 2015).  
 
Although there is disagreement amongst action-based theorists as to the details 
of how offline phenomena come about, it is agreed upon that offline cognition 
refers to phenomena which are stimulus-absent. The generation of the mental 
activity yielding offline phenomena is said to be largely spontaneous and thus both 
causally independent and decoupled from task relevant stimulus features in the 
environment. It follows that in such episodes of cognition offline states and 
environment states fail to provide mutual information about one another given that 
the activity resulting in offline states stops short of acting on the environment and 
receiving environmental feedback. Whilst offline states such as dreaming and 
contemplating non-existent entities (e.g., having thoughts about unicorns) might 
fail––at least in any direct way––to hinge upon prior environmental challenges 
encountered, many offline phenomena may be seen as “systematic explorations 
to problems set by experience” (Gerrans, 2007, p. 46). In other words, it is typical 
of a wide range of offline phenomena that they are deployed in solving problems 
which a cognizer may initially be presented with online. They provide an efficient 
way to explore behavioural options––often future oriented––thus avoiding costs in 
the form of time and energy-consuming, ‘real-time’ action or environmental 
exploration. Some further examples of offline phenomena are:  
 
 
• Mentally navigating a route which has previously not been taken  
• Mentally rehearsing a sequence of dance steps without carrying them out 





With the online/offline distinction to hand, let’s move onto CMIG. CMIG is an 
example of an interesting form of mental imagery which illustrates that not all 
imagery generation is decoupled from the environment. In closely examining 
CMIG, it will be suggested that the stimulus-absent vs stimulus-based means of 
analysing cognition overlooks an important concept, that of stimulus-sensitivity. 
Because mental imagery generation may be consistently stimulus-sensitive and 
stimulus-absent, and (I will argue) stimulus-sensitivity is a way of being causally 
coupled to the environment, comparative mental imagery generation 
simultaneously involves decoupling and coupling. This is a significant result 
particularly for wide-scope action-based theories given that it provides a means of 
substantiating the claim that higher cognitive states like mental imagery involve 




5.2.1 Comparative Mental Imagery Generation 
 
 
To understand what CMIG is, imagine a disk pairing game. You are presented with 
a table upon which are two rows of five disks of various sizes. The two rows are 
separated by a distance of one metre (or any approximate distance where you 
cannot view the rows simultaneously by saccades alone). Some of the disks are 
of noticeably different sizes and others with a mere difference of less than a 
centimetre (see Figure 11). The aim is to form pairs of disks from each row by 
sameness of size as quickly as possible. If you were to compare the size of two 
discs by actually placing them adjacent to (or atop) one another and looking for a 
noticeable difference, you would be engaging in real-time, online cognition. Offline 
cognition, however, might take the form of your mentally comparing the size of one 
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disc with another by holding an image of the disk in mind, while looking at the disk 





Disk Pairing Game: the aim is to pair the disks from each row according to sameness of size 
as quickly as possible.  
 
 
Let’s focus on some of the characteristics of offline cognition that are brought out 
in this example. Introspection reveals the following: during the game, a disk’s 
dimensions (i.e., size) are perceptually sampled, an image is generated and held 
fixed, transposed to a different location and tacitly compared to the size of a disk 
that is perceived online. Thus, despite their being derived from a perceptual 
encounter with the disks, the disk images elicited are stimulus-absent. That is, 
once the disk is perceptually sampled, the maintained image becomes decoupled 
from the disk it was sampled from, and thus no longer under the causal influence 
 
 
126 For a classic comparative imagery study involving mental rotation, see Shepard & Metzler 
(1971). Although it involves 3-D manipulation, something which is much more complex than 
holding the disk size fixed and transposing it across one spatial dimension for comparison, the 
Shepard & Metzler mental rotation task may be nonetheless considered a form of CMIG. This is 
because the mental rotation task, although it involves 3-D rotation, requires holding a generated 
shape fixed in order to compare it to another shape that is seen online. Rotation may be seen as 
another manner of mentally transposing an image, albeit a spatially complex manner placing a 
higher requirement upon working memory. 
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of the disk. For instance, subsequent to sampling and maintenance, one may 
certainly break the disk without breaking the image. Importantly, this is illustrative 
of a case in which the mechanisms for generating and maintaining stimulus-absent 
images are deployed simultaneously to those that are being used for online 
perception; a capacity that falls out of the fact that mental imagery in a particular 
modality and perception in the corresponding modality may occur concurrently 
(Nanay, 2017).  For the disk image to be used in a comparison task requires both 
the image and disk percept to be used concurrently.  
 
Such simultaneous deployment should be expected given the general 
consideration that offline cognition is often used in the service of solving problems 
which an organism encounters in real-time (Gerrans, 2007) and that real-time 
problems often require constant reference to those environmental features from 
which the problems stem. Furthermore, it has been established by a range of 
neuroscientific studies that imagery and perception deploy much of the same 
neural circuitry (Kosslyn,1978, 1980, 2005; Farah 2000), supporting what has 
become known as the continuum thesis127. This thesis, which is assumed true 
within the cognitive science of mental imagery (Thomas, 1999), often begins with 
the evolutionary assumption that more complex cognitive capacities such as 
mental imagery generation developed from simpler perception-action capacities 
(Cisek & Kalaska, 2014; Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). At least one version of the thesis 
then goes on to claim that mental imagery generation makes use of some of the 
same processing that is deployed in perception with the exception that in imagery 
generation the processing that would normally lead to perception is somehow 




127 The continuum thesis that will be referred to throughout this paper should not be confused with 
the more controversial philosophical continuum thesis. The philosophical continuum thesis states 
that there is no qualitative difference between mental imagery and perception, but rather a mere 
quantitative difference. I am greatly indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this 
distinction to my attention.  
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If imagery makes use of much of the same neural processing as perception, we 
might expect that one kind of phenomenon could affect the other. This suggestion 
is supported by the fact that impairments in one domain can often be accompanied 
by impairments in the other (Farah, 2000). Early research by Bisiach & Luzzatti 
(1978), for example, discovered that patients suffering from unilateral neglect also 
tend to neglect the corresponding area of their mental imagery. Additional 
evidence comes from the noting that making random eye movements disrupts 
visual imagery (Thomas, 2010) and imagining a particular type of object involves 
making similar saccadic eye movements to those that one would make when 
perceiving that object (Fourtassi, Hajjioui, Urquizar, Rossetti, Rode & Pisella, 
2018). 128 In the next subsection, I will attempt to specify just how the stimuli 







The disk pairing game exemplifies CMIG. This domain of offline cognition, I will 
argue, makes it evident that the online/offline taxonomy as based upon the notions 
of stimulus-based and stimulus-absent is underdeveloped. CMIG is a temporally 
extended process in which the spatial comparison of generated and held imagery 
with spatial environmental features requires the use of both off and online 
mechanisms. Given that perception requires the processing of environmental 
stimuli, it may be asked whether the stimuli thus processed have any causal effect 
upon the accompanying maintained visual imagery?129 In other words, although 
 
 
128 Fourtassi et al. (2018), by applying a bi-dimensional regression model to eye-tracking data 
collected during an imagery task (i.e., imagining different towns in France) were able to confirm 
that saccadic gaze patterns closely reflect spatial dimensions of relative town locations. 
129 This question is different than that of whether or not the general processes involved in 
perception, such as random eye movements, affect imagery, something which––as pointed out 
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the imagery associated with CMIG is stimulus-absent (i.e., causally decoupled 
from the sampled source) is it possible that the held imagery is sensitive to 
impinging visual stimuli encountered during the comparison task? It is by posing 





Let us define stimulus sensitivity as follows: 
 
A mental process is stimulus sensitive just in case:   
 
(1) its individuating features are subject to being affected by incoming 
stimuli and  
(2) it is likely to elicit adaptive-control responses when such stimuli threaten   
to degrade the imagery being generated/maintained. 
 
To take an example from the disk pairing game, the mental image is a blue disk of 
certain size and lasting in its vivacity and dimensions over a certain period of time 
corresponding to the task at hand. Condition (1) on stimulus sensitivity requires 
that such an image’s individuating features be subject to influence by visual stimuli. 
Where individuating features are those subjective properties of an image which 
qualify it as the image token that it is. Let’s imagine that after sampling one of the 
disks on the left-hand side of the table and holding that image, an intense flash of 
light occurs, hitting your eyes as you direct your head and eyes to the disks on the 
right-hand side of the table. Were this light flash to affect the blueness, size, or 
shape of the held image then such an image would satisfy condition (1)130. 
 
 
above––has been empirically supported. This question is particularly about the influence of 
environmental stimuli upon imagery.  
130 That this could be the case presupposes that an intense flash of light hitting one’s eyes 
typically blurs online vision and that the affected processes are the same exploited by offline 
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Condition (2) requires an image to be likely to elicit behavioural responses that aid 
in the maintenance of those individuating features of an image. The notion of 
adaptive-control here is one borrowed from control theory (Pezzulo & Cisek 2016; 
Ashby, 1952). It may be roughly thought of as a means to keep a certain control 
variable in a system within a restricted range by actively controlling the feedback 
into the system. In the disk pairing game, the control variable may be construed as 
one of the image individuating features of any sampled disk. Adaptive control 
responses would be those which the imager would deploy (tacitly or non-tacitly) in 
order to maintain that feature during the comparison task. If there were certain 
behaviours that were likely to be elicited for this purpose, then condition (2) would 
be satisfied. Are there any reasons to believe that mental imagery satisfies either 
of these conditions on stimulus sensitivity? Let’s look at each condition 
respectively.  
Lending support to the satisfaction of condition (1) we may look to luminance 
effects studies by Keogh & Pearson (2014). It is well established that when a 
subject is told to generate a mental image of one of two binocular rivalry images, 
say a green Gabor patch, and then shown a binocular rivalry display with opposing 
red and green Gabor patches, the congruent green patch in the display will be 
experienced as more dominant (Keogh & Pearson 2011; Sherwood & Pearson, 
2010). By increasing background luminance during the generation of a mental 
image, Keogh & Pearson have shown that congruent images presented 
subsequently in a binocular rivalry display were less dominant for good imagers. 
This suggests that “incoming visual information, which has obligatory access to 
early visual areas, can interfere with […] internal sensory representations” (Keogh 
& Pearson, 2014:10). In other words, online stimuli can––in some cases––degrade 




vision. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to clarify this point in more 
detail. 
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What about condition (2)?  One way to frame the question about satisfying (2) is 
to ask what can an agent do to avoid image degradation? In responding to this 
question, I will focus upon two kinds of responses: saccadic eye movement and 
pupilar constriction. These responses offer indirect––though, I suggest, 
compelling––support for the satisfaction of (2) based on empirical studies. In 
coming to understand how saccades may be used to avoid degradation, it is helpful 
to keep in mind the seminal research on eye tracking and top-down influence by 
Alfred Yarbus (1967). In one famous experiment, Yarbus, used a painting depicting 
a family gathered in a parlour as a visual stimulus. After an initial viewing, before 
which no particular instructions were given, subjects were assigned various tasks 
to carry out prior to each subsequent 3 minute viewing (e.g., “estimate the material 
circumstance of the family”, “remember the positions of the people and objects in 
the room”, “Surmise what the family had been doing before the arrival of 
‘unexpected visitor’”). Whilst carrying out these various tasks, the subjects’ 
saccades were tracked. It was found that the saccadic patterns varied significantly 
with the kind of task assigned, thus providing evidence that saccades can be driven 
to pursue meaningful information given the nature of the task. Saccades, it turned 
out, are not just passive responses, but are under the influence of ‘top-down’ 
control , deeply reflecting the nature of the goals to be achieved.131 With this in 
mind, I would like to suggest a variation on Yarbus’s findings that will underwrite a 
response to the question about (2) posed above, viz., saccades can be driven to 
avoid disruptive visual stimuli given the nature of the task.  
 
Recent research by Kilpeläinen & Theeuwes (2016) supports this claim. After 
establishing a penalty zone (an area which subjects would be financially penalized 
for fixating upon) in a visual display and instructing subjects to locate cues that 
 
 
131 Although today this conclusion is not surprising, in 1967 it was. Three decades prior to Yarbus’ 
research into active vision, work by G.T. Buswell (1935) confirmed that the eye movements are 
under the influence of goals. However, due to the fact that his experiment featured different kinds 
of tasks requiring different kinds of cognitive faculties (e.g., remembering vs judgement), Yarbus 
managed to demonstrate not only that goals influence saccades but that differences in goals are 
systematically reflected in saccadic activity in a fine-grained manner.  
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would be intermittently flashed in the same display, Kilpeläinen & Theeuwes found 
that saccades can be flexibly adapted to changing environmental circumstances 
to improve reward outcome. Given that improving reward outcomes in this 
experiment is equivalent to decreasing penalization outcomes, these results 
suggest that the bodily exploration of the environment involved in perception might 
be adaptively shaped both by what is desired and what is not desired: the result 
being the avoidance of undesired stimuli. Given that this is the case, an account 
of CMIG as a stimulus-sensitive process predicts that in mental imagery cases 
subsequent to exposure to image degrading stimuli (e.g., high luminance 
surfaces), a subject will reduce the number of saccades to locations containing 
such stimuli in order to improve the task outcome.  
 
Pupilar dilation provides striking additional support for the satisfaction of condition 
(2). Studies by Binda, Pereverzeva & Murray (2013) have shown that pupils 
constrict when subjects are merely looking at photos of the sun. These findings 
suggest contextual expectations elicit pupilar response and modulation of sensory 
processing. Returning to the context of mental imagery, given these results one 
might expect that after learning which stimuli (or changes in stimuli) predict the 
presence of high luminance conditions, an agent’s pupils might constrict to avoid 
the degradation of imagery and dilate otherwise (say, for further sampling during 
CMIG). This goes beyond mere anticipatory pre-emption in that some stimulus is 
required as a predictor of the upcoming increase in luminance (much as the image 
of the sun serves as a predictor of vision-degrading brightness). It is this predictor 
stimulus that is necessary to drive behaviour in ways that help stay within a certain 
imagery-friendly luminance range. Thus, such constriction and dilation would have 
to be a measured and delicately balanced response; one influenced both by top-
down and bottom-up processing.  
 
Taking into consideration both luminance effects on imagery and evidence that 
saccades and pupilar responses may be contextually driven to avoid anticipated 
image-degrading stimuli (or equally driven to couple to stimuli that is non-
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degrading to imagery), gives strong, though indirect, support for the hypothesis 
that CMIG is stimulus sensitive. To be sure, there are other instances of visual 
mental imagery generation in which an agent is not subject to the influence of 
visual stimuli. For example, were one to wear an eye mask blocking out all visual 
stimuli, luminance effects (in addition to all other possible light stimuli effects) 
would be null; there would be no occasion for visually based adaptive-control 
responses. In such a case, it might well be that visual mental imagery generation 
is stimulus-insensitive.132 However, since CMIG by definition involves comparing 
imagery with perceived objects and thus requires an openness to incoming visual 
stimuli, the imagery generated and maintained during CMIG remains sensitive to 
visual stimuli which, via adaptive control, are kept within a limited, image-
conducive, range.133 Stimulus sensitivity thus implies that the processing 
underlying CMIG remains causally coupled to the environment. CMIG piggybacks 
on stimulus-based perception but is a distinct offline process. 
 
Crucially, this opens up the theoretical space for the images in CMIG to be 
consistently both stimulus-absent (i.e., causally decoupled from the environmental 
source of their phenomenal character) and yet stimulus-sensitive (i.e., causally 
coupled to visual stimuli encountered during the visual task). Accepting this kind 
of analysis of CMIG as plausible, however, is to a large extent dependent upon 
providing an account of what it is that visual systems are coupling to. In the course 
of addressing this question in the next section, some important further details about 




132 It is an interesting and open empirical question whether or not (or the degree to which) non-
visual exteroceptive modalities such as sound have any significant effect upon visual mental 
imagery. That this is the case with respect to auditory stimuli seems to me to clearly to be the 
case, particularly with respect to sound effects. See Miller & Marks (1992) for evidence as to how 
radio sound effects affect the elicitation of visual imagery. 
133 This claim is consistent with the further claim that saccades reflect ‘encoded’ spatial relations 
and hence are sensitive to various spatial dimensions which have been encoded into memory. 
The point again is that saccadic behaviour during imagery maintenance is not only driven by top-




5.4 Coupling to Variant Information 
 
 
What does a cognizer couple to during CMIG? In answering this question, it will be 
helpful to examine the kind of coupling relata that an ecologically informed theory 
of active cognition is committed to. The reason for this is that ecological theories 
place an emphasis upon the environment as playing an indispensable role in 
cognition and thus such theories offer the most richly developed framework for 
thinking about coupling amongst action-based theories. Drawing on Gibson’s 
ecological psychology (1979) one form of enactivism (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2018; 
Bruineberg et al. 2018; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014) understands coupling to be a 
relation between inner dynamics and the environmental information. If 
environmental information is given its usual gloss of being invariant patterns that 
specify the layout of the environment (Gibson, 1979), then it is by coupling to 
invariant information that organisms perceive the environmental layout specified 
by that information.  
 
With this in mind, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between invariant 
information and the stimuli involved in stimulus sensitivity. Given the description of 
stimulus-sensitivity provided above, it seems that the kind of stimuli that affect the 
phenomenal character of imagery and elicit response does not specify the 
environmental layout. Returning to the Keogh & Pearson (2014) study, although 
the high luminance light that disturbs imagery generation originates from a surface, 
the light itself does not specify that surface. In Gibson’s (1979) terminology, such 
light stimulus is not “ambient” but merely “radiant” and thus falls short of carrying 
invariant information. Given that this is the case, the latter does not specify 
unchanging environmental structure. So, whatever the kind of coupling that 
stimulus-sensitivity implies is, it is distinct from that which occurs in perception.  
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The coupling that ecologically informed theories have traditionally used in 
accounting for perception is understood to involve information that specifies the 
environmental layout or what actions the layout offers (i.e., affordances). However, 
the environmental relata which stimulus-sensitivity involves, because of being 
behaviour guiding nevertheless serves as information for the perceptual system. 
In the case of CMIG, the visual system is coupled to meaningful, non-homogenous 
stimuli that are instructive as to how to behave relative to the task at hand.134 Alone, 
high luminance radiant light does not serve as information, but given the limited 
range of available stimulus conditions within which imagery can be maintained and 
the location of the perceiver in relation to varying environmental stimulus 
conditions, such radiant light stimulus is informative: it specifies where not to 
saccade from this location.  
 
One might object, arguing that such information––call it ‘variant information’––
seems nonetheless unlikely to be the kind of thing which could be the 
environmental relata that underlies coupling. For it would seem odd that the 
occasional encounter with high luminance conditions and the elicited response to 
avoid them could be considered anything other than a temporary coupling and 
immediate decoupling from such stimulus conditions. In other words, it seems that 
the visual system is adapting in ways so as to remain decoupled from high 
luminance, image degrading stimuli. In response to this, one need only be 
reminded that light conditions are continuously fluctuating in ways that are 
sometimes better or worse for imagery maintenance. During CMIG the visual 
system is constantly engaged in an attempt to stay coupled to the range of stimulus 
conditions that are best suited for imagery maintenance and it does this by 
coupling to and decoupling from degrading stimuli exogenously encountered. 
 
 
134 One way of conceiving the difference between those things that are specified affordances and 
those things which variant information specify may be brought out respectively in the vocabulary 
of “action selection” and “action specification” (Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). This may be seen as a 
difference between selecting amongst those activities (i.e., what) the environmental layout offers 
(e.g., sitting, standing, walking through, etc.) and the specification of an action that describes how 
one’s body must behave to successfully bring about a selected action.  
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Thus, it may be argued, that the visual system does not couple to high luminance 
surfaces only to decouple from them, but, instead, when such conditions are 
encountered, by responding in ways to avoid them (or adapt to them), the visual 
system remains coupled to the stimulus conditions which are conducive to imagery 
maintenance. Variant information in this sense guides the visual system back to 
the ‘optimal’ conditions, constraining the task driven saccadic patterns that unfold 
during CMIG.  
 
One may think about this process analogously to descending an unfamiliar 
staircase in the dark by sweeping a foot along until it meets the next stair below. 
Failing to encounter a surface upon which to shift one’s weight, one continues to 
sweep and until such a surface is detected. A sweep that fails to detect anything 
is nonetheless informative as to where not to place one’s weight.  On the other 
hand, when one detects a surface, one knows where to shift one’s weight. Through 
a series of such moves one descends the darkened staircase, staying balanced 
upright along the way. Similarly, variant information guides the visual system in 
both how and how not to behave given both the task at hand and the location that 
one occupies.  
 
The specifying role of this ecological variant information is made explicit in the 
following passage from Warren (2005), who, drawing a comparison between it and 
the role of invariant information, writes:  
 
“Reciprocally, the varying spatial relation between objects and perceiver is 
specified by the perspective structure of stimulation. This corresponds to 
the view of the environment from here, which locates environmental 
surfaces and objects relative to the perceiver, and the perceiver relative to 
its environment” (Warren, 2005, p. 343). 
 
This perspectival structure is what Gibson (1979) referred to as propriospecific 
information. Since it specifies something about the perceiver’s current position 
relative to the environment, it may be thought of as providing her with the kind of 
indexical information required to direct her body in ways that would change her 
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relationship to the environment. Self-specifying variant information and 
environment-specifying invariant information, according to Gibson, are 
complementary (1979, p. 183), with each reciprocally determining the other. 
Importantly, neither kind of complementary information is something that one is 
aware of. One is, however, aware of those things which the information types 
specify: the stable environmental layout (e.g., the non-changing proportions of a 
table’s rectangular surface as one approaches it) and the flowing perspective on 
the environment from here (e.g., the increasing amount of space that the table 
occupies in one’s visual field the closer one gets to it).  
 
In the case of CMIG, one may worry that because the image generated and 
maintained is decoupled from the causal source of its spatial dimensions, there 
fails to be invariant information that acts as a complement to the proposed variant 
information. This worry may be avoided when taking a few facts about imagery into 
account. As we have seen above, when imagining a particular object, one’s 
saccadic eye patterns are similar to those which would occur if one were actually 
perceiving that kind of object (Thomas, 1999; Fourtassi et al., 2018). This saccadic 
re-enacting of the object spatial relations brings with it a multiplex of visually 
registered stimuli. I would like to suggest that this stimuli, variant information, acts 
as afferent feedback for helping to guide the visual system in ways that efferently 
maintain (or systematically alter) the imager’s perspective on that which was 
sampled.135 In the case of CMIG, variant information does complement invariant 
information, but the latter need not be something that is currently coupled to for the 
former to continue to guide saccadic re-enactment. Any non-homogenous stimuli 
will serve the purpose of providing variant information (i.e., feedback) as long as it 
 
 
135 One might object here that it is possible for one to generate a visual image in complete 
darkness where no such variant information is available and one’s eyes nonetheless saccade in 
ways that reflect the spatial relations of the imagined object that was previously perceived. 
Assuming that one is in a condition of complete darkness ––something that is rarely the case in 
non-experimental environments––in order for this objection to hold it must be shown that both 
saccades and image maintenance in the two conditions of complete darkness and in typical 
viewing conditions are identical. This is an open empirical question. More importantly, in the case 
of CMIG, typical perceptual lighting conditions are necessary.  
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is in the particular range that does not degrade imagery. What qualifies such stimuli 
as variant information is how it is used to maintain one’s perspective on invariant 
structure in the environment.  
 
For example, in the disk game, by coupling to invariant spatial structure of a 
particular disk, one simultaneously couples to the variant, perspectival, information 
that accompanies it. After the disk is sampled, one’s visual system decouples from 
it and yet remains coupled to the changing light stimulus encountered. The visual 
system, by using differences in light stimulus as feedback to continue the 
perspective-driven saccadic pattern, is able to maintain a phenomenal perspective 
on the spatial dimensions of the disk. This is not to say that one cannot alter one’s 
perspective, something that is clearly the case in mental rotation tasks. The point 
is that extracting variant information from the environment is a process of using 
stimuli as feedback to drive saccades (and the visual system generally) in order to 
re-enact a perspective on invariant structure that is absent. This re-enactment 
process is not just driven by inner dynamics but guided by variant information in 
the environment.136  
 
Visual variant information is generated by the interaction of saccadic patterns and 
differential light stimulus. Changes in impinging stimulus act as feedback––a kind 
of ‘scaffold’––to control (confirm and correct) saccadic patterns.137 It is here that 
stimulus-sensitivity comes into play. Some stimuli which the visual system 
attempts to couple to in re-enacting perspectival structure can be of magnitudes 
too intense (or not intense enough) to act as feedback and thus corrupt the on-
going saccadic pattern. Whilst the perceiver is simultaneously moving her sensory 
surfaces through the environment, high luminance stimulus that is encountered 
 
 
136 I will assume that other features of imagery like colour piggyback on re-enacting perspective. 
(See Bompas & O’Regan, 2005). 
137 The generation of imagery without sampling of perceived dimensions may similarly involve the 
engendering of saccadic eye patterns as a result prior perceptual system biasing. These patterns 
are sustained (i.e., confirmed and corrected) by the generation of and coupling to variant 
information. 
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marks out the locations which saccades should avoid. Adaptive saccadic 
adjustments are made whilst the overall saccadic pattern is sustained.  
 
Although variant and invariant information are complementary, it is possible for a 
cognizer to remain coupled to the former whilst decoupling from the latter. In the 
case of CMIG, one may actively couple to stimuli in the environment which allow 
for imagery maintenance from here, whilst decoupling from the invariant 
information that is causally dependent upon the particular object sampled. To 
maintain an image in CMIG is to (at least in part) adjust to the stimuli encountered 
in ways that allow for a lasting perspective on that which was sampled. Coupling 
to variant information in CMIG involves the tacit guiding of the perceptual system 
so as remain receptive to the range of stimuli that do not result in the loss of one’s 
perspective. It is telling that the phenomenology of mental imagery––with respect 
to objects––is essentially perspectival.138 The difficultly (or more likely, 
impossibility) of taking more than one perspective at a time on a generated image, 
if this account is correct, is more to do with the fact that it is not possible to re-enact 
multiple perspectives simultaneously with saccades.  
 
Although this kind of coupling does not take environment-specifying information as 
one of its relata, it is nonetheless a form of coupling to perspective-specifying, 
behaviour guiding variant information.139 The claim that a perceptual system may 
be decoupled from invariants and nonetheless operate in non-(strictly)perceptual 
cognition is supported by Gibson when he writes:  
 
 
138 I have qualified this statement to apply to objects given the possibility of generating an image 
that consists of nothing other than uniform colour or (i.e., a ganzfeld). Although there is no 
perspective involved in such a ganzfeld, generated images of objects seem to be perspectival 
through and through.  
139 This kind of divergence of coupling to variant information from coupling to invariant information 
may be exemplified in the following example: whilst looking out the window of a high-speed train 
and staring steadily at a fixed area in the foreground, one is strongly decoupled from much of the 
invariant information specifying individual objects outside due to their size (say, a piece of fruit 
hanging from a tree) and the speed travelled. Despite this, one can couple to the present variant 
information specifying one’s perspective; a perspective from here that phenomenologically 
encompasses one’s moving at a certain velocity in relation to a static out there.  
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“…a perceptual system that has become sensitised to certain invariants 
(information) and can extract them from the stimulus flux can also operate 
without the constraint of the stimulus flux” (Gibson 1979, p. 256). 
 
In line with Gibson’s claim, the account being developed here proposes that 
subsequent to being sensitised to invariant structure (i.e., sampling), a perceptual 
system can couple to behaviour guiding variant information sans the invariant 
structure of the object sampled. Variant information is necessary for perspectival 
re-enactment (e.g., saccadic guidance and pupilar response) in CMIG.140  It is this 
coupling to variant information that I shall call variant coupling. It may be contrasted 




5.5 Sketching a Taxonomy 
 
 
Taking the proposed account of CMIG into consideration, I would now like to 
sketch a taxonomy of online/offline cognition which, going beyond the limited 
specification criteria of stimulus-present and stimulus-absent, includes weak 
coupling and stimulus sensitivity. The previous sections have provided reasons to 
think that such a taxonomy may accurately represent the underlying relations and 
features of CMIG. Before proceeding with this sketch, however, a few remarks are 
necessary. To remind the reader, the continuum thesis, beginning from the 
evolutionary assumption that imagery capacities developed from simpler 
perceptual capacities, states that perception and imagery share some of the same 
 
 
140 Another way of interpreting Gibson here is to view imagery (or memory) as emerging from the 
re-enactment of the kinds of activities which were carried out when a perceiver was actually 
coupled to invariant information in the absence of such information (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2018). 
The account developed in this paper goes further than this analysis, linking re-enactment to 
feedback provided by coupling with variant information. 
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underlying processing. Is there a reason to believe that variant coupling names a 
kind of processing that is a shared feature of perception and the imagery involved 
in CMIG? And if so, is variant coupling a more general feature of both online and 
offline cognitive phenomena?  
 
In response to the first question, the analysis of CMIG provided above suggests 
that endorsing the ecological claim that both variant and invariant information pick-
up is involved in perception gives reason to think that weak coupling is involved in 
both perception and CMIG. In response to the latter, more general question, the 
claim that weak coupling is involved in all offline phenomena may certainly be 
challenged. The onus, however, falls on one who denies that there are stimulus-
insensitive processes to demonstrate––pace our intuitions––that all offline 
cognitive phenomena are coupled to variant information. Any argument in favour 
or against stimulus-insensitive phenomena would take us too far afield, given the 
aim and limited scope of this paper. However, in assuming that some cognitive 
phenomena are stimulus-insensitive the following sketch of an offline/online 
taxonomy that does justice to CMIG begins to take shape. (see Figure 12 and 
Table 2). 





Coupling in CMIG: assuming that there are offline cognitive phenomena that are stimulus-
insensitive (i.e., imagery, the generation and maintenance of which is immune to 
environmental stimulus encountered and thus do not elicit adaptive control responses), 
stimulus-sensitive and stimulus-insensitive are both ways of being stimulus-absent (offline) 
cognition. A stimulus-sensitive process is distinguished from stimulus-insensitive process in 
that it is both decoupled from invariant information but coupled to variant information, whereas 
a stimulus-insensitive process is decoupled from both invariant information and decoupled 
from variant information. Stimulus-based perception is coupled to invariant information, 
however, like stimulus-sensitive imagery, involves also variant coupling. CMIG is a stimulus-
absent process of the stimulus-sensitive type (i.e., invariant decoupling and variant coupling) 
which occurs concurrently with stimulus-based perception. This allows for variant information 
that is generated in stimulus-based perception to act as a feedback in stimulus absent imagery 






In CMIG, mental images are decoupled from invariant information yet remain 
coupled to variant information in the environment. In contrast, online perception 
involves both invariant and variant coupling. Importantly, being stimulus-sensitive 
(or possibly stimulus-insensitive) is a way of being stimulus-absent. In other words, 
stimulus-sensitivity is a determinate of determinable stimulus-absent. On the other 
hand, there is no further determinate of stimulus-based cognition.        
 
 
                                         
Table 2: Implication relations. Stimulus-based implies being both variant and invariant 
coupling. Stimulus-sensitive implies variant coupling and invariant decoupling, and granting 
the possibility of stimulus-insensitive phenomena, stimulus-insensitivity implies being variant 
decoupling and invariant decoupling. Since stimulus-based has no determinate, there is 
nothing that is implied by being both decoupled to variant information and coupled to invariant 








Both the proposed action-based account of CMIG and the taxonomical sketch on 
offer here may only do the work that I suggest that they may in fact do if the one is 
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willing to concede that coupling is not restricted to the strong variety involving 
Gibsonian invariant information. However, the fact that variant information has 
been previously given a valid place within ecological analysis should make the 
notion of variant coupling more attractive to any theorist who is already 
sympathetic to the ecological framework. If the argument that I have presented 
above is correct, CMIG is both stimulus-absent and stimulus-sensitive: the imagery 
in CMIG is decoupled from the sampled invariant structure and yet remains 
coupled to the range of flowing variant information that enables the behavioural 
responses for maintenance of a perspective on that which was sampled. As such, 
the internal dynamics during CMIG are not detached from the environment but 
subtly coupled to it as the environment provides the feedback required for a 
stimulus-absent perspective.  
 
CMIG is an interesting phenomenon because it calls into question the view that all 
mental imagery is an offline and decoupled process. The kind of variant coupling 
that I have suggested underwrites CMIG is a natural extension of the ecological 
construct of environmental information. This deployment of the ecological 
framework to the analysis of CMIG has been shown to yield a novel taxonomy of 
online/offline cognition which goes beyond stimulus-presence and stimulus-
absence. In virtue of the place this taxonomy allows stimulus sensitivity, it is able 
to do justice to CMIG’s status as an offline and coupled phenomenon. Despite any 
hard to shake reluctance that one may have in accepting the accuracy of this 
taxonomic sketch, it may be nonetheless reasonably concluded from the case 
study of CMIG provided that any online/offline distinction which fails to allow for 
stimulus sensitive cognitive processes is inadequate. CMIG demonstrates that the 
online/offline bifurcation fails to be as clear-cut as it seems.  
 
What ramifications might this analysis of CMIG and variant coupling have for the 
general project of articulating an ecologically informed enactivism. Assuming that 
some accounts of ecological enactivism attempt to account for all basic cognition 
with the notion of inner and environmental dynamical coupling (Kiverstein & 
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Rietveld, 2018; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Bruineberg et al.  2016,2018), one 
reason that the ecologically informed enactivist might be moved to adopt the notion 
of variant coupling is the following thought: even in those cases in which cognizers 
fail to be coupled to invariant information in their environment, they may be thought 
to be continuously––to varying degrees––coupled to variant information in it. For 
the purposes of sketching an online/offline taxonomy that can account for CMIG, 
it was assumed that there are stimulus-insensitive phenomena. Going against this 
assumption, it may be asked whether there is ever a situation in which a cognizer 
is completely isolated from impinging environmental stimuli?  
 
Answering this question negatively might suggest that all mental imagery could be 
stimulus-sensitive to varying degrees. This would allow the ‘eco-enactivist’ to work 
backwards from those putative cases of stimulus-absent cognition to 
considerations about the causal effect of variant environmental information upon 
various types of non-comparative mental imagery generation or offline cognition 
more generally. Whether or not all mental imagery is in fact stimulus-sensitive is 
an empirical question which conceptual analysis alone cannot decide. Even in the 
case that there are forms of offline cognition which are stimulus-insensitive, the 
concepts of stimulus-sensitivity may nonetheless provide a means for more 
carefully distinguishing those phenomena that are coupled in those distinct ways 












When attempting to understand strong continuity of life and mind, two questions 
become the focus of the investigation: what are the common organizational 
principles and properties are shared by living processes and cognitive processes?  
And how are the principles and fundamental to life enriched so as to result in 
cognitive processes? In this thesis three anticipatory cognitive frameworks have 
been deployed to investigate these questions. It was also intimated that taking up 
the strong continuity thesis from the perspective of FEF, PP, and EP would expose 
more about the explanatory scope of each of these frameworks, their relations, 
and that they may be used together to answer some puzzling questions regarding 
biological cognition. The remainder of this thesis will make explicit what was 
gleaned from each framework (independently and/or jointly) concerning possible 




The Free Energy Framework and Strong Continuity 
 
 
In chapter 1, it was argued that FEF may be seen as a kind of biogenic framework 
which starts by viewing cognition as a biological process that is grounded in free-
energy minimization. Free-energy minimization allows a living system to actively 
provide evidence for itself as a model of the kind of environment that it should 
encounter, bringing about the very bodily and environmental conditions required 
for it to remain alive. Thus, at the heart of FEF lies an imperative that bridges life 
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and cognition; the free energy principle states that any thermodynamically open 
system that appears to resist the tendency of entropic decay is one that minimizes 
variational free energy. The free energy principle, which was put into use in 
chapters 2 and 3, provides a clear example of the kind of fundamental 
organizational principle that the strong continuity thesis posits as common to life 
and mind.  
 
We saw however in chapter 3 that free-energy minimization in biological systems, 
although necessary for biological cognition, is not sufficient for cognition. Adaptive 
active inference as opposed to mere active inference is required (Kirchhoff & 
Kiverstein 2019a, 2019b). That is, being a cognizer demands that a living system 
engage in a high degree of autonomous free-energy minimization; it must be the 
primary source of its self-evidencing processes (i.e., active inference and 
perceptual inference). This constraint on cognition, besides enabling FEF to avoid 
the charge of being overly permissive that Adams (2018) foists against biogenic 
approaches (chapter 1), suggests one way in which to answer the enrichment 
question posed above: living processes rise to the status of cognitive processes 
when living Markov-blanketed systems have the capacity for a high degree of 
autonomous self-evidencing. The proposed kind of enrichment, it was argued in 
chapter 3, allows us to answer the following question: why are mitochondria not 
cognizers despite their being free- energy minimizing living systems? The answer 
we saw was that the free-energy minimization that a mitochondrion engages in is 
too dependent upon the activities of the larger cellular matrix within which it is 




141 Interestingly, mitochondria may have been at one point in their history––prior to their being 
endosymbionts––autonomous enough to qualify as minimal cognizers. I conjecture that if the picture of 
complexity matching is correct, it may have been the decrease in environmental uncertainty for 
mitochondria brought about by their entering to the mitochondrion-cell symbiotic association that resulted 
in a decrease in their autonomy. This is an instance in which traits underwriting cognition may have been 
gradually selected against. 
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Moreover, taking this approach to enrichment provides the FEF theorist with a 
principled manner of identifying biological cognizers that may not fit with our 
intuitive folk-psychological conceptions of what cognizers are. This itself has 
consequences for understanding possible ways in which complex cognitive 
mechanisms have evolved from those of lesser complexity. A case was made for 
the notion of a symbiotic mind based upon the idea that some symbiotic 
associations (e.g., Vibrio-squid symbiosis) engage in autonomous self-evidencing 
at the level of the symbiotic unit. This kind of striking result is important because it 
offers cognitive scientists and biologists one manner of understanding a possible 
transition in cognition: from multi-organismal cooperative action to the purposive 
intelligent behaviour of a multicellular individual. FEF, by providing both a common 
organizational principle of life and mind (i.e., the free-energy principle) and an 
answer as to how living processes have been enriched so as to result in cognitive 
processes (i.e., a high degree of autonomous self-evidencing) not only sheds light 
upon the strong life-mind continuity thesis, but in doing so provides a some helpful 




Predictive Processing and Strong Continuity   
 
 
Throughout this thesis action-oriented PP (Clark, 2016a) has been deployed. This 
variant of PP emphasizes that the prediction driven dynamics core to PP are not 
aimed at constructing accurate generative models or ‘true’ predictions but at 
providing agents with a satisficing means to adaptively respond to the changing 
dynamics of the environment. As such, the link between life and mind implicit in 
PP is that cognition is fundamentally in the service of guiding world engaging 
adaptive behaviour; something itself which may be interpreted as an expression of 
the environmental complexity thesis (ECT) that was introduced in chapter 0.  
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What does PP suggest regarding common underlying organizational principles of 
life and mind? We saw in chapter 2 that PP may be subsumed under FEF. Given 
that prediction error, under simplifying mathematical assumptions, is equivalent to 
the quantity of free energy, minimizing free-energy is the same as minimizing 
prediction error. When nesting PP in FEF, the free-energy principle maintains its 
status as a common organizational principle of life and mind. This being said, even 
when viewing PP as nested within FEF, it should be remembered that free-energy 
minimization (and hence prediction error minimization) is not sufficient for cognition 
but something else is required: autonomous self-evidencing. Living systems 
become more enriched so as to become cognitive systems with an increased 
ability to actively regulate their own sensory and behavioural traffic with their 
environments (i.e., adaptive active inference), providing sensory evidence for the 
generative models they instantiate.  
 
Similarly, prediction error minimization may occur in PP in various domains that 
are determined by the nature of the predictions (i.e., exteroceptive predictions, 
proprioceptive predictions and interoceptive predictions). Interceptive prediction 
errors, like exteroceptive and proprioceptive errors, may be resolved by active 
inference which enlists autonomic reflexes and some biochemical processes (as 
opposed to engaging the motor system or motor reflexes (Seth & Friston 2016). 
Although this process of altering physiological variables in order to return to 
homeostatic equilibrium reduces interoceptive prediction error, minimizing 
prediction error in this manner does not by itself qualify as cognition according to 
PP (neither in FEF nested PP nor in PP as a standalone framework). Why? 
Although reducing interoceptive prediction error is often interwoven with reduction 
of exteroceptive and/or proprioceptive prediction error reduction, these reflex 
driven autonomic system responses are too hardwired and inflexible to qualify as 
cognitively driven intelligent behaviour. In other words, interoceptive prediction 
error minimization by itself fails to involve what in chapter 1 was called “weak 
intentionality” (i.e., phenotype-relative “aboutness” of internal dynamics directed at 
target objects/gradients that causally underpin adaptive behaviour). Interoceptive 
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prediction error minimization by itself is a kind of closed loop feedback control that 
allows for the maintenance of homeostasis via local autonomic response. As we 
saw in chapter 1, weak intentionality requires more than this. It demands the 
enlisting of sensorimotor and/or biochemical behaviour strategies––along the lines 
of allostatic control––that by investing homeostatic resources now enable the 
organism to maintain its long-term homeostasis and hence provide sensory self-
evidence for its own existence. Such evidence is by its very nature meaningful 
(e.g., unlike for a human, garnering sensory evidence of being submerged in water 
over a long period of time for a fish means ‘I will exist’) and such strategies are 
imbued with weak intentionality.  
 
What does PP offer that FEF does not in terms of telling us about the strong 
continuity of life and mind? Since PP places structural constraints on the kinds of 
mechanisms that it views as central to cognition, it offers a principled manner of 
understanding how such mechanisms may be structurally implemented and how 
certain mechanisms that serve more complex functions (e.g., attention, context 
sensitive behaviour, etc.) may require increased structural complexity. As it was 
shown in chapter 2, although PP is typically applied to humans (or more generally 
animals with neuronal substrates), this need not be the case. In arguing for the 
plant predictive processing hypothesis (Calvo & Friston, 2017), we saw in chapter 
2 that a slew of evidence has been gleaned in support of the claim that plants 
engage in anticipatory and purposive perception-action. In light of the kind of 
enrichment property that this thesis has uncovered, we may now understand this 
claim in terms of adaptive active inference: plants autonomously harvest evidence 
for their own existence by purposively interacting with their environments so as to 
bring about the conditions in which they can continue to survive and thrive. 
 
To this, and relevant to the question of enrichment, we saw that plants have PP 
compatible electrophysiological profiles and a physical structure that could 
implement hierarchical bidirectional message passing. Possessing a physical 
organization that could allow for hierarchical bidirectional message passing is a 
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structural constraint on PP agents (and hence on cognitive processes). As it was 
argued in chapter 2, pace traditional PP accounts, this structural constraint can be 
satisfied in non-neuronal systems. However, to advance beyond the kind of 
minimal perceptual capacities (i.e., perception of global chemical concentration 
gradient increases and/or decreases and their affordances) that plants and 
perhaps other non-neuronal living systems possess to maximal perceptual 
capacities (i.e., the perception of objects and their affordances) may require a kind 
of physical structure on the part of the predictive agent that supports predictions 
(and models) with an increased temporal depth. Nervous systems seem to be one 
likely candidate for such a structure. This thesis suggests the following: living 
processes are enriched so as to support cognitive processes both in terms of (a) 
an increased degree of autonomy and (b) an increased structural complexity that 
allows for generative models with more and more temporal depth to take root. The 
structural constraints that PP places upon the kinds of cognitive architectures that 
can get into the hierarchical bidirectional message passing game sheds light upon 
the kind of enrichment of living processes expressed by (b). Put into the 
terminology introduced in chapter 1, moving from weak intentionality to strong 
intentionality across the continuum of intentionality involves (at least) possessing 
physical structures and organization that can implement the kind of integrated and 
fast message passing that temporally deep models require. As living processes 
are further structurally enriched, cognitive processes allow for anticipation of action 
outcomes further into the future based upon ontogenetically learnt evidence that 
reaches further into past experience.  
 
One such sophisticated cognitive capacity that the kind of enriched structure of 
human nervous systems allows was given treatment in chapter 4. We saw that 
perception of affordances is modulated by historical context. Historical context 
sensitivity (HCS) may be elegantly accounted for within the PP framework with the 
mechanism of precision weighting. However, the form of precision weighting 
constitutive of working memory in HCS may come apart from the other forms of 
precision weighting and core mechanisms of PP. For example, the kind of PP that 
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occurs in non-neuronal organisms might involve precision weighting (i.e., 
decreased precision on proprioceptive error that allows for behaviour to take 
place), but because their physical structure places limits upon connectivity, 
integration, or other factors, the kind of precision weighting that results in HCS (i.e., 
precision as product of working memory) does not arise.  
 
HCS seems to demand a shift towards the use of updated prior ‘beliefs’ to drive 
behavioural response. That this shift can occur in response to varying contexts not 
only presupposes that certain mechanisms are in place but that responding to 
certain contexts is something that is adaptive for the agent. It stands to reason 
then that the limits of direct perception are important for a framework such as 
action-oriented PP because such limits may very well demarcate where distinct 
(yet interacting) kinds of mechanisms and processes get a foothold relative to the 
kinds of increasingly complex niches that predictive agents have evolved with. As 
suggested in chapter 4, the capacity to use precision weighting to increase the 
impact of priors on object perception over time may very well represent a kind of 
cognitive transition marker separating biological systems with and without working 
memory.142 This transition marker  defines a difference in the degree and manner 
in which environmental information is used relative to the degree and manner in 
which precision weighted prior ‘belief’ drives adaptive behaviour.  
 
 
To sum up: whether nested within FEF or used alone, action-oriented PP suggests 
a form of structural enrichment that living processes must have in order to qualify 
as cognitive processes. That is, if a living system fails to have the kind of physical 
structure that would at least allow it to instantiate a two layer generative model 
(i.e., a hierarchical organization allowing the passing of at least a top-down 
prediction signal and a bottom up sensory/ error signal) it would fail to be the kind 
 
 
142 Just how the capacity to use precision weighting this way is related to the kind of “unlimited associative 
learning” that Ginsburg & Jablonka (2019) identify as a transition marker for minimal conscious systems is 
an interesting question that I hope to pursue in future research.  
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of system that could in theory be a cognitive system. This, however, is not to 
suggest that there are living systems which indeed fail to have such a structure. 
When PP is subsumed within FEF, the fact that all living cognitive systems must 
obey the free energy principle suggests not only that they minimize prediction error 
but that they do so by way of instantiated hierarchical generative models that elicit 
the kind of bidirectional message passing that is core to PP. If this is the case, PP’s 
structural constraint provides a kind of distance measure: by being subject to 
further structural enrichment over evolutionary timescales, living systems which 
are already hierarchically structured develop the ability to engage with temporally 
distal future events conditioned upon both current and past sensory evidence; this 
is a movement from weak intentionality to a form of strong(er) intentionality. 
 
Such a structural distance measure does not conflict with plant predictive 
processing (or bacterium predictive processing for that matter!) but rather places 
it in a larger ecological context since the capacity to predict the outcomes of their 
current behaviour over temporally slow timescales (e.g., weeks, months, and 
years) is not something that is required of plants (or simpler organisms) for them 
to cope with the kinds of environmental complexity that they tend to encounter in 
their eco-niches; the physical structure of plants and simple organisms is complex 
enough to harness the statistical structure that they must anticipate and respond 
to at the faster timescales which they occupy. More complexity in a niche drives 
further complexity (structurally and/or functionally) in the organism which may 
result in further alteration of the niche, making it even more complex over time. PP, 
by emphasizing hierarchical structure and the connection that such structure has 
to temporally thick predictions and deep models, offers the strong life-mind 
continuity thesis a description of one manner in which the enrichment of already 
complex living and cognizing systems become further adapted to increasingly 
complex environments. PP offers a computational manner of understanding what 
throughout the current thesis has been called “complexity matching”.  This brings 
us to the third framework which this thesis has deployed in order to glean insights 





Ecological Psychology and Strong Continuity 
 
 
In this thesis ecology psychology (EP) has played a principal role in providing a 
selection of conceptual tools (i.e., affordances, environmental information 
exploitation, perceptual medium and organism-environment mutuality) that have 
been deployed in accounting for various cognitive phenomena. As originally 
proposed by Gibson (1966, 1979), this ecological toolkit has been used to account 
for active perception in a manner that avoided recourse to top-down processing 
and modulation by memory states (chapter 4). In this thesis, rather than being 
constrained by EP’s notion of direct perception, the concepts of affordances, 
environmental information exploitation, and organism-environment mutuality have 
been adopted for use from within the frameworks of FEF and PP in an effort to 
identify and understand different kinds of frugal cognitive strategies and 
mechanisms that might underpin the adaptive behaviour of simple and non-
neuronal organisms, strategies and mechanisms which have been conserved in 
complex neuronal organisms.143 Affordances and ecological information pick-up 
provide a manner of thinking about the ‘bare bones’ basis for anticipatory cognitive 
processes from which more elaborate cognitive mechanisms and prediction driven 




143 The idea having been that the theoretical apparatus that direct accounts of perception deploy 
may be used external to the theory of direct perception; a framework which uses the notion of 
environmental information exploitation in the analysis of certain psychological phenomena need 
not itself be committed to the rejection of inferences or memory states as constituent parts of 
perceptual processes. For this reason, although a direct perception theory like EP cannot be 
expanded by the mechanisms of PP, PP can be expanded by the theoretical apparatus 
underwriting ecological direct perception 
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One thing that is presupposed in deploying ecological conceptual apparatus is that 
perception (and cognition more generally) is an environmentally coupled 
sensorimotor activity that involves extracting information for perception (and 
action) from the environment. This kind of coupling, we saw in chapter 5, can 
possibly go further than accounting for online perception, providing a plausible 
manner of explicating some kinds of mental imagery generation. With this in mind, 
one way of answering the question as to how the properties and principles 
constitutive of living processes have been enriched so as to result in cognitive 
processes may be brought out by considering the place of sensorimotor behaviour 
as a condition for cognitive processes. Taking a broad conception of sensorimotor 
behaviour that is (minimally) driven by weak intentionality (chapter 1) and includes 
not only motor control but directed growth that occurs in plants (chapter 2) and 
some controlled biochemical responses (chapter 1 and chapter 3), one might 
argue as follows: assume that the capacity to engage in sensorimotor behaviour 
is essential for EP’s conceptual apparatus to be deployed in cognitive explanation, 
and that not all living systems have the capacity to engage in sensorimotor 
behaviour; if EP’s apparatus feature into the best explanation of some minimal 
(i.e., basic) forms of cognition which happen to be the basis for all non-basic forms 
of cognition, then sensorimotor behaviour would seem to be a requirement for both 
basic and non-basic cognition.  
 
Sensorimotor behaviour follows from the kind of weak intentionality that in chapter 
1 was argued is sufficient for cognition. If there are in fact organisms which fail the 
capacity for weak intentionality driven sensorimotor behaviour (so broadly 
conceived), then these are the kinds of organisms which would lack cognition 
despite their being able to minimize free-energy and keep themselves alive via 
interoceptive predictions and homeostatic regulation.144 For example, simple 
 
 
144 How would controlled biochemical processes qualify here as adaptive free-energy minimizing 
behaviour rather than reduction of interoceptive prediction error? Consider the hypothetical case 
of a particular snake that could volitionally make its venom more or less potent depending upon 
how large or small it perceives its prey to be. This is a controlled biochemical process that I think 
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organisms which fail the capacity to use current environmental sensory cues to 
anticipatorily guide metabolically expensive behaviour in order to avoid 
irrecoverable deviation from homeostatic norms may be one example of organisms 
that lack sensorimotor behavioural capacities; such simple organisms would 
largely be slaves to the dynamics of their homogeneous milieus. Short-term 
physiological and/or reflex-like recovery from environmentally caused homeostatic 
deviation would be the extent of their activity.  
 
When locating sensorimotor behaviour within the context of affordance perception, 
it becomes evident that one manner in which life may have been enriched so as to 
support cognition is by the addition of sensorimotor mechanisms and processes 
that allow living systems to purposively move around to actively reveal affordances 
in the array. In chapter 2 we saw that plant predictive processing gives us reason 
to believe that plants, like neuronal organisms, anticipatorily perceive and 
adaptively behave in ways that keep them far from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
Importantly, if the account of minimal-perception that was introduced in chapter 2 
is correct, plants (and possibly other non-neuronal organisms) in detecting the 
invariant structure of chemical concentration gradients within their perceptual 
medium, anticipatorily perceive constancies. Relative to the plants as perceivers, 
these constancies are none other than affordances (e.g., a nitrate gradient 
increase affords sustenance). If follows from the fact that affordances are relational 
properties (i.e., they are properties of the environment relative to the perceiving-
acting organism), and because they are construed in EP as the primary things 
perceived, that perception-action is fundamentally in the game of serving an 
organism’s adaptive response to its environment given its needs. That is, the very 
notion of affordances suggests that cognition has the function to keep organisms 
appropriately coping with (i.e., staying alive in) their niche, thus reiterating the 
environmental complexity thesis (ECT).  
 
 
has all the makings of a purposeful behaviour despite the fact that it does not involve the snake’s 
initiating a motor control that changes its sensorily observable relation to the environment. 
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Staying alive––at a certain level of organismic complexity––from an ecological 
perspective may roughly be conceived as perceiving and exploiting those 
affordances that would allow a living system to continue perceiving and exploiting 
affordances in its niche. Staying alive in more complex environments––and at a 
higher level of organismic complexity––may require not only perceiving 
affordances but creating them, thus sculpting the very environment that one is 
adaptively responding to. Affordances whether available or created are future-
oriented relations. They provide a concrete manner of understanding how 
anticipatory life has become enriched to arrive at anticipatory cognition: while not 
all living systems may have the capacity to perceive affordances and engage in 
the sensorimotor behaviour required to actualize them, this thesis has provided 
some reasons to believe that all systems that are bio-cognizers possess this 
capacity. Biological cognitive systems are those that have (amongst other things) 
become tuned to the abundance of rich environmental information available for 
perception-action, reflecting the ongoing organism-environment mutuality that is 






Returning to active adaptation  
 
 
We started this thesis with a few initial characterizations of life and cognition. It 
was suggested that both life and mind might share a common characteristic of 
serving the active adaptation of the living system to the complexity of the 
environment. That is, it was suggested that both life and cognition are 
endogenously driven processes in virtue of which biological systems tend to 
preserve their organization by adapting to encountered environmental fluctuations. 
In using FEF, PP and EP to explore the various forms that cognition takes along 
the continuum of intentionality and given what has been proposed about how 
cognition arises out of free-energy minimization (prediction error minimization) that 
is enriched through increased autonomous self-evidencing, the chapters of this 
thesis have gone a long way in supporting this initial suggestion. For instance, 
recall that weak intentionality is essentially a normative property of living systems, 
such that any system’s behaviour that is guided by weak intentionality is measured 
against states of the world (and states of the organism) that ‘should’ be observed 
given the kind of organism that the living system is (i.e., its phenotype). This kind 
of normativity is something that is endogenous to the system in question, arising 
from the processes and mechanisms that underwrite the system’s microscale 
(physiological-level) activity and which are constrained by the system’s 
macroscale (psychological-level) behaviour. As such, weak intentionality is a 
description of the active and endogenously driven aspects of living processes that 
span biological and psychological domains, and which help to solidify active 
adaptation as a common property of life and mind.  
 
We are now, however, in a position to sharpen and enrich this notion of active 
adaptation given what we have gleaned from investigating strong continuity from 
the perspectives of FEF, PP and EP.  
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When using FEF, PP and aspects of EP jointly, the following may be concluded: 
the free energy principle is a common organizational principle that underlies both 
life and mind that allows organisms to deal with environmental complexity. 
Moreover FEF, PP, and EP as combined in this thesis reveal at least four manners 
in which life has been enriched to arrive at cognition. These are: 
 
E1. An increase in the degree of autonomous self-evidencing  
E2. An increase in temporal depth of model/ predictions 
E3. The introduction of the capacity for sensorimotor behaviour 









One common characteristic of PP, FEF and EP which was a central motivation for 
choosing these frameworks to investigate strong life mind continuity was the fact 
that they all view cognition as an anticipatory process. Anticipation in FEF and PP 
underpins the very expectation-driven processes that are constitutive of adaptive 
active inference. While in EP, the place of anticipation in cognition (active 
perception) is intrinsic to the notion of affordances. 
 
E2, I would like to suggest, is key to understanding how increased hierarchical 
complexity of generative models and predictions in PP and FEF results in 
increased anticipatory capacities. As such the latter kind of increase may be seen 
as a functional description of E2. Temporal-depth (sometimes referred to as 
temporal thickness) of a model is generally seen as the capacity for generating 
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long timescale predictions of the kind of sensory feedback that would arise were a 
protracted sequence of actions initiated to bring spatially (or temporally) distal 
environmental objects into the purview of immediate action (Kiebel, Daunizeau & 
Friston, 2008). Assuming that temporal depth is a universal feature of generative 
models in biological self-maintaining systems (Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston & 
Kiverstein, 2018), models may vary both in degrees of depth deployed from 
problem space to problem space and degrees of depth available from organism to 
organism; not every hierarchical level of a generative model must be deployed in 
order to resolve prediction error in every problem space across the board. 
Similarly, not every environmental niche demands the same degree of future 
oriented deep-model driven behaviour; a little temporal depth in less complex 
environments may go a long way! As anticipatory capacities increase along with 
the temporal depth of models, the capacity to reduce variational free-energy is 
augmented with the capacity to minimize expected free energy (i.e., the free-
energy that arises from the disparity between preferred sensory outcomes of action 
and the actual sensory outcomes of actions). 
 
It is when attempting to answer the question “what are the conditions under which 
the lower end of the model-depth spectrum are deployed?” that the distinction 
between the environmental medium and the environmental layout (i.e., structure) 
beyond the medium becomes suggestive of an interesting and useful partition: 
deep functioning levels are those at which generative models function to predict 
the sensory feedback that would occur were actions upon the structure beyond the 
medium initiated; shallow functioning levels are those at which generative models 
function to predict the kind of sensory feedback that would occur were actions upon 
(or with respect to) the perceptual medium initiated. This partition is captures two 
distinct, yet causally interacting, environmental realms that generative models of 
varying depth allow error minimizing interaction with: the environmental layout 
beyond the medium (i.e., objects with certain degree of permanence such as 
mugs, hills, people, etc.), and higher-order invariant structures in the perceptual 
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medium (e.g., chemical gradients, mechanical gradients, etc.).145 This model-
depth distinction may be also recast in terms of the minimal vs ‘maximal’ 
perception distinction that was proposed in chapter 2. Models functioning at the 
deep level distil environmental information for the perception of affordances that 
the environmental layout offers. Models functioning at the shallow level, on the 
other hand, distil environmental information for the perception of affordances that 
the higher-order structure of the medium itself offers. One example of this latter 
kind of affordance is an increasing hydrogen sulfide gradient. Smelling the 
increasing gas gradient itself is sufficient for guiding behaviour away from the 
direction of further increase in concentration. An agent, in such a case, is not 
avoiding the source per se, but avoiding the increasing level of putrid gas in the air 
medium.  
 
To be sure, generative models may function (often simultaneously) at both levels. 
What determines the degree to which a model functions at the shallow or deep 
level is the nature of source of possible prediction error that must be minimized. 
As the source of possible prediction error grows in complexity, so does the need 
for models to function at deep levels. Thus, one manner in which living processes 
have been enriched, as suggested by E2 above, may be unpacked in terms of 
increased anticipatory processes, which itself when using FEF or an FEF nested 
PP suggests the kind of relationships between environmental complexity and 







145 Although, in this exposition I have focused on the external milieu, the environmental realms 
which the partition exposes may be equally understood in terms of the inner environments. With 
respect to interoception, the more permanent environmental realm is that of expected bodily 
states as defined by an organism’s phenotype (i.e., a temperature of approximately 37.0 degrees 
for a human). One example of an inner medium in such cases may be blood which carries 






Relations between environment and model: In the environment there are two distinct 
realms labelled medium environment and environmental layout. These lay along a dimension 
of increasing complexity. On the agent side of the divide, the model is partitioned in to two 
distinct levels corresponding to the two environmental realms. The shallow functioning level 
and deep functioning levels respectively lay along a dimension of increasing model depth. The 
distinction between the shallow and deep functioning levels of the model are fuzzy, shading 




The manner of temporal-depth specification on offer, by serving to emphasize that 
environmental information exploitation does not play a fixed and inflexible role in 
affordance perception, may be used to provide a methodologically useful way of 
partitioning the space of explanatory strategies that philosophers and cognitive 
scientists should use. Just how much cognitive load the environment bears in 
guiding context-sensitive intelligent behaviour depends upon a combination of the 
agent’s skills and the complexity of the (global) environment perceived. With 
variation in temporal-depth of generative models across organismic complexity 
comes variation in free-energy minimizing strategies. As we have seen in chapter 
4, common to all these strategies is the possibility for a PP agent to exploit 
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information in the environment. For simple organisms (e.g., bacteria) and some 
plants, the survival of which might require only responding to the dynamics of their 
perceptual medium and nothing beyond it, exploiting information in the medium by 
deploying shallow functioning models need be the only satisfying option. For more 
complex organisms like us, although we may exploit models for minimal-perception 
when faced with certain undemanding tasks, in other contexts the kind of 
decoupled modulation of present experience by past experience that historical 
context sensitivity (HCS) describes may make the difference between reducible 







Located at the intersection of philosophy of biology and cognitive science, this 
thesis has aimed to expose some of the general mechanisms, principles and 
properties underwriting cognition at various levels of organismic complexity. Using 
the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing and some of the conceptual 
apparatus from ecological psychology in providing various perspectives from 
which to investigate strong life-mind continuity, over the course of the preceding 
chapters I have argued for a biogenically grounded manner of identifying and 
accounting for a wide range of intelligent adaptive behaviour in biological systems, 
spanning from that of minimal cognition in plants, to cognition in symbiotic 
associations, and finally to historically context sensitive cognition in humans. A few 
of the perplexing questions that have been addressed along the way to 
understanding how the properties and principles underwriting life have been 
enriched to as to arrive at cognitive processes have been “what are the explanatory 
limits of the ecological direct theory of perception?”; “How might bidirectional 
message passing be implemented in non-neuronal distributed minimal cognitive 
systems?”; “What is the relationship between metabolism and cognition?”; “What 
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more is required of a biological system that engages in the minimization of free-
energy to qualify as a biological cognizer?”  
 
Life and mind are puzzling processes. Methodologically, the strong life-mind 
continuity thesis suggests that understanding either life or mind requires 
understanding the relationship between life and mind. This relationship will 
continue to be a central topic in the philosophy of cognitive science. One of the 
things which this thesis has shown in drawing from resources across disciplines is 
that any successful attempt at understanding the relationship between life and 
mind may very well require an expansive interdisciplinary effort between (not 
exclusively) philosophers, cognitive scientists, biologists, physicists, computer 
scientists, and system-theoretic scientists. The success of any such project has 
immediate impact not only upon how we view ourselves and our evolving 
relationship to the living world we are embedded in, but also how we go about 
recognizing the subtle and often extraordinary variations in the forms in which 
cognitive processes express themselves. It is only by being able systematically 
develop empirically grounded concepts to recognize these different forms and 
discover their possible common properties, mechanisms, and principles that we 
allow ourselves the opportunity to appreciate just how varied both life and mind 
can be. 
 
The future of life-mind continuity research is promising and yet will remain an 
ongoing challenge given the difficult nature of the subject matter and the 
interdisciplinary demands which are placed upon its progress. That being said, I 
hope that I have shown that at least some progress can be made when jointly 
deploying the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing, and ecological 
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